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PATRIOTS IN THE MAKING

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WHAT AMERICA CAN LEARN FROM FRANCE AND GERMANY

BY

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WITH AN INTRODUCTION
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TO MY FATHER

AUSTIN SCOTT

THIS BOOK IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED

FOREWORD

This book was not begun with the idea of teaching a lesson, but rather with the object of showing something of the relationship that has long existed in France and Germany between the school and the national consciousness. In both these countries education has long been used as a political instrument. Prussia perceived its possibilities after the battle of Jena; France realized its value after Sedan. Both nations have employed the school to mold the mind of rising generations to a preconceived type of patriotism. The significance of the psychology thus formed is revealing itself in the present war.

The experience of these countries ought not to be disregarded by the United States. After her crushing defeat in the Franco-German War, France saw clearly the danger of a blind, boastful patriotism founded on ignorance of national conditions. This sort of patriotism led to over-confidence, unreadiness, chauvinism and disaster. Hence France founded the preparedness movement, which she undertook after the war, on an intelligent, critical patriotism, carefully developed through education. Only thus did it seem possible to make adequate preparedness permanent. The lesson of this should not be lost on Americans.

On the other hand it must be admitted that there has been a tendency, both in the French and German schools, to magnify nationalism and to develop antagonism toward other countries. True, the influence of this has been partly offset, in France at least, by certain humanitarian teachings which found their way into the schools during the last quarter-century; but the tendency to an intensification of the principle of nationality remained predominant. Our own schools have not been free from instruction of this sort; but it behooves us in future to avoid such teachings. To draw the line between an education that makes for proper patriotism and one that makes for narrow nationalism may not be easy, but it can be done if careful attention is given to the problem. True Americanism should pave the way through education to that mutual understanding among the nations which alone can form the basis of permanent peace.

I am happy to acknowledge the assistance which I have received from many persons in the preparation of this work. To the Hon. Myron T. Herrick, who has kindly consented to write the introduction, I am most grateful. I am also greatly indebted to Professor Paul Monroe, of Teachers' College, who has helped me with advice and criticism; to Professor Herbert A. Kenyon, of the University of Michigan, who has generously gone over all the manuscript with me; to Professor W. A. McLaughlin, of the same institution; to Professors Davis and Billetdoux, of Rutgers College, and to Mrs. W. H. Wait, of Ann Arbor, who have given me valuable suggestions.

I owe much also to various members of my family, especially to my father, who has helped me particularly in the preparation of the chapter on the teaching of patriotism in Germany. To him this little book is gratefully dedicated.

JONATHAN F. SCOTT

Ann Arbor, Michigan

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INTRODUCTION

NOTWITHSTANDING that more than two years of the most terrible war in all history have passed, the American imagination as yet has failed to grasp the full lesson of the tragedy. To the average American, Europe is like a stage on which is being played a horrifying melodrama that will presently come to some happy end. That he may himself ever become an actor on such a stage, rather than a mere spectator, he finds it difficult to conceive. The old unseeing faith in our national isolation still affects his thinking.

That isolation is no longer so complete or secure as once it was. By the extension of our possessions to new contacts with other powers, by advance in methods of communication, and the growth of new commercial and political relations, we have passed from the period of our exclusiveness to full membership in the concert of world powers.

But, while our national position has changed, our national mechanism has not been altered to conform to the new conditions. Even in the midst of a world at war, with the certainty of resulting change as the one certain thing in view, we are clinging obstinately to old method, old tradition, trusting to some lucky opportunism, rather than trying to determine our own future and preparing to meet in full readiness

the issues that are still obscure. As a nation we seem to be groping aimlessly in the dark, rather than courageously attempting to find the light.

The course that the United States has followed in these eventful years has not added to the security of its position in international society; there is reason to doubt whether we have now a single friend among the nations of Europe, and it is evident that we have lost favor with at least one of our neighbors in the western hemisphere. We have to realize that as a nation we are standing alone at a time when the balance of the world has been upset and the whole future made obscure. Few, indeed, want to see our country involved in the struggle that is destroying civilization abroad, but it is not hard to comprehend the difficulty and danger of keeping an even course in these days of perplexity and doubt.

That the defects of the national structure have not gone unnoticed is evidenced in the spontaneous and general movement for "preparedness." Growing out of the sudden realization that our army and navy are quite inadequate, under modern methods of warfare, to protect the country against aggression, and inspired by the thought that a nation which is worth having is worth protecting, this movement has developed into a serious effort to coördinate all sources of American strength—economic, social, political—and to apply them to the promotion of American interests everywhere and the advancement of mankind. The United States has advantages in natural resources, in situation, above all in character of population, that entitle her to a prominent place in the world.

We have all the parts of a great national mechanism; to assemble those parts, to fire the living mechanism with the high ideals of its founders, is the grand object of true preparedness.

If long years of peace and prosperity have made us somewhat forgetful of the duties we owe to the country that has made us prosperous, if differences of race and language have obscured for a while our common Americanism, it is time now to sink our selfishness and join our hearts and our energies for the common service of the nation. A democracy like ours is powerless except as it draws on the united strength of its citizens; they are both the government and the governed, to whom every question comes for final answer, on whom every burden falls.

Every boy in Europe knows, as soon as he knows anything, that he owes one certain, fixed debt—service to country. He learns that lesson in his home and in his school; it is the atmosphere in which he lives.

Here in America we have neglected the teaching of that lesson. Life has been easy and pleasant for us in this new, rich land, and in the fifty years since the Civil War settled our last great national questions we have tended to look on government as a thing remote and apart, that would go on somehow whether we gave it any attention or not. The collapse of civilization abroad has shocked us from our self-absorption, and the whole nation is stirred by a regenerative force like that which quickened the hearts of the men of '76 and of '61.

If this new spirit in American life is not to evapo-

rate in inconsequential hysteria it must be transmitted to the generation of young Americans now growing up in school and college. They should be taught, as the youth of France and Germany have learned, that in war or in peace the first duty of citizens is to country. So may our citizens of tomorrow be more ardent Americans; so may they come nearer to the realization of American ideals; so may they make of America in fullest measure that which it was established to be—the foremost exponent of popular government, a refuge for the oppressed of every race, an inspiration through all the world to those who seek liberty, justice and equality.

MYRON T. HERRICK

Cleveland, Ohio, July 31, 1916

PATRIOTS IN THE MAKING

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL SKETCH: FRENCH EDUCATION AS NATIONAL SELF-EXPRESSION

From time immemorial national ideals and purposes have found expression in education. Warlike states have inspired their youth with the glories of military achievement; peaceful countries have taught the blessings of order and calm. Religion, love of beauty, reverence for the past, the desire for material prosperity—all these forces and many others, where they have been dominant in the lives of nations, have given color to national education, as the tree lends its hue to the chameleon clinging to its branches. Thus in ambitious, courageous, brutal Sparta, lads were torn from their homes at an early age, and brought up in public barracks, there to be toughened, hardened and made ready for the emergencies of warfare. Athens, too, had to train her young men to be soldiers, but in this esthetic and pleasure-loving state it was literature, music and gymnas-

tics which helped to prepare the son of the cultured Athenian gentleman for "the rational enjoyment of leisure hours." In China, until recent years, love of order and stability made education primarily a recapitulation of the past. Every highly developed country, though not unresponsive to the general influences of civilization, has given to its system of instruction a distinctively national character.

In France education has been powerfully affected by the vicissitudes of French history. At one time it has worn the dress of a courtier, at another the garb of a monk, at another the uniform of a soldier. Political and social developments seemingly far removed from the training of children have profoundly affected their instruction. A brief survey of French education from the time of Louis XIV to the present day will serve to show how instruction has responded to the influences dominating the life of the nation.

It was the absolute monarchy of the Ancient Régime that indirectly brought about what Professor S. C. Parker has termed the "dancing-master" education. Shortly after the middle of the seventeenth century, royalty had virtually completed the process of subjugating the

aristocracy, once so powerful and independent, rivaling even the king himself in splendor. Louis XIV signalized his victory by the establishment of his brilliant court at Versailles; here he could have the greater and lesser lords under his eye, forestalling any possible insubordination, while at the same time their luster increased his own. The nobles, for their part, sought eagerly the favor of the king, finding it an honor to stand behind him at table or to hand him his nightshirt when he retired. The fighting cavaliers of ancient days had been transformed into fawning courtiers.

Thus there developed that extravagant, ceremonious, yet highly competitive court life, the pride of the Ancient Régime, destined to perish in the wrath of the Revolution. To gain the favor of the king the nobles must ingratiate themselves with the monarch or with his powerful satellites. To ingratiate themselves they must follow certain carefully prescribed forms; for the king was a stickler for etiquette and set the fashion of a rigid and elaborate ceremonial.

For a career at court, therefore, a careful training became necessary. "There was then . . ." says Taine, "a certain way of walking, of sitting down, of saluting, of picking up a

glove, of holding a fork, of tendering any article, in fine, a complete mimicry, which children had to be taught at a very early age, in order that habit might become a second nature, and this conventionality formed so important an item in the life of men and women in aristocratic circles that the actors of the present day, with all their study, are scarcely able to give us an idea of it."[1] It is easy to understand how an enfeebled aristocracy, fitted only to ornament the elaborate gardens and rococo palaces at Versailles, should come to look upon the dancing-master as the "fulcrum of education."

His teachings did not indeed comprise the sum total of instruction, nor did they reach all the children of France. Many of the people were illiterate; others looked entirely to the priests and monks for what little learning they received. Even the little aristocrats, worldly as they were, were subject to a certain amount of religious and intellectual education. But the dancing-master was conspicuous as a practical teacher. The training that he gave, use-

[1] Taine: The Ancient Régime, p. 15; *see also* Parker, S. C.: The History of Modern Elementary Education, Chap. VIII.

less as it might be to the world at large, was nevertheless of high utilitarian value to the well-born boy or girl, since it paved the way to social success, to pensions, advancement and power at court.

Such was the spirit of France under the Ancient Régime and such the education that reflected that spirit. In the early nineteenth century, however, the Ancient Régime had passed and new forces dominated the state. Disillusioned by the excesses and failures of the Revolution, France longed for the establishment of security and order at home. At the same time, intoxicated by her military successes abroad, she thirsted for further conquests. "What the French want," said the cynical but clear-sighted Napoleon, "is glory and the satisfaction of their vanity; as for Liberty, of that they have no conception." Thus the spirit of the era centered around the personality of the great conqueror, who could turn the dreams of the French people into realities. It was militaristic and imperialistic, but at the same time characterized by orderliness and constructive statesmanship in home affairs.

From this background developed the Na-

poleonic system of education. All instruction was centralized in the Imperial University, with a grand master at the head, whom Napoleon thought to control. The Emperor aimed to make himself loved and obeyed in all the schools, securing loyalty to his despotism and to his dynasty.[1] In the secondary schools known as *lycées,* discipline was at once military and monarchical.[2] The pupils were divided into companies of twenty-five, in each of which were a sergeant and four corporals. All exercises were opened with the roll of drums. Punishments were severe; even for slight offenses the boys might be imprisoned. In the primary schools the children were taught that "to honor and serve our Emperor is to honor and serve God Himself."[3] All instruction

[1] Aulard, A.: Napoléon *1*er et le Monopole Universitaire, p. 364. "Il voulait fonder son dépotisme sur les âmes, et . . . une instruction publique fortement centralisée et donnée par l'État, lui parut le plus efficace moyen pour façonner les âmes."

[2] Ibid., p. 93.

[3] Quoted in Fournier: Napoleon (Bourne, ed.), p. 409. "To the question what was to be thought of those who should fail to perform their obligations toward the Emperor, the catechism made answer: 'According to Saint Paul they would sin against the ordinances of God Himself and draw down upon themselves eternal damnation.'"

was to rest upon "the precepts of religion, of loyalty, and of obedience."[1]

In such fashion the ideals and purposes of imperialism were implanted in the hearts of the young. In such fashion instruction was adapted to carry out the aims of the day.

Since the fall of Napoleon I various forces have engaged in a bitter struggle for control over the national life of France and hence for control over national education. Sometimes this struggle has smoldered in the embers of obstruction and resentment; again it has burst forth into the flames of hot political controversy and even open warfare. The spirit of the Ancient Régime, enfeebled and injured as it had been, did not give up the ghost during the period of the Revolution and the First Empire, but strove again, in the uncertain political atmosphere of the remainder of the century, to regain something of its ancient fullness of life. The French love of glory and the national tendency to hero-worship have fought against the French devotion to reason. The monarchical principle has striven to assert itself against the growing spirit of democracy.

Catholicism has warred against the articles

[1] Arnold, M.: Popular Education in France, p. 37.

of faith proclaimed by the men of the great Revolution. In its struggle with the Revolution the Church has, in a general way, associated itself with the monarchical, as against the republican, cause; but the alliance between throne and altar has not been so close as it was before 1789. The union has been one of policy rather than of true affection; for the Church has ceased to be Gallican and has become Ultramontane. Its loyalty has been to Rome rather than to Paris or Versailles. During the past century, then, the establishment of monarchical or imperial government in France did not mean the complete triumph of Catholicism, nor did it signalize the complete downfall of the principles of the Revolution, for royalty was never able to rid itself entirely of these. National education, therefore, did not don again all the ecclesiastical and courtly garments that it had worn under the Grand Monarque and his successors, but appeared for more than sixty-five years in a garb partly clerical, partly secular, till finally it was forced to wear no other uniform than that of the laïcal, republican state.

Nevertheless during the period of the Restoration, lasting—with the Napoleonic interruption—from 1814 to 1830, it seemed to the de-

luded that the Bourbons were coming into their own again. Even before ultra-royalism ascended the throne in 1824, in the person of the once dashing and always stubborn Charles X, there began a pseudo-renaissance of the Ancient Régime, which increased the influence of courtiers and clerics. Naturally enough, education took on a coloring more distinctly ecclesiastical than in the days of Napoleon. Priests and monks, flocking back to their posts, took up the task of molding the mind of the young to loyalty toward the Church and the legitimate monarchy. Warmed to the fight by the sunshine of royal favor, they attacked the monopoly of the Napoleonic University, under whose baleful influence, so Chateaubriand claimed, the youth of France were becoming irreligious, debauched and contemptuous of the domestic virtues.[1] This monopoly they did not succeed in destroying; but they brought it under clerical control.[2] In general it seemed as if the youth of France were to be made "as royalist as Charles X, as good Catholics as Saint Louis, as orthodox as Bossuet."[3]

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[1] Buisson, etc.: La Lutte Scolaire, p. 43.

[2] Ibid., pp. 51 ff.

[3] Ibid., p. 74.

Nevertheless the leaven of democracy was working, and the anger of the bourgeoisie was growing. The July Ordinances brought the downfall of Charles X; and Louis Philippe of the House of Orleans took possession of the royal armchair, to remain until 1848. Though an advance along the road of democracy, the new monarchy by no means marked the triumph of liberty, equality and fraternity. Though the atmosphere was Voltairian, there was no thought of giving free play to the forces of irreligion or of turning over the control of the state to extreme republicans. In fact the reign was a "'just mean' between democracy and legitimism."[1] Hence that great educational measure, the law of 1833, did not establish the entire system of public education which the Revolution had projected; nor did it destroy completely the influence of clericalism over the school. It did, however, place on the communes, and indirectly on the state, the responsibility for maintaining primary schools,[2] though only the children of the very poor were to be taught gratuitously. The number of

[1] Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 479.

[2] Guérard: French Civilization in the Nineteenth Century, p. 234.

lay teachers—"wretched little pedants," Montalembert called them—was thus increased, though parish priests shared with civil officials the supervision of state schools,[1] in which, also, was to be given religious instruction.[2] The law tended toward the democratization of education, toward the extension of the civil authority in this field, at the expense of the Church. But it was a compromise, and being a compromise, it served to buttress the July Monarchy.[3]

The years that followed the downfall of Louis Philippe in the Revolution of 1848 witnessed not only the development of the power of Napoleon III, but also the growth of clerical influence. The little man with the glorious

[1] Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 490.

[2] Compayré: History of Pedagogy, p. 524.

[3] Guizot, father of the act, believed that "'the hopes of religion, together with the enlightenment given by a system of instruction controlled by religious belief, would be the best means of arresting moral degeneration and the dangers to which the revolutionary classes, and in consequence of class demands, the whole of society, were exposed.'" Cambridge Modern History, Vol. X, p. 490. But "these national schools must respect that religious liberty which the nation professed. The wishes of parents were to be ascertained and followed in all that concerned their children's attendance at the religious instruction." Arnold: Popular Education in France, p. 52.

name, imitating the policy of his admired uncle, planned to use the clergy to buttress his throne. Favors were scattered among them with lavish hand and it was not hard to understand why "the men in black had grown so amiable."[1] Furthermore, the bloody insurrection of June, 1848, had brought a reaction against Socialism and toward religious orthodoxy. The frightened bourgeoisie, realizing to what dangers novel theories might lead, were inclined to take refuge under the protecting arm of Mother Church, and listened more willingly than in earlier days to the pleas of the clerics for "liberty" of education.

Out of this atmosphere developed the reactionary *Loi Falloux* and other educational measures of the new era. " 'Three facts,' says M. Liard, 'are bound together like the terms of a syllogism in the short public career of M. de Falloux. The closing of the national workshops causes the upheaval of June. The Days of June strike the bourgeoisie with terror. The terrified bourgeoisie vote the law of 1850 as a measure of social preservation.' "[2] The *Loi*

[1] Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XI, pp. 295-296.

[2] Guérard: French Civilization in the Nineteenth Century, p. 235.

Falloux abolished the Napoleonic University, whose power in the field of education the Catholics had long attacked. "The bishops were ex-officio members of the academic councils, and their authority therein was really greater than that of the rectors themselves. Catholic schools could be endowed and subsidized by the local authorities and by the State. . . . In elementary education the letter of affiliation . . . of a friar or a nun was accepted instead of a qualifying certificate." [1] In spite of the fact that the right to grant degrees still remained a state monopoly,[2] the Church might well rejoice over its increased power to influence the minds and hearts of the youth of France.

Directly as well as indirectly the school was used to fortify the position of Napoleon III. During the years 1851 to 1856 every teacher was obliged to swear allegiance to him.[3] Children were to be brought up in loyalty to the Emperor as they had once been brought up in loyalty to his uncle. Thus the school was once more called to the service of the throne and the altar; and the influence of a large proportion of the gen-

[1] Ibid., pp. 236-237.
[2] Ibid., p. 237.
[3] Ibid.

eration reared under such auspices survived to trouble the anti-imperial, anti-clerical statesmen of the Third Republic.

The ideals and aims of the government under which France has now lived for more than forty-five years have been very different from those of the Second Empire. The tragedy of the Franco-German War at once saddened and awakened the nation. Mourning the loss of its ancient glory, the country nevertheless set to work sternly and resolutely to recuperate its weakened strength and to prepare to defend itself adequately against another possible invasion. Many patriots, too, dreamed of *revanche* and looked forward to the day when Alsace and Lorraine should be brought back again to the mother country. If their hopes in that direction have not been fulfilled they have found cause for pride in that successful colonial policy on which France has embarked and which has done so much to restore the prestige of former days. The vigor and the ambitions of the French people did not die in 1871.

But the state has not had merely to gird up its loins for battle and for conquest; it has had as well the task of establishing on a firm basis the republican ideal. It has had to complete the

work of the Revolution of 1789. It has had to make the ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity mean more than they had meant during nearly three-quarters of the nineteenth century. The Republic has taken Reason as its guide and has attempted sincerely to live by Reason. Hence it has had to combat the national tendency of the French people to hero-worship, and has had to guard against the restoration of some one of the dynasties formerly governing France, as well as against the exaltation of a new dictator. It has had to contend against the Catholic Church, which would have the people live not by the light of Reason, but by that of spiritual authority. On the other hand, while standing for the principles of the French Revolution it has yet had to curb the excesses of the revolutionary spirit. The world has just begun to realize how well the Third Republic has carried its burdens, how zealously it has set itself to the fulfillment of its ideals.

The educational system of the country did not at first respond to these new forces which were beginning to dominate the life of the nation. For more than a decade the school remained almost entirely in the hands of the Church, inculcating in the rising generation those beliefs

and ideals for which the Church stood. In the early eighties, however, the government usurped (or shall we say "resumed"?) control over education, and in later years completed the work of making instruction almost a state monopoly. For some thirty-five years, then, the school has attempted to mold the mind of France to an acceptance of the principles and purposes of the Third Republic. There has not, indeed, been entire agreement in regard to these principles and purposes; the pacificism which was a natural outcome of certain of the theories of the Revolution, for example, has conflicted with the nationalism which was a natural outgrowth of the Franco-German War. Liberty of thought has excluded complete uniformity in political instruction. Nevertheless it may be emphatically asserted that the school of the Third Republic has been a powerful and effective instrument in inculcating in the oncoming generations of Frenchmen sentiments of patriotism and loyalty.

Thus education in France from the time of Louis XIV to the present day has experienced changes corresponding to changes in the government and ideals of the state. Under the influence of the court life at Versailles instruc-

tion for the upper classes and for those who imitated the upper classes was characterized by a training in etiquette and carefully prescribed forms. Under Napoleon I it became militaristic and imperialistic, aiming to inculcate admiration for, and loyalty to, the conqueror. During the sixty-five years following his fall, when the country was at heart uncertain as to what government and what social forces it would definitely support, it responded now to Catholicism and monarchy or imperialism, now in a tentative way to the principles of the Revolution of 1789. Finally it has come definitely to mirror the policies of the Third Republic.

I do not mean to imply that education has been shaped entirely by national forces. There are, of course, certain subjects in the curriculum which remain comparatively unaffected by political and social vicissitudes. Furthermore the tendency of a dominant type of instruction is to reflect the principal characteristics of the whole civilization from which it originates. Thus education in the Middle Ages was primarily religious, with a goodly proportion of athletic and military training for the fighting noble. At a later date the Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-Reformation united to emphasize

the teaching of Latin and Greek; for the classics met the religious, cultural, and certain of the utilitarian needs of the time. In a practical, commercial, bourgeois age there will be strong pressure for industrial and vocational education. The school, then, is not bounded entirely by national lines.

Furthermore, tradition and custom have an important influence on education. By reason of their power a given type of instruction tends to survive long after the forces through which it originated have ceased to be vital. Thus it was that the classics maintained in the nineteenth century a position in the English public schools entirely disproportionate to their value to society. English conservatism magnified their importance. Similarly a new social force may knock for a long time at the door of the school before being allowed to enter. Every student of recent educational history knows how hard it has been for the secular, scientific spirit to affect the curriculum in any marked degree. Every thoughtful observer of contemporary conditions knows of the struggle now going on in the United States to free the school from the influence of tradition and to adjust it to what are believed to be the needs of today. The

school system of every country has been encumbered with survivals.

With the growth of national consciousness, however, the influence of custom and conservatism over the school system has been lessened. Education has tended to become a political instrument, the study of it almost a branch of political science. This is especially true of Germany, to whose efficiency education has contributed to a degree not fully appreciated even yet by the rest of the world; but it is also true of France. Thus Jules Ferry, the powerful prime minister who did so much to wrest control of the school from the hands of the Church, held instruction to be "an affair of state, a public service."[1] His view, according to a recent writer, was that the state should be "the supreme intelligence which ought to think for the entire nation and to form minds according to a type proposed by itself."[2] This ideal has, in some measure, been realized.

Hence it follows that a study of education under the Third Republic furnishes an excellent approach to an understanding of the na-

[1] Vaujany: L'École Primaire en France sous la Troisième République, p. 2.

[2] Ibid.

tional psychology of modern France;[1] for the national consciousness expresses itself through the school as perhaps through no other institution. From the school, therefore, far more than from the opinions of individual writers, one can learn what the factors dominant in the life of the country really are. The student of social psychology must be careful, however, not to attribute to national ideals and purposes elements in the educational system which are really due to the general influences of modern civilization or to those of custom and tradition.

The little textbooks of the French schools, then, are extremely significant. They are not written solely for the torture of rebellious youth, nor simply to prepare the child to earn a living or enjoy rationally the leisure hours of later years. They form a part of that educational renaissance whose significance it is as

[1] Similarly the history of education furnishes an excellent but much neglected approach to an understanding of the Zeitgeist. If education reflects the dominant characteristics of the civilization or civilizations from which it grows, then it follows that from a study of a given type of education one is in a position to learn something of the underlying factors of the civilization from which it springs. The method must be used guardedly, however, because of certain limitations, especially because of the survivals with which education is always encumbered.

important for the historian to grasp, as it is for him to understand the diplomacy and the preparations for military defense that preceded the present conflict. Though these books have been the work of individual writers and have been stamped by individual opinions, they have on the whole safeguarded the dominant ideals and gained support for the dominant purposes of the Third Republic. From them, then, we can learn something of national attitudes. From them, too, we can learn something of the part played by education in fortifying France against internal and external crises. They have been used to mold the psychology of the nation.

CHAPTER II

MOLDING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEFENSE

1. THE LESSON OF 1870 AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF EDUCATION

In the pleasant, prosperous days that preceded the present conflict the average American was apt to judge France by Paris and Paris by the boulevards. He thought of the French people as frothy, sentimental, vivacious, fond of wine and song, only too fond of the third member of the famous trio. The courage of daring he might indeed attribute to them, but not the greater heroism of sustained effort. Cynicism, pessimism, irreligion and contempt for virtue he believed to be characteristic not merely of the frequenters of cafés, but of a large number of writers and men in public life as well. "France is decadent," was the dictum of the American traveler returning from his three months' tour of Europe, bringing with him, perhaps, memories of his own contributions to that decadence.

The great war, however, has revealed a new France. When the call came her sons were ready, grimly resolved to stem the great Teutonic tidal wave before it engulfed Paris. Quietly and soberly they have undertaken as a simple duty the task of driving the invader from French soil. They have borne without flinching the monotonously awful strain of trench fighting. They have supplemented the dash and daring inherited from ancient days by a power of endurance, the depth of which has not yet been completely tested. If the commanders have proved themselves capable of handling the great problems presented by the German attack, the common soldier has shown an intelligence and a loyalty which have moved the world to wonder. While England has been striving to remove the incubus of national ignorance and to arouse the lower classes to a realization of the danger of a disruption of her empire, France has presented a united front, her masses seriously conscious of the task that lies before them, and determined at all costs to perform that task loyally and efficiently. France has demonstrated that a democracy can handle effectively the problem of national defense.

Very different, this, from the conduct of the nation in 1870. Then all was noise, bustle and confusion, the prelude to a great disaster. "Have arrived at Belfort," telegraphed General Michel July 21. "Can't find my brigade; can't find the general of the Division. What shall I do? Don't know where my regiments are."[1] Soldiers were transported from Metz or Strassburg to Brittany, even to Algiers, only to be returned to their regiments close to the points from which they had started. Staff officers were frequently out of touch with the army and had little or no practical knowledge of their duties.[2]

In contrast with the efficiency and intelligence of the Prussians, common soldiers as well as great commanders, the ignorance and stupidity of the French were appalling. To ignorance, more than to any other cause, Gambetta later attributed the disasters of the tragic year; nor was he the only one to realize at that time the baleful effects of unintelligence.[3] The

[1] Quoted in Hazen: Europe Since 1815, p. 295.

[2] Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XI, p. 582.

[3] Gambetta: Discours et Plaidoyers Politiques, Vol. II, p. 252. "Eh bien! dominant toutes les autres causes de nos défaillances, de nos désastres, il y a l'ignorance, cette ignorance particulière, cette ignorance double, qui est propre à

war party in Paris who precipitated the bungling, frothy France of the Second Empire into conflict with the highly trained Prussia of the man of blood and iron, committed an act of terrible rashness and folly.

Whence came the dogged and disciplined spirit of resistance, characteristic of the France of today? First of all it must have developed from the natural reaction of a proud and sensitive nation against the tragedy of her overwhelming defeat. Napoleon III, sitting dispirited and dejected in front of a roadside cottage, on the morning after the battle of Sedan, a prisoner in the hands of the Prussians, epitomized the departed glory of the country over which he had ruled. That glory must be regained by the Third Republic, since the Empire had failed to maintain it. Sadly and wearily, therefore, but with true-hearted determination, the nation set to work to rid herself of internal weaknesses and to retrieve her position in the

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la France"; Bréal: Quelques Mots sur l'Instruction Publique en France (published 1872), p. 122. "Le courage de la nation s'est montré tel qu'on l'avait connu en tous les temps; mais on a été effrayé de trouver une telle inexpérience de pensée, un si grand désarroi intellectuel. Il est pénible de dire, mais il faut avoir le courage de dire que les Allemands nous trouvaient naïfs."

world. Fear of another attack from her powerful neighbor stimulated her resoution to make herself strong and ever watchful. The Treaty of Frankfort in 1871 had cost her five billion francs and the better part of two of her most valuable provinces. The results of another successful invasion would be too terrible to contemplate. Hence as a first means to strengthen herself and insure her safety she established by law (1872) a five-year period of compulsory military service for all but certain exempted classes of her citizens. Never again, she determined, would she be found wanting in military efficiency as she had been in 1870.

Nevertheless it must not be taken for granted that the memory of defeat and of its consequences, with the anticipatory fear of another disaster, would of themselves have sufficiently sustained the national will in preparing the country adequately for defense against possible aggression. The laws enforcing compulsory military service have borne hard upon the people. When the bill of 1913, increasing the period from two years to three,[1] was introduced,

[1] The law of 1889 reduced the term of active service to three years; that of 1905 lowered it to two, though exemptions were abolished.

it met with rancorous opposition from Socialists, from certain thoughtful men of the educated classes, and even from many of those actually serving in the army, who looked on the increase as an almost intolerable oppression.[1] In a democracy such burdens are borne only with difficulty, and as the memories of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine receded further and further into the past, as prosperity brought comfort and carelessness, it would not have been surprising if the country had thrown off a large part of its burden of military preparedness with the accompanying taxation. The renaissance of the national spirit under the Third Republic has been her great safeguard against this danger; and in this renaissance it is not too much to say that education has been the chief factor.

Confidence in education as a means of regenerating the national life followed hard upon the heels of the disasters of the War of 1870. Gambetta, advocating compulsory military service and a more rigorous application of the

[1] "The Three Years' Bill in France," *Living Age,* for July 26, 1913, Vol. 278, pp. 245-248. "The great bulk of Frenchmen," says the writer of this article, "are in a mood which a gust might turn against the national duty at this moment."

national sovereignty, placed above these "an education truly national, that is to say, an education imposed on all."[1] "This land must be rebuilt," said he, "its customs renovated, the evil which is the cause of all our ills, ignorance, must be made to disappear; there is but one remedy, the education of all."[2]

It was largely from their conquerors that this lesson was learned. Prussia, in transforming the spirit of the nation after the battle of Jena, had begun a reorganization of education with the aim of making over the people and bringing back the state to its former proud position.[3] "The state must regain by intellectual force what it has lost in physical force," said the King of Prussia in 1807;[4] and the subsequent development of the power of his realm has more than justified his anticipations of the efficacy of instruction. Keen observers like Gabriel Monod testified to the intelligence of the German common soldier in the War of 1870.

"I knew before the campaign," he said,

[1] Gambetta: Discours, etc., p. 387.

[2] Hanotaux, G.: Contemporary France, Vol. II, p. 719.

[3] Bréal: Quelques Mots sur l'Instruction Publique en France, p. 2; Duruy: Pour la France, p. 11.

[4] Bréal, op. cit., p. 2.

shortly after the war, "how high was the level of instruction in Germany; but I did not suspect how far this universal instruction had developed. Almost all the soldiers had with them notebooks in which they took notes on the campaign; they loved to read and all knew how to write. But what astonished me most was the lucidity and the stability of their spirit. With almost all I could converse with interest, and the accuracy of the information which they gave me proved that the critical spirit, which constitutes the glory of German science, has insensibly penetrated all ranks of society. When they gave an account of a battle, they knew how to distinguish that of which they had been eye-witnesses from that which they had learned at second hand, but with guaranties of certitude, and from that which they knew only by hearsay."[1] French statesmen accepted the dictum that it was the Prussian schoolmaster who won at Sedan;[2] and it was pointed out that "by the school . . . the character of a nation can be

[1] Ibid., pp. 397-398, quoting Monod: Allemands et Français; "'We have been beaten by adversaries,' said Gambetta in 1872, 'who had on their side foresight, discipline, and science.'" Hanotaux, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 719.

[2] Guérard: French Civilization in the Nineteenth Century, p. 239.

molded."[1] Out of the black depths of the tragedy of 1870 has developed the new spirit of intelligent patriotism in the French schools.

As long as instruction was not entirely gratuitous, however, as long as it was not compulsory, and as long as the state school was primarily under the influence of the Church, it was impossible to make full use of education as an instrument of national regeneration. It was natural and consistent that the religious teachers should pay more attention to the principles of Christianity and the doctrines of the Catholic Church than to the formation of a psychology of national defense and loyalty to the Republic. Furthermore, the clergy favored the reëstablishment of monarchy. Hence Republican leaders bent their energies for many years following the war to making education free, universal, compulsory, and secular. Their efforts, at first not very successful, owing largely to the unsettled internal condition of the country, culminated finally in the passage of three important laws. That of the 16th of June, 1881, made instruction absolutely gratuitous in all the public primary schools, in the *salles*

[1] Bréal: Instruction Publique, p. 118.

d'asile and in the primary normal schools.[1] The act of the 28th of March, 1882, established the compulsory principle for all children between the ages of six and thirteen years.[2] It also forbade any religious instruction to be given within the walls of the school, at the same time withdrawing from members of the clergy the right to inspect schools, conferred on them by the *Loi Falloux*.[3] The law of 1886 organized primary instruction, public and private, providing also for state inspection of all elementary schools, including those of religious orders. Thus by making education universal the state was in a position to raise the general level of the intelligence of the French people; by freeing

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[1] Levasseur, E.: L'Instruction Primaire et Professionelle en France sous la Troisième République, p. 14.

[2] Ibid., p. 15. Article 4 of the law reads: "L'instruction primaire est obligatoire pour les enfants des deux sexes âgés de six ans révolus à treize ans révolus; elle peut être donnée soit dans les établissements d'instruction primaire ou secondaire, soit dans les écoles publiques et libres, soit dans les familles, par le père de famille lui-même ou par toute personne qu'il aura choisie."

[3] Ibid. Article 2 reads: "Les écoles primaires publiques vaqueront un jour par semaine, en outre du dimanche, afin de permettre aux parents de faire donner, s'ils désirent, à leurs enfants l'instruction religieuse, en dehors des édifices scolaires."

the school from clerical influence, it could use that institution more fully than ever before to aid in carrying out national aims and ideals.

II. THE TEACHING OF PATRIOTISM

In molding the psychology of defense against aggression it was not enough, of course, that the state should simply stand sponsor for the education of every boy and girl between the ages of six and thirteen years. A new spirit must be infused into the youth of France. Their ideals must be unified; they must be led to realize the gravity of their country's problems. In other words, a staunch and true devotion to the Fatherland, sufficient to weather any crisis, must be inculcated in the minds and hearts of the oncoming generations. Therefore direct instruction in patriotism has been given in the schools, which has revolved chiefly around the following points: (1) the love of France; (2) the military spirit and the obligatory service; and (3) the duty of cultivating physical courage. Furthermore, (4) the children have learned to know that taxation is necessary to support the army; (5) they have been given some definite information in regard to the state

of the national defenses; and (6) certain writers have pointed out to them the perils of depopulation in a country menaced by increasingly powerful neighbors.

Each of these points will be considered in turn. In general the aim has been to create in the children a rational patriotism, rather than an unthinking, emotional attachment to the land of their birth. It has therefore been the task of teachers and of the writers of textbooks to develop ideals in the pupils, and to support these with arguments. It has been the duty of the government to make the instruction systematic. The teaching has indeed had its weaknesses and failures, but on the whole it has fostered successfully the new spirit in France.

A glow of ardor suffuses the formal, precise pages of the textbook when the author deals with "La Patrie." Here, at any rate, he can give full vent to his enthusiasm.

"Do you know what the Fatherland is? It is the house where your mother has carried you in her arms. It is the lawn on which you play your joyous games. It is the school where you receive your first instruction. It is the town hall where floats the flag of France. It is the cemetery where

your ancestors rest. It is the clock which you see again with a new joy on each return to the village. It is the fields which bear the traces of the labor of your fathers. It is the hills, the mountains which you have so many times climbed.

"Men of the same country are *compatriots;* they form a great family, a nation.

"The thirty-seven million inhabitants of France constitute the *French family.* They have the same history, the same joys, the same hopes. They sorrow over the reverses of their common Fatherland, and take pride in her prosperity; they share her fortune, good or bad."[1]

Love of France constitutes the road to happiness;[2] more than that, it is the first of duties.[3] "The Fatherland," says Compayré, "is the nation which you should love, honor and serve with all the strength of your body, with all the energy and all the devotion of your soul."[4] And in a little poem a father thus counsels his son:

[1] Jost et Braeunig: Lectures Pratiques, pp. 111-112.

[2] Boniface: Pour le Commencement de la Classe (garçons), p. 144.

[3] Catholic texts place it second. *See* Wirth: Livre de Lecture Courante des Jeunes Filles Chrétiennes.

[4] Éléments d'Instruction Morale et Civique, p. 56.

Be son and brother to the end,
My joy and hope enhance,
But lad, be sure that 'fore all else
You place the love of France.[1]

One author, indeed, reminds us of the Napoleonic catechism in stating that, according to an ancient writer, to love and serve one's country is one of the means of honoring the Deity.[2]

Americans are too apt to assume that patriotism is a plant that needs no watering, that it grows of itself; but the more intelligent French schoolmaster is far from this unwarranted assumption. "There are people," says Compayré, "who say, 'One does not learn to love one's country.' They deceive themselves; one learns to love one's country as one learns anything else." [3] Nor is it sufficient, according to a recent writer, simply to love France; it is necessary to know why one loves her. Only through such knowledge can patriotism rest on a sound basis.[4] Thus by instruction the ideal

[1] From "Tu Seras Soldat" by V. de Laprade, quoted in Jost et Braeunig: Lectures Pratiques, p. 119.

[2] Fouillée: Les Enfants de Marcel, p. 73.

[3] Éléments d'Instruction Morale et Civique, p. 59; Pontsevrez: Cours de Morale Pratique, p. 124, puts it thus: "L'amour de la patrie est naturel; l'éducation le fortifie."

[4] Duruy: Pour la France, p. 23. "La conclusion de tout

of devotion to the Fatherland is implanted and fostered in the hearts of the youth of France;[1] and upon this foundation is reared the superstructure of the various duties which patriotism entails.[2]

First of all these obligations is that of defending the Fatherland in time of war. Into the heart of the little boy sitting on the bench of the village school is instilled the ideal of defending his country as he would his family, as he would his mother.[3] "If your family were

ce qui précède est qu'il ne suffit pas d'aimer sa patrie, mais qu'il faut encore savoir pourquoi on l'aime. Le patriotisme repose alors sur une base plus solide que l'instinct seul."

[1] Le Peyre: Livret d'Éducation Morale, pp. 22-23; Bataille: Lectures Françaises, pp. 177-178; ibid., p. 180; Boitel, J.: La Récitation (9 à 12 ans), pp. 59-77; ibid., (6 à 9 ans), pp. 37-44; Ibid., Trois Années, etc., pp. 184-218; Boniface: Pour le Commencement de la Classe, pp. 37-38; Lemoine: Livret d'Enseignement Moral, p. 24; Manuel, G.: Nouveau Livre, etc., p. 35; Pontsevrez, op. cit., p. 140; Foncin, M.: L'Année Préparatoire de Géographie, p. 6; Devinat: Livre de Lecture et de Morale (Cours Moyen), pp. 46-61; Barrau: La Patrie, passim; Bedel, J.: L'Année Enfantine de Géographie, p. 9; Duruy: Pour la France, passim; Martin et Lemoine: Lectures Choisies; Fautras et Villain: L'Enseignement Musical à l'École Primaire, passim; etc.

[2] Compayré: Éléments d'Instruction Morale et Civique, p. 59.

[3] De Grandmaison: Scènes, p. 95.

insulted, attacked, what would you do? You would join with your father and your brothers to defend it against its enemies. Likewise when the Fatherland is menaced, all Frenchmen rise to defend it against the foreign foe." [1] It is not war for war's sake that these writers teach. They do not attempt to attract the support of youth to a policy of conquest by veiling in a mist of glory the miseries and horrors of battle, or by crowning the bloody head of Mars with a wreath of romance.[2] Of this sort of patriotism they had had their fill before 1870.[3] Not infrequently a writer cautions his youthful readers against the spirit of chauvinism,[4] warning them, for example, against too keen a susceptibility to slights and insults, and condemning such aggressions as those of Francis I against Italy, Louis XIV against Holland, and Napoleon against Europe.[5] The author of

[1] Jost et Braeunig: Lectures Pratiques, p. 112.

[2] E.g., Madame Fouillée's book: "Les Enfants de Marcel," which in 1896 was in its seventieth edition, gives a vivid picture of campaign life in the Franco-German War, praising the soldier's devotion to duty in the midst of suffering and tragedy.

[3] Bréal: Instruction Publique, p. 117.

[4] E.g., Compayré, op. cit., p. 63.

[5] Payot: La Morale à l'École, pp. 220-229.

a recent manual bids schoolboys distinguish between *l'esprit militaire* and *l'esprit guerrier*, the former being right and necessary, the latter wrong and dangerous.

"However painful the sacrifice may be, young people, it is necessary to renounce this war-loving spirit (*esprit guerrier*). If it well becomes the youth of a fiery people, consumed with the need of activity and expansion, it does not suit the maturity of a great nation like our own. He who has reached manhood ought not to have the same tastes as a child. It is the same for peoples, who, like individuals, pass through successive ages. France is now at the age when the serious work of the brain is being substituted for violent action, when impetuous outbursts should give place to reflection.

"Let the war-loving spirit yield to the military spirit.

"The military spirit is that of a people firmly resolved not to make any attempt against the independence of its neighbors, but firmly resolved also to make its name respected. . . . The military spirit will see to all the needs of our security, because it will bring us the solid virtues that render a people invincible."[1]

[1] Duruy: Pour la France, pp. 30-32.

In this book, as in many others for the use of children, there is expressed a foreboding, even a belief, that a day of conflict must come, a day when the envy or jealousy of some other power will result in an attack on the Fatherland. Thus a poet, popular in the schools of France, sings:

> Tu seras soldat, cher petit!
> Tu sais, mon enfant, si je t'aime!
> Mais ton père t'en avertit,
> C'est lui qui t'armera lui-même.
>
> Quand le tambour battra demain,
> Que ton âme soit aguerrie;
> Car j'irai t'offrir de ma main
> A notre mère, la Patrie.[1]

Indeed the general tone of patriotic instruction in France is one of solemn expectation, rather than of satisfied retrospection as in the United States. "Be ready!" is the advice given by their mentors to the youth of France.[2] "When 'The Day' arrives, be prepared to endure hunger, thirst and cold for the sake of the Fatherland. Be ready to die rather than abandon your post."[3] These and other precepts have

[1] V. de Laprade: "Tu Seras Soldat."

[2] Payot: La Morale à l'École, p. 225.

[3] Aulard et Bayet: Morale et Instruction Civique, Part I, p. 51.

helped to keep alive in the minds of Frenchmen the possibilities of another war, and have shown them how serious were to be their own obligations in the day of crisis.

Love of country and a stern sense of duty must, of course, be supplemented in war time by physical bravery. Partly because of this fact the children have been led to look upon courage as one of the highest of virtues. Through story and through precept it is taught.[1] A reading book tells the tale of a brave little lad who saves a baby from being killed by a mad dog.[2] A manual of moral instruction points out the misery of trembling cowardice;[3] and both these books emphasize the virtue and necessity of coolness in time of danger. So, too, the advantage that courage in time of war gives both to the nation and to the individual is inculcated.

"Bravery is courage in battle," says Payot.

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[1] Petit et Lamy: Jean Lavenir, p. 318; Devinat: Livre de Lecture et de Morale (Cours Moyen), pp. 145-160; Boitel: La Récitation (9 à 12 ans), pp. 104-109; ibid. (6 à 9 ans), p. 51; ibid., Trois Années, etc., pp. 57-65; Aulard et Bayet: Morale, etc., Part I, p. 54; Cuir: Les Petits Écoliers, p. 92; Chalamet: Mes Deuxièmes Lectures, pp. 103-105, etc.

[2] De Grandmaison: Scènes, pp. 183-186.

[3] Payot: La Morale à l'École, p. 66.

"In war, courage and steadiness are necessary every minute. To march in weather icy cold or burning hot, often with wounded feet, with chilblains, to lie on the damp earth, to suffer thirst and hunger: all this must be endured gayly. Those who complain are bad comrades, for discouragement is contagious.

"In the day of battle the terrible roar of the cannon makes the heart beat and brings the cold sweat . . . but the brave quickly recover their coolness. They save their cartridges. If it possessed a hundred riflemen, perfectly calm, a regiment would be invincible. A story is told of a battle, in 1881, where it took 41 cannon shots and 33,000 rifle shots to kill 70 Arabs. In Afghanistan the English, at 300 meters, fired 50,000 times and killed 25 enemies! Twelve calm men, who aim with tranquillity, are worth a regiment of fools.

"Keep cool under fire, and we shall be invincible." [1]

Thus from very early years the French lad is taught the meaning of courage and coolness; the ideal of bravery inspires him to heroic deeds. Such teachings play an important part in the formation of the psychology of national

[1] Ibid., pp. 67-68.

defense; and this psychology must account, in a measure, for the French soldier's readiness to do his full duty in the present crisis, for his realization of the sacrifices which the fulfillment of that duty must entail. It is a training which the United States would do well to imitate.

The French have understood, however, that in laying the educational foundations for the task of national defense it is necessary to do more than arouse the spirit that would brave danger and death in time of war. The youth must be led to bear willingly during peaceful years the heavy and painful burden of preparation for the coming conflict. Courage, enthusiasm, and self-sacrifice would be powerless against a hostile army, organized and trained.[1] Hence the oncoming generations must be taught to support the government's program of universal compulsory military training.

In pursuance of this policy the writers of school manuals have appealed to the reason of the youth of France with many arguments to show the necessity of the military service for everyone. Thus it is pointed out that while citizen armies were once possible, they are so

[1] Gérard: Morale, p. 188.

no longer, because "the complexity of the military trade has rendered necessary a long apprenticeship." [1] One never knows when the country will be in danger,[2] for the jealousy or ill will of neighboring peoples will some time render war necessary.[3] And when the enemy is at the frontier every citizen ought to know how to manage a gun or cannon, or to ride a horse.[4] Love of discipline is a duty, since an undisciplined army can cause the ruin of a country.[5] Furthermore, military training hardens the body, counteracting the enervating influence of the soft and easy life to which France is becoming accustomed.[6] The activity of neighboring countries in manufacturing guns and cannon,[7] the superior preparation of the Prussians in the War of 1870 [8] are other reasons ad-

[1] Mabilleau, Levasseur et Delacourtie: Cours d'Instruction Civique. Instruction Civique—Droit Usuel. Économie Politique, p. 136.

[2] Pontsevrez: Cours de Morale Pratique, p. 136.

[3] Compayré: Éléments, p. 89.

[4] Bert, P.: L'Instruction Civique, pp. 15-16.

[5] Fouillée: Francinet, p. 258.

[6] Laloi, P.: La Première Année d'Instruction Morale et Civique.

[7] Lavisse, Ernest: La Nouvelle Deuxième Année d'Histoire de France, p. 404.

[8] Chalamet: Jean Felber, p. 109.

vanced for bearing the burdens of militarism; and the conclusion is reached that "since military service is necessary it ought to be obligatory." [1]

"The military training," says M. Aulard, "is an obligation very heavy, very painful. We would suffer less of it, and fewer soldiers would be necessary, if there were no longer in Europe kings and emperors who amuse themselves by exciting quarrels among peoples, by making them believe that they hate one another. Little by little people will learn that they are brothers, and the French Republic will have no longer any fear of being attacked or invaded by kings or emperors. Unfortunately this bright day is still far distant, and, as long as other nations will not disarm, we must have a powerful army to defend the independence of our nation.

"That is why the military service is obligatory. If there were no army, France would be conquered and would become German or Russian. But we wish to remain Frenchmen, and,

[1] Mabilleau, Levasseur et Delacourtie: Cours d'Instruction Civique. Instruction Civique—Droit Usuel. Économie Politique, p. 136; Coudert et Cuir: Mémento Théorique, p. 133.

besides, the existence of France is useful to humanity.

"Therefore let us perform our military service with good grace, since it is necessary to do it. Let us perform it with zeal, in willing compliance with the military regulations, since it is for the interest of France." [1]

Not only are these arguments set forth in support of the general policy of compulsory training, but the laws of 1872 and 1889 are specifically defended,[2] while at least one author, writing near the end of the nineteenth century, argues in favor of increasing the length of the term of service.[3] In such fashion the growing boy is led to realize the necessity of the hard years of drill that lie before him.[4]

The importance of this teaching it is difficult to overestimate. It cannot, indeed, be proved to a mathematical certainty that without the

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[1] Aulard et Bayet: Morale et Instruction Civique, p. 53.

[2] Blanchet et Pinard: Cours Complet, p. 602; Le Peyre, Livre d'Éducation, p. 42.

[3] David-Sauvageot: Monsieur Prévôt, p. 36.

[4] Belot: La Vie Civique, p. 143; Caumont: Lectures, p. 348; Aulard et Bayet: Morale, etc., Part II, p. 42; Jost et Braeunig: Lectures, etc., p. 42; Quilici et Baccus: Petit Livre, p. 165; Petit et Lamy: Jean Lavenir, p. 248; Chalamet: Jean Felber, p. 109, etc.

aid of the school the government's program of preparedness would have broken down; but it is at least a fair supposition that without such instruction the policy could not have been maintained in its entirety. If there were many intelligent statesmen who could not appreciate the magnitude of the German menace, how could the populace be expected to realize it? With the growth of international socialism the clamor for disarmament was ringing ever louder. Many resented the irksome years abstracted from their careers; and it was said that when the period of service with the colors was increased in 1913 from two years to three, "the great bulk of Frenchmen" were "in a mood which a gust might turn against the national duty."[1] Who can say that it was not largely the teachings of early years that held the people to a support of this rigorous training? And without such training how could the French have maintained any effective resistance to German invasion?

Less directly connected with the development of patriotism than the teaching of bravery, love of country, or the obligatory mili-

[1] "The Three Years Bill in France," *Living Age,* Vol. 278, p. 247.

tary service, but still significant in the educational equipment for resistance to a foreign foe, has been the instruction in regard to national defenses and to taxation. The Franco-German War showed thoughtful men that officers and soldiers must have more accurate understanding of the country's fortifications and of its topography in the region of probable military operations; for in such knowledge their foes had been greatly superior.[1] The major portion of such training must, of course, come during the years of obligatory military service, but certain fundamental notions have been implanted in the schools. Thus Foncin's popular "Première Année de Géographie" devotes one out of fifty-two pages to the subject of national defense. He takes up, among other things, the

[1] Bréal: Instruction Publique (1872), pp. 90-91. "Nous avons trop vu dans la dernière guerre les avantages de ce genre d'instruction pour qu'il soit nécessaire d'y insister. Nos soldats, ne comprenant point d'où venait la science topographique de l'ennemi s'acharnaient à poursuivre des espions imaginaires. Mais non seulement chaque sous-officier prussien, en consultant sa carte, connaissait mieux le pays que la plupart des habitants, mais il savait à quel mouvement d'ensemble son corps d'armée prenait part, il voyait les progrès des opérations et il en pressentait les effets. La confiance s'en trouvait augmentée et passait dans les rangs des soldats."

fighting strength of the army and navy, shows how the country has been fortified against attack, explains the military significance of railroads, and indicates on a map the location of the principal fortifications.[1] "Paris," he says, "is an immense intrenched camp, and the heart of the national resistance in case of invasion."[2] Another writer points out that "the Meuse is the trench of our frontier," and that the Argonne offers no serious natural obstacle to the invader.[3]

Sometimes military matters are discussed in considerable detail,[4] though naturally in a rather elementary way. For example, a school reader by MM. Jost et Braeunig[5] devotes sixty-eight out of some four hundred pages to the army.[6] The authors define the character of

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[1] La Première Année de Géographie (199e édition), p. 28.

[2] Ibid., p. 12; Leroux et Montillot: Une Famille, pp. 257-258.

[3] Dubois: France et Colonies, p. 39.

[4] E.g., Lavisse: Tu Seras Soldat, pp. 171-177, includes the following topics: "Construction d'une échelle au 1/80000." "Comment on mesure une distance au moyen de l'échelle kilométrique." "Comment on détermine une hauteur sur les cartes d'état-major."

[5] Lectures Pratiques.

[6] Ibid., pp. 116-184.

the various divisions of the army—infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineering corps and baggage train. They explain the meaning of the company and of the regiment. Thus, in regard to the regiment, "Four companies joined together form a battalion, commanded by the battalion chief or commandant. A captain acts as aid to the commandant to transmit orders to the different companies; he is the captain-adjutant-major."

"Four battalions, four thousand men, form the regiment commanded by the colonel. He is assisted by a second colonel, called the lieutenant-colonel." [1]

Furthermore, a careful description is given of the natural and artificial fortifications by which France is protected. The frontier toward Germany, for example, is defended by four great places:

"1. Verdun, on the Meuse, in front of the passes of the Argonne; it recalls the siege of 1792 and the energetic Beaurepaire.

"2. Toul, at the westernmost bend of the Moselle, one of the three bishoprics reunited to France by Henry II.

"3. Epinal, on the upper waters of the Mo-

[1] Ibid., p. 132.

selle, remarkable for its picturesque situation in the heart of the Vosges.

"4. Belfort, which, with its detached forts, guards the passage between the Vosges and the Jura." [1]

By means of such instruction boys are given a general idea of the army organization and are initiated into a general knowledge of their country's facilities for resisting a foreign foe.[2]

In dealing with the frontier certain writers call attention to the danger to France from the northeast. Indeed long before the German whirlwind swept over the ill-fated state of Belgium these men were pointing out to schoolboys the possibility of a violation of its neutrality.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 166.

[2] Vidal de la Blache et Camena d'Almeida: La France, p. 408 and passim; Allain et Hauser: Les Principaux Aspects du Globe, p. 220 and passim; David-Sauvageot: Monsieur Prévôt, pp. 36-38; Le Leap et Baudrillard: La France, etc., pp. 44-45; Lanier: Cours du Certificat d'Études Primaires, p. 47; Mabilleau: Cours d'Instruction Civique, pp. 3-6; etc.

[3] Foucart et Grigaut: Géographie (Deuxième Année), p. 144; Dupuy: Livret de Géographie, pp. 16-17; Jost et Braeunig: Lectures Pratiques (17e édition, 1899), p. 157; Vidal de la Blache et Camena d'Almeida: La France, p. 59; Guillot: La France et Ses Colonies. Premier Cycle. (Classe de Troisième), p. 157.

Not all of the writers, it is true, realize the full gravity of the peril. One puts his faith, in case of such attack, in the forts of Dunkirk, Lille and Valenciennes.[1] Another believes that the aggressor would find as many inconveniences as advantages in violating Belgian neutrality.[2] But the well-known M. Marcel Dubois, predicting and fearing the move which the Germans have actually made, advocates that the French anticipate their plan by themselves taking the offensive.

"The Belgian frontier," he says, "is perhaps more dangerous still. The neutrality of Belgium can be violated as well as that of Switzerland; and in this country absolutely flat, where mounds of 40 meters pass for mountains, . . . no natural obstacle aids resistance. There lies the weak point of our defense. . . . Everything, therefore, seems to indicate that if the French themselves do not take the offensive the great battles will take place behind our first line of defense, on the Marne and the Oise, in that plain of Champagne which has already seen the defeat of the Huns of Attila

[1] Dupuy: Livret de Géographie, pp. 16-17.

[2] Vidal de la Blache et Camena d'Almeida: La France, p. 413.

and the last resistance of Napoleon I. It is therefore greatly to the interest of France to march forward."[1]

This is the only statement of the sort I have met, and can by no means be taken as typifying the view of the whole nation. But it is interesting to note that as early as 1891 a school geography was creating opinion among the youth of France favorable to a violation of Belgian neutrality by the French themselves.

Since money is the sinews of war and of armed peace as well, instruction in regard to the reasons for taxation becomes an element in the formation of a psychology of national defense. From time immemorial men have groaned under the weight of tax assessments, and in days of stress, when their burdens have been augmented rather than decreased, bitterness has sometimes culminated in open rebellion. Now the huge army and navy of France have constituted a heavy drain on the purse of her citizens, a drain which they, not fully awake to its need, might some day refuse to allow, preventing the government by ballot or by bullet from carrying out its program. The school men have therefore come to the rescue of the

[1] Dubois: France et Colonies, pp. 149-150.

state by pointing out to children the necessity of taxation for military and naval purposes.

"You have admired the martial air, the spirit, the fine bearing of the troops, which, at the autumn maneuvers, have camped near the village," says a textbook writer. "You have said to yourselves that if ever the country were in danger, this army would be there to defend it. Have you also asked what the cost is of so many uniforms, rifles, horses, cannon? To what sum each year amounts the maintenance of a permanent army of 600,000 men?"[1] The cost of keeping up army and navy is heavy, admits Foncin, but must be borne with patriotism, since the country is menaced by many enemies.[2] In general the authors try to show the reasonableness of taxation in support of the army and the navy, as well as of other national institutions and public works.[3] The docility in

[1] Jost et Braeunig: Lectures Pratiques, p. 293.

[2] La Première Année de Géographie, p. 28.

[3] Aulard et Bayet: Morale et Instruction Civique, pp. 40, 41; De Grandmaison: Scènes, p. 109; Lemoine: Livret, p. 25; Belot: La Vie Civique, pp. 61-69; Devinat: Livre de Lecture et de Morale, pp. 61-63; Bert: L'Instruction Civique, p. 37 and passim; Vidal de la Blache: La France, p. 242; Guyau: La Première Année, etc. Cours Moyen, pp. 275-276; etc.

financial matters thus inculcated must have proved a great help, no less real because impossible of accurate measurement, to the government in meeting anti-militaristic opposition.

It must not be supposed that the teaching of patriotism in the schools has been simply the chance outgrowth of the sentiments of individual writers and schoolmasters. On the contrary, the highly centralized government of France has supervised the development of this instruction and rendered it systematic, partly by means of laws, but more directly through the official school programs and plans of study. These programs have been formulated from time to time by the government with the cooperation of the two Chambers, and have the force, though not the form, of law.[1] They indicate for the individual master the objects of instruction and the limits within which it is to be pursued.[2] Thus it happens that some teaching in regard to each of the topics thus far touched upon in this chapter has been enjoined by the government for the boys of France at

[1] Liard, L.: Le Nouveau Plan d'Études de l'Enseignement Secondaire, p. 66.

[2] Buisson: Dictionnaire de Pédagogie.

one or more stages of their school careers. For example, one of the subjects of moral instruction provided for in the programs for elementary primary schools, beginning with 1882, has been *La Patrie,* under which heading have been taken up "France, her triumphs and her misfortunes—Duties toward the Fatherland and toward society."[1] In a higher class of the same schools boys have been taught "What a man owes to the Fatherland: obedience to the laws, military service, discipline, devotion, fidelity to the flag."[2] In the same connection instruction in regard to taxation has been provided for, while in other places arrangement has been made for the teaching of *Le Courage*[3] and *La Frontière.*[4] Thus the state has caused the spirit of that patriotism, which, according to Compayré, "ought to be the

[1] *Organisation Pédagogique et Plan d'Études des Écoles Primaires Publiques,* 1882, p. 38; ibid., 1887, p. 36; ibid., 1887-1910.

[2] *Organisation Pédagogique et Plan d'Études des Écoles Primaires Publiques,* 1882, p. 40; *Organisation Pédagogique et Plan d'Études des Écoles Primaires Élémentaires Prescrits par Arrêtés des 18 janvier 1887 . . . 1909,* p. 24.

[3] *Plan d'Études . . . de l'Enseignement Secondaire,* 1902 (Huitième édition), p. 53.

[4] *Plan d'Études et Programmes de l'Enseignement Secondaire,* 1902 (Edition of 1907), p. 67.

lay dogma, the religion of all Frenchmen,"[1] to permeate education from primary to normal school.[2]

Carefully organized and systematized as have been the government's plans for molding the psychology of patriotism, however, it must not be supposed that they have met with no opposition and that they have had no defects. Not only have attempts to create and drill companies and battalions of scholars as preparatory to the obligatory service of later years proved in many cases a lamentable failure,[3] but the teaching body itself has been affected by the propaganda of pacificism and even of anti-patriotism.[4] Furthermore, the Third Republic and

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[1] Compayré: L'Éducation Intellectuelle et Morale, p. 439.

[2] *Organisation Pédagogique et Plan d'Études des Écoles Élémentaires,* 1887, pp. 19, 23, 27, 36; *Organisation Pédagogique . . . des Écoles Primaires Élémentaires,* 1887-1909, pp. 24, 29; *Plan d'Études des Écoles Primaires Supérieures,* 1887, p. 25; *Plan d'Études . . . des Écoles Primaires Supérieures de Garçons,* 1909, pp. 9, 48, 62; *Plan d'Études . . . de l'Enseignement Secondaire Spécial dans les Lycées et Collèges, Prescrits par Arrêté du 10 août 1886,* p. 38; *Plan d'Études . . . dans les Lycées et Collèges de Garçons,* 1902, pp. 23, 77-78, 157; *Plan d'Études . . . des Écoles Normales Primaires,* 1905, p. 6; ibid., 1910, pp. 6, 8, 13; etc.

[3] *Le Foyer,* Jan. 1, 1913, pp. 532-533.

[4] *See* Chapter VI.

the textbook writers who mirror its ideals have apparently done little to combat through the school the evil of depopulation. In an age when numbers make such a tremendous difference from the military point of view, France might well have felt alarmed to see her population remaining practically stationary while that of Germany was increasing at the rate of not far from a million a year. Efforts to combat the evil have been unsystematic and have lacked in vigor, though certain textbook writers have pointed out that the failure of France to increase in numbers constitutes a national peril, indicating causes and suggesting cures. Ganneron holds the influence of the doctrines of Malthus primarily responsible for this lack of increase,[1] while Foncin attributes it partially to the fact that too many peasants desert the country for Paris, where existence is at once more costly and less sane.[2] Another author advises Frenchmen to emigrate to the colonies, mingle with the natives and make of them good Frenchmen, ready to defend *La Patrie*.[3] Suggestions of this character, however, appear to be excep-

[1] Une Année de Droit Usuel, p. 159.

[2] La Première Année de Géographie, p. 52.

[3] Villain, Comtois et Loiret: La Lecture, p. 367.

tional rather than typical; little has been done to implant and foster in the hearts of young Frenchmen the ideal of the large family; and a recent writer has even averred that "Malthusianism is preached unblushingly with the constant connivance of the government."[1] Possibly the school could do little to remedy the evil of depopulation, but it could at any rate make more active efforts to do so.

Whatever have been the weaknesses and failures of the Third Republic's policy of using the school to aid in fortifying the state against the hour of danger, these have been greatly overbalanced by its successes. In the first place the teaching of patriotism has led to a wider, keener and truer understanding of the problems of national defense. It has made impossible not merely that callous, selfish, ignorant indifference to the needs of the Fatherland, such as has been found in certain classes of the English working people even in the hour of crisis, but also that vain boasting and rash overconfidence which characterized the France of 1870. For it is an honest patriotism, a critical patriotism, that has been taught in the schools of the Third Republic. The aim has been not

[1] Dimnet: France Herself Again, p. 103.

to explain or excuse the crimes and disasters of the past, but to prevent the repetition of these in the future. Hence schoolboys have been warned of the suffering and trouble that a new invasion would necessarily bring. They have been taught the strong and the weak points of the national defense. They have been led to realize the necessity of enduring the hard discipline of military service in time of peace, as well as to contribute willingly to the maintenance of a large army and navy. In other words, the Third Republic, with Reason as its guide, has appealed to the reason of the individual for support in its preparedness for the dangers of war.

In the second place the state has fostered carefully and systematically certain of those ideals which always must form the foundation of the highest and truest heroism. Courage and coolness the French boy learns to admire from his earliest years. Love of country, which in its crudest form may, perhaps, be almost intuitive, the school has attempted to develop into a rational, intelligent, devoted patriotism, which will not shrink from the gravest dangers, which places duty to the Fatherland before all selfish interests. It is this new and serious spirit of

intelligence, loyalty and determination, developed largely through education, which constitutes the essential difference between the France of today and the France of 1870. It is a spirit which is every day apparent in the struggle of France against the war machine of her Teutonic foe. It is a spirit which may prove a decisive factor in the big war.

CHAPTER III

THE INCULCATION OF HOSTILITY TOWARD GERMANY

The Treaty of Frankfort gave to Germany the better part of Alsace and Lorraine; it left in the hearts of Frenchmen a deep-seated resentment against the adamantine foe who had forced the nation to yield this cherished portion of her patrimony, for the two provinces had been among the richest and most highly prized parts of France. Centuries of conquest and diplomacy had been required to win them bit by bit from the Hapsburg power, though for more than a hundred years before the outbreak of the Franco-German War they had been entirely in the hands of France. Their value was out of all proportion to their size, for not only were they fair and flourishing, but they had formed the strongest of barriers against aggression from the East, a guaranty of safety, a part of that national boundary to whose complete attainment French eyes have ever

looked so longingly. Furthermore, though these provinces had become so late a part of France, their sons were among the most loyal to *La Patrie;* and when Germany insisted on the spoils of war, the thirty-five deputies from the unhappy lands protested at Bordeaux that "Alsace and Lorraine refuse to be alienated. With one voice, the citizens at their firesides, the soldiers under arms, the former by voting, the latter by fighting, proclaim to Germany, and to the world at large, the immutable will of Alsace and Lorraine to remain French!"[1] The people of France joined heart and soul in this fervid though fruitless protest against what they believed to be the most unjust of annexations. More potent with the French, perhaps, than any of the other reasons for anger against Germany, was the feeling of humiliation that this aggregation of states, once so weak and disunited, had forced to her knees the proudest nation of Europe. It was a humiliation not to be forgotten or forgiven.

From these feelings of injustice and wounded pride developed the doctrine of *revanche* or reprisal. Some day France must regain from Germany the "lost provinces." Reconquest

[1] Quoted in Rose, J. H.: The Origins of the War, p. 94.

could not of course be immediate, for the country was exhausted and helpless, while the enemy was strong and powerful; renewal of strife could only mean ruin. Therefore it was necessary to watch and wait, to recuperate for the struggle which would come later, to be thoroughly prepared for the day of opportunity. The dream of *revanche* was in the hearts of all ardent patriots at the very moment of the cession of Alsace-Lorraine.

Nevertheless it was realized that the generations to come might be less eager to regain the lost provinces than those who had lived under the awful shadow of the tragic year and had known its full meaning. What had been to the men of 1871 a terrible humiliation might become to their posterity an accepted fact, unless the memory of loss and the duty of reconquest were kept alive and constantly fostered. Hence it has come about that the doctrine of *revanche* has been taught in the schools, in order that the sons and grandsons of those who struggled against Germany might sense fully their responsibility for the recovery of the conquered lands. In various ways has this teaching been inculcated, sometimes by the merest suggestion, sometimes by the direct warning not to for-

get that France was robbed. Fervid rhetoric has made of *revanche* an ideal, while cold logic has reënforced with argument the duty of winning back for the Fatherland the lost territory. Finally certain writers, irrespective of any direct inculcation of *revanche,* have aroused antagonism against Germany in the breasts of the school children who have studied their books. Geographies, histories, readers, and manuals of moral and civic instruction have played their part in fostering a psychology of hostility toward Germany. But in spite of this it may be questioned whether the teaching of *revanche* ever rose to the dignity of a national policy.

Sometimes the teaching of reprisal takes the form merely of a delicate suggestion or a pious hope that the provinces will some day be brought back to France. Gambetta used to say that one should think of *revanche* always, but speak of it never. But to this sentiment a textbook objects for "in order to think of it, it is necessary to know it."

"We who protest against the brutal words: '*La force prime le droit,*' who know the fidelity of the people of Alsace-Lorraine, do not forget, behind the blue line of the Vosges, 'the lost Paradise.' The stork, symbolical bird of Al-

sace, comes back invariably in the spring to its nest. Let us wish that the 'Paradise Lost' may become 'Paradise Regained.' "[1] Children are reminded that the Rhine may once more be the boundary of the Fatherland.[2] They are told that every good Frenchman looks forward to the recovery of the provinces.[3] It is the habit of map makers to separate the Alsace-Lorraine region from the rest of Germany by special boundary lines.[4] Thus the boundaries of France are sometimes carried out to the Rhine, in such a way as to appear tentatively to include the provinces, though the present political limits of the country are also clearly defined.

[1] Le Leap et Baudrillard: La France, etc. (Cours Moyen), p. 48.

[2] Jost et Braeunig: Lectures Pratiques, p. 157.

[3] Dupuy: Livret de Morale, p. 12.

[4] Boitel: La Récitation (6 à 9 ans), p. 38; Levasseur: Précis de la Géographie, Atlas, passim; Dubois: France et Colonies, p. 72; Pape-Carpantier: Éléments de Cosmographie, Géographie, p. 42; Foncin: Géographie de la France, Enseignement Secondaire, passim; Coudert et Cuir: Mémento Théorique, etc., p. 97[b]; Guillot: La France et ses Colonies. Classe de Première, pp. 280-281; Lanier, etc.: La France et ses Colonies, Leçons Préparatoires, pp. 10, 12, etc.; Le Leap et Baudrillard: La France, Métropole et Colonies. Cours Moyen, pp. 31, 34, 38, etc.; Lemonnier et Schrader: Éléments de Géographie, pp. 41, 54, 58; Fouillée: Francinet, p. 164, etc.

Sometimes the *"Reichsland"* is colored in such a way as to differentiate it from Germany and at the same time from France.[1] The impression inevitably conveyed by this geographical hinting is that if Alsace and Lorraine no longer belong to *La Patrie,* neither are they admittedly and definitely a part of the Empire of the Hohenzollerns. "Let us continue to learn the geography of Alsace," writes Mme. Pape-Carpantier, "as one continues to occupy oneself with a sister momentarily absent."[2] Such devices and sentiments serve to stimulate memories and to sustain hopes.

Sometimes incitement to reprisal is more direct and decisive than that just described; the responsibility for redeeming the honor of their country is placed squarely on the shoulders of the youth of France.[3]

"My son," writes one impassioned author, "be the soldier of the humiliated Fatherland

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[1] Foncin: La Première Année de Géographie, passim; Bedel: L'Année Enfantine de Géographie, p. 13; Lanier, etc.: La France et ses Colonies, p. 14; ibid., Cours du Certificat d'Études Primaires, p. 30; ibid., Cours Élémentaire, p. 24; etc.

[2] Éléments de Cosmographie, etc., p. 52.

[3] E. g., Lavisse, Ernest: La Première Année d'Histoire de France, p. 216.

which must be avenged, of France which must be regenerated. Serve no man whatsoever; serve neither party nor family, but one idea and one thing: Liberty and the Republic. Work, study, seek, meditate, learn, and when you and those of your age shall have brought back to the Fatherland her greatness, come back and strike with your hand, once little but then strong, on the stone under which I shall sleep, and say only these words—but say them, '*La revanche est prise.*' "[1] Thus if certain writers aim merely to keep alive the memory of France's loss or to suggest recovery in some vague future, in such passages as the one just quoted, on the other hand, the demand for reprisal rises to the height of an ideal.

It is characteristic of the French to appeal to the head as well as to the heart, so the textbook writers advance arguments to show why Alsace and Lorraine ought to form a part of their country. Some point out that the "natural" boundary of France to the east is the river Rhine.[2] One contends that as long as the disputed territory remains in the hands of the

[1] Burle: L'Histoire Nationale, p. 59, quoting J. Claretie.

[2] Hanriot: Vive la France!, p. 124; Foncin: La Première Année de Géographie, p. 29.

Empire "it will be an insurmountable obstacle to the reconciliation of France and Germany; it will compel ruinous armaments for both; it will profoundly trouble the peace of Europe." [1] Little stress is laid, however, on the historical claims of France to the two provinces.[2] After all, as an English scholar has admitted since the opening of the present war,[3] if history alone were the arbiter, Germany could show a better title to the region than France.

What grieves the school men most, apparently, what rouses their indignation to the highest pitch, is that the provinces were annexed to Germany against the will of their inhabitants, the greater part of whom, it is claimed, have remained at heart ever loyal to *La Patrie*.[4] "How they have suffered from the brutal War of 1870!" is the sentiment of a school

[1] Foncin: Géographie de France, Enseignement Secondaire, pp. 120-121.

[2] The historical argument is, indeed, sometimes used by French writers, e. g., Lanier, etc.: La France et ses Colonies. Cours du Certificat d'Études Primaires, p. 54.

[3] Rose, J. Holland: The Origins of the War, p. 92.

[4] Rocherolles: Les Secondes Lectures, p. 13; Lavisse: La Première Année d'Histoire de France, p. 216; Foncin: La Première Année de Géographie, p. 29; Chalamet: Mes Premières Lectures, p. 77; Guyau: L'Année Préparatoire, Cours Elémentaire, p. 195; Gérard: Morale, p. 184.

reader. "Their heart still bleeds, they cannot accustom themselves to being French no longer."[1] "Oh, Papa!" exclaims little Louis, in one of those dialogue stories with which French textbooks abound. "What pain it must give the people of Alsace and Lorraine to see German soldiers in command over them, to perceive from afar the French flag under which they are unable to range themselves!"[2]

It is stated that the Germans have ill-treated the folk of the conquered lands.[3] A story is told of one Jerome Brunner, who was condemned to three months' imprisonment for flying the French flag.[4] "In this unhappy country of Alsace," says Chalamet, "one risks being spied upon and denounced. Each day brings news of condemnations as ridiculous as they are odious. . . . Young people are thrown into prison for having sung the Marseillaise, or for having spoken ill of Germany."[5] It is

[1] Juranville et Berger: La Troisième Livre de Lecture, p. 54.

[2] Mabilleau: Cours d'Instruction Civique, p. 7.

[3] Schrader et Gallouédec: Cours Général de Géographie, p. 513; Chalamet: Mes Premières Lectures, p 83; Blanchet: Précis d'Histoire, p. 244.

[4] Chalamet: Jean Felber, pp. 347-349.

[5] Ibid.

stated that the inhabitants of the provinces have never ceased to protest against incorporation in the Empire,[1] that many of them migrate to France each year to avoid being under German rule.[2] Thus General Lavisse says: "In order not to become Germans many natives of Alsace and Lorraine left their villages and towns; the old houses where their parents had lived, the fields, the factories, all their fortunes, they abandoned to remain Frenchmen.

"Others remain there, submitting perforce to the laws of Germany, but at the bottom of their hearts they always love France; they hope one day to come back to her." [3] The tragedy of the separation from the homeland is perhaps best brought out in Alphonse Daudet's little masterpiece, "La Dernière Classe," even more popular among the school children of France than among American boys and girls, for whom the pathos of the master's farewell to his scholars is sometimes marred by the painful requirements of translation.

Thus many children in France have been led

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[1] Jallifier et Vast: Histoire Contemporaine, Cours de Philosophie, p. 600.

[2] Ibid.; Burle: L'Histoire Nationale, p. 65.

[3] Lavisse: Tu Seras Soldat, pp. 29-30.

to look upon the Alsace-Lorraine region as rightfully theirs. The school has helped to prevent the soporific influence of Time from gradually and unprotestingly lulling the youth of the country into insensibility to the wounds and sufferings of 1870. Education has been used to aid in molding a psychology of reparation.

The doctrine of *revanche* has been further buttressed in the schools by criticisms of Germany and the Germans, which amount at times to an inculcation of dislike, antagonism, even hatred. Compayré, for example, in a book of moral and civic instruction, warns his youthful readers against entertaining too strong a liking for other countries, and especially against any friendly feeling toward Germany. "Do not place in the same rank in your affections France, which is your common mother, and England, Italy, Spain. . . . As for the people who have done evil to your country, who have ravaged its territory, who have massacred its infants, how could you love them?"[1] Other writers aver that Germany combines the brutality of barbarous races with the intelligent dissimulation of the most

[1] Compayré: Éléments d'Instruction Morale et Civique, p. 62.

civilized,[1] that she has risen to power by intrigue, cunning and abominable warfare.[2] The eminent historian Lavisse accuses her of hating France, against whom she has long been planning a new war,[3] while the author of another historical text directly advises the French to cultivate a "patient hatred of the invader."[4]

Such hatred toward Germany the writer of a recent book of moral and civic instruction deprecates, yet himself naïvely suggests by warning French youth against Teutonic arrogance and brutality.

"Let us not hate; let us surpass! Hatred is a low sentiment. Besides no passion so generally prevents one from observing carefully and reasoning well. Of what advantage is it, for example, to hate the Germans? Let us surpass them in ardor for work, in the intelligent utilization of knowledge, in commercial patience. Let us surpass them by not having their

[1] Pigeonneau: L'Europe, p. 215; Reclus: Géographie, p. 82.

[2] Pape-Carpantier: Éléments de Cosmographie, Géographie, p. 82; Dubois: France et Colonies, p. 132.

[3] La Nouvelle Deuxième Année d'Histoire de France, p. 405 (Edition of 1901); Hanriot: Vive la France, p. 274.

[4] Pigeonneau: Histoire de France, p. 274.

arrogance, their brutality, their disdain for the rights of other nations." [1]

That Germany's conduct of the War of 1870 was implacably cruel and barbarous,[2] characterized also by insolence and brigandage,[3] is another of the accusations brought against her. "Recently," says M. Reclus, "they [the Germans] have proved that the basis of their morality is *Zweckmässigkeit* (the end justifies the means)." Germany "has shown that her last word is a brute-like discipline, a science commanded by ambition, a brutality in the service of violence, and a national pride ministering to madness." [4] Not infrequently, and especially in the earlier textbooks, appear stories of those atrocities which the French claim to have characterized Germany's invasion of France in 1870. A favorite tale is that of the three instructors of the department of the Aisne, whom the Germans shot, apparently in order to terrorize the inhabitants of the region through which the invading army was march-

[1] Payot: La Morale à l'École (Quatrième édition, 1910), p. 227.

[2] Duruy, V.: Petite Histoire Générale, p. 247; Hanriot: Vive la France, p. 16; Gérard: Morale, p. 227.

[3] Pigeonneau: Histoire de France, p. 274.

[4] Reclus: Géographie, p. 82.

ing.[1] The following version of the story is given in the "Lectures Pratiques" of MM. Jost et Braeunig:[2]

THE THREE INSTRUCTORS OF THE AISNE

"In the court of the Normal School at Laon stands a commemorative monument, the face of which, in black marble, bears this inscription:

TO THE MEMORY
OF THE THREE INSTRUCTORS OF THE AISNE
SHOT BY THE PRUSSIANS
FOR HAVING DEFENDED THEIR FATHERLAND
DURING THE WAR OF 1870-1871

THE COUNCIL-GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT

"With what facts is this inscription connected? In 1870, after the unhappy days of Reichshoffen, Gravelotte and Sedan, the department of the Aisne was invaded, as were so many other French departments. Everywhere the people turned to the duty of defending the country.

"The instructors did not content themselves

[1] Laloi: L'Année Préparatoire d'Instruction Morale et Civique, pp. 109-110; Lavisse: Tu Seras Soldat, pp. 37-45; etc.

[2] Pp. 161-164.

with teaching patriotism, they preached it by example, they paid their debts to it in person —and with their lives.

"At Pasly, Jules Debordeaux, at the head of the national guard, repulsed the enemy, who were seeking to throw a bridge of boats across the river Aisne. But the Germans crossed the river at another point and turned the flank of the valiant defenders. In place of honoring the patriotism and the courage of these brave Frenchmen, they maltreated Jules Debordeaux and another member of the national guard, and shot them on a neighboring hill, firing at them one after the other, as at a living target, and abandoning the bodies without burial.

"At Vauxrexis, Poulette had distributed arms to the national guard. The Prussians shot him with two other patriots. Some twenty persons, arrested as hostages and cruelly maltreated, were forced to bury the dead bodies and to trample on the soil which covered them.

"At Vendières, Leroy was arrested in his classroom, in the midst of his pupils; they accused him of having been one of a body of *francs-tireurs*. He had not been out of his commune; he had not left his class. But no rea-

son, no proof was necessary; he was torn from his family, beaten, led to Châlons and shot.

"'Come,' he cried, 'come and see, ye people of Châlons, how an innocent Frenchman dies.' Of four condemned men, the unfortunate Leroy was the fourth to be shot. To the last moment he held his right hand up, as though still to affirm his innocence.

"Leroy had taken no effective part in the defense of the country, but was the victim of a wicked condemnation, intended above all to terrorize the people; but he died a man of courage and his name should be associated with those of his colleagues who paid with their lives for their devotion to the Fatherland."

Another story is that of the heroic peasant woman who was shot by the Prussians for refusing to betray the direction taken by a French regiment.[1] Children coming under the influences of such teachings must naturally incline to look upon the Germans with distrust and dislike, must believe them capable of the worst barbarities.

"When their eyes were moist with tears," says General Lavisse, describing the effects of such recitals on the pupils of a school, "when

[1] Lebaigue: Le Livre de l'École. Choix de Lectures, etc.

indignation was depicted on their faces at the memory of cruelties inflicted, the master was content. These young hearts would love France well, since they already knew how much she had to suffer.''[1]

This dark and somber picture of Teutonism, however, is not wholly unrelieved by the light of praise. Certain qualities of the Germans the French lad is called upon to admire and presumably to imitate. The perseverance and the spirit of discipline by which Prussia has become powerful are commended;[2] so also is the Teutonic ardor for work.[3] Guyau says that while German children labor less quickly than French, they do so with no less courage. They learn and preserve the habit of discipline, the first quality of a soldier.[4] In rare instances a writer rises above the attitude of hostility to something approaching friendliness.[5] The authors of a manual of moral and civic instruction even go so far as to maintain that the

[1] Lavisse: Tu Seras Soldat, pp. 37-38.

[2] Dupuy: Livret de Géographie, p. 18.

[3] Schrader et Gallouédec: Cours Général de Géographie, p. 504.

[4] L'Année Préparatoire, etc. Cours Élémentaire, pp. 199-200.

[5] Villain, Comtois et Loiret: La Lecture du Jour.

French should love all men, whatever their race, religion or nationality, and those who hold that Germans or Englishmen ought to be detested are not patriots but ignoramuses.[1] Such a statement, however, is exceptional rather than typical. A grudging admiration may, indeed, be yielded to certain qualities of the Germans, but a desire for really friendly relations with the neighboring country is seldom evinced.

In spite of all that has been said, however, it may be affirmed that if the teaching of hostility thus far described constitutes an indictment, it is an indictment against individual writers rather than against the government of France or the nation as a whole. True, certain of the textbooks in which antipathy to the Teutons has been expressed have been extraordinarily well received in France. Compayré's book of moral and civic instruction, to which reference has been made, had at an early date reached its 112th edition and was carried on all the departmental lists.[2] Foncin's elementary geography had, shortly before the war, gone through two hundred and twenty-four edi-

[1] Aulard et Bayet: Morale, Part I., p. 85.

[2] Compayré: Éléments d'Instruction Morale et Civique.

tions;[1] and a number of other books characterized by antagonism to Germany have enjoyed wide sales.[2] Nevertheless, there is no mention of *revanche* in certain books where it might easily have been introduced, while in others it has received but the barest recognition, the slightest of allusions; to the authors of such works, apparently, the doctrine has not become a burning ideal. Furthermore, there has been no enforcement of the teaching of *revanche* or of criticism of Germany, so far as I have found, in the school programs published before the war. Therefore such instruction has lacked the systematic character and the uniformity of the teaching whose aim has been to form a psychological preparation for the national defense. Furthermore, the doctrine of *revanche* in the schools has been modified by the influence of certain ideals and principles which cannot be discussed in the present chapter but which will

[1] Géographie (Première Année), Cours Moyen, p. 29.

[2] Blanchet: Histoire de France, 196th edition in 1904; Rocherolles: Les Secondes Lectures Enfantines, 46th edition in 1904; Jost et Braeunig: Lectures Pratiques, 17th edition in 1899; Chalamet: Jean Felber, 48th edition, date not given; Lanier, Rogeaux et Laborde: La France et ses Colonies. Cours du Certificat d'Études Primaires, 30th edition in 1905, etc.

be dealt with later. Suffice it to say here, then, that the country has not lent complete support to bellicose teachings.

Possibly, however, the future will see a change in this respect. At any rate, if report be true, the inculcation of hostility toward Germany bids fair to become general. According to word received in this country in the autumn of 1915, the Ministry of Public Instruction has distributed "to all the school teachers in France a manual of information on what they should have in mind in teaching history to their classes." In this manual, Paul Deschanel, President of the Chamber of Deputies, recalls the atrocities of 1870, declares that the generosity of France has caused her to forget too easily, and advises the teachers not to allow the lessons of the great war to pass from the minds of the children now growing up, as easily as the lessons of the Franco-German War were allowed to pass from the minds of their elders.[1] Thus, if this evidence can be trusted, antagonism to the "Boches" is being transmitted systematically and officially to yet another generation of Frenchmen.

[1] *New York Times* for September 18, 1915. The item is cabled from Paris and is dated September 17.

It would, indeed, be easy to condemn this sort of instruction wholesale; but there is something ludicrous in the attitude of the armchair moralist who ventures to sit in judgment on the wickedness of those who are attempting seriously to render a service to their Fatherland. Without impropriety, however, the outsider may tentatively inquire whether the possible advantages of such teaching outweigh its possible disadvantages. The doctrine of *revanche* does not, indeed, lack point or definiteness. Its dissemination in the schools would naturally incline a larger number of Frenchmen than otherwise to take up the cudgels against Germany. Presumably it would increase willingness to support a large army and would supply a cogent argument for the tedious years of military training preparatory to actual warfare. It might lend a fury of effectiveness to the fighting of the French when at last the enemy should appear at the gates. Thus it would tend to foster a certain kind of loyalty to the Fatherland.

On the other hand, there must always lie a grave danger to society in education thus tinctured with chauvinism. Even though this sort of instruction has not been universal it has

tended to breed in the hearts of many Frenchmen suspicion of the good faith of their neighbors, while it has naturally weakened German confidence in the peaceful intentions of France. For, of course, it was well known in the land beyond the Rhine that Frenchmen were inculcating hostility toward Germany. Furthermore, it is in a soil of mutual suspicion and ill-will that modern warfare breeds most easily. "The causes of war in the future," wrote ex-President Eliot several years ago, "are likely to be national distrusts, dislikes, and apprehensions, which have been nursed in ignorance, and fed on rumors, suspicions, and conjectures propagated by unscrupulous newsmongers, until suddenly developed by some untoward event into active hatred, or widespread alarm which easily passes into panic."[1] But if unscrupulous journalism is dangerous, how much more so is that chauvinistic instruction which in the impressionable years of life creates a militant bias from which biology itself makes escape difficult after manhood has been reached! That the sufferings and passions of war should now

[1] Eliot, C. W.: Some Roads Toward Peace. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of Intercourse and Education. Publication No. I, p. 14.

incline the French to transmit to their children their present feelings of bitterness against the invaders of their country is natural. But let us hope that when the smoke of today's conflict has at last cleared away, that noble and generous people, to whose humanitarian ideals the world already owes so much, will hasten the day of universal peace through an education at once fair-minded and tolerant, just and forgiving.

CHAPTER IV

THE TEACHING OF LOYALTY TO THE REPUBLIC

On the fourth of September, 1870, France became a republic for the third time. Two days before, at Sedan, the gallantry of French arms had yielded to the efficiency and bravery of Prussian discipline. The mediocre adventurer who had followed the star of destiny to the throne of empire had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The news had come to Paris, had been communicated to the Chamber of Deputies, and this body "in the midst of a glacial silence"[1] had voted the dethronement of Napoleon III. The power of the man who had been at the head of the French nation since 1848, first as president, then as emperor, had fallen like a house of cards. Now, on the fourth, a throng of people—a mob, if you will—burst into the hall where the Assembly was sitting. There were cries of "Down with the Empire!"

[1] De Coubertin: The Evolution of France under the Third Republic, p. 3.

"Long live the Republic!" The leaders of the opposition were seized, were marched through the streets of Paris to the Hotel de Ville. There the Republic was solemnly proclaimed. Thus suddenly, after the French manner, was initiated that form of government which has served France for more than forty-five years.

It was to all appearances but a fragile bark that was thus launched on the stormy seas of warfare and politics. There were many in those early days who felt that the Republic would founder ere she had well begun her voyage. There have been many since who have predicted that she could never hold her course. For from the outset she has been threatened by grave dangers. First it seemed that the ship of state might fall afoul of the rock-ribbed principle of monarchy. This might take the form of a Legitimist restoration, an acknowledgment of Bonapartist claims to empire or the lifting to power of some new adventurer. Then there were the lowering clouds of clerical disfavor, perhaps not seriously endangering, but at any rate overshadowing the safety of the Republic. Thirdly, the new government might be engulfed in the whirlpool of social revolution. In the angry tempest of war now raging

these dangers take on new significance; and France is fortunate in having safeguarded herself against internal crisis by an education of loyalty, as she has armed herself against external crisis by an education in patriotism.

For some years after the Franco-German War the menace of monarchical restoration lay heavy on the hearts of those who loved the Republic. The National Assembly, chosen to decide the question of war or peace with Germany, contained a majority of monarchists; for the peasant electors had feared that the Republican party would attempt to prolong the struggle. Naturally this Assembly aimed to reestablish a throne in France. Therefore it continued to sit after it had completed the task for which it had been convened. But its members were divided in regard to candidates. Some supported the Bourbon, the "legitimate" line, others the House of Orleans, while still others remained loyal to the dynasty of the Bonapartes. Furthermore, the Assembly found an obstacle to the accomplishment of a monarchical restoration in the person of Adolphe Thiers, the astute old gentleman who for the time being held the office of President of the Republic.

Himself a monarchist, a former minister of Louis Philippe, Thiers felt the Republic to be conducive to internal tranquillity. It was he who invented the happy formula, "The Republic is the form of government that divides us least." He therefore advocated its continuance. He succeeded in converting many deputies to his views, and the monarchists, alarmed for their cause, brought about his resignation in 1873.

In that year the prospect seemed bright that a king would soon be seated on the throne of France. Between Legitimists and Orleanists an agreement was being arranged. The Comte de Chambord, the Bourbon claimant to the throne, was childless, and so consented to acknowledge as his heir the Comte de Paris, who represented the House of Orleans. But a seeming trifle spoiled the plan. The Comte de Chambord, inheritor of Bourbon pride and Bourbon obstinacy, refused to accept the tricolor flag, insisting on the fleur-de-lis, that ancient emblem of absolutism. No amount of persuasion could make the old man change his mind, and to his decision the monarchists perforce must yield.

Nevertheless they did not lose heart, but took

such measures as seemed best suited to the ultimate triumph of their cause. A law fixed the president's term of office at seven years. During this long period much might happen. For example, Chambord might die, and the more tractable Comte de Paris would then become the candidate of two monarchical parties. Meanwhile a supposedly staunch royalist, Marshal MacMahon, was elected president. Alas for the hopes of those who would fain be ruled by a king! Republican influence grew steadily during MacMahon's presidency, and he, finding himself utterly at odds with the Chamber of Deputies, resigned in 1879, a year before the normal expiration of his term. Immediate danger of one-man rule ceased, and frightened Republicans breathed easily again.

The peril to the existing government was revived a few years later, however. The three years from 1886 to 1889 constituted a period of nervous political tension. Scandals in the household of the president, petty bickerings in politics, colonial ambitions of which many disapproved, and the storm-attended secularization of education brought discontent and aroused enmity toward the Republic. Wiseacres pointed out that no form of government in France since

1789 had lasted more than eighteen years; they saw no reason why the Republic should be an exception. Hence the French love of change, the French tendency to hero-worship, fastened themselves on the person of the dashing General Boulanger. This handsome and popular "Man on Horseback" appeared quite willing to play the rôle of dictator, which destiny seemed to have assigned him. For a time he filled Republican leaders with apprehension. But he lacked the courage for a *coup d'état,* and fearing to face the charges of conspiracy brought against him, fled to Belgium where he later committed suicide. The Republic emerged from the fiasco stronger than ever. Nevertheless the vague shadow of Caesarism ever lurks in the background of French politics. "Nervous Republicans . . ." says the Abbé Dimnet, "dread the possibility of having to love another dictator."[1]

Naturally enough, therefore, the public school has come to the rescue of those who would prevent the national tendency to hero-worship from hypnotizing the mind of France. It may surprise admirers of Napoleon I to learn how badly he fares at the hands of the writers of

[1] Dimnet: France Herself Again, p. 72.

French textbooks. True, he is admitted to have been a great captain,[1] a wonderful administrator and legislator.[2] One writer goes so far as to say that "his institutions, his ardent love for France, the services he had rendered, should cause his faults, harshly expiated, to be pardoned."[3] But this, the only really commendatory summary of Napoleon's character I have found in the textbooks, is as nothing in comparison with the avalanche of condemnation which has overwhelmed the Corsican's name. "When I teach you that Napoleon I reigned from 1804 to 1815, I contribute to your instruction," says Compayré, "but when I show you that Napoleon I was an ambitious man, an egotist, who for the satisfaction of his vanity made millions of men perish, I contribute to your education."[4] Napoleon is criticized for the war with Spain, for the Russian campaign,

[1] Blanchet et Pinard: Cours Complet, p. 528: ibid., pp. 543, 544; Jallifier et Vast: Cours Complet d'Histoire. Cours Troisième. Histoire Contemporaine, p. 177; Lavisse: Livret d'Histoire, p. 38; Aulard et Bayet: Morale, Part I, p. 170.

[2] Jallifier et Vast, op. cit., p. 177; Lavisse: Livret d'Histoire, p. 39.

[3] Pigeonneau: Histoire de France, p. 217 (10th edition, 1882).

[4] Éléments d'Instruction Morale et Civique, p. 34.

for the final loss of his conquests,[1] for his pitiless censorship of the press,[2] for his inability to endure contradiction,[3] for his persecution of the Republicans who refused to serve him.[4] It is said that he lacked political insight, spilled the blood of France in unreasonable and unjust wars, and changed to hatred the love with which that country had inspired Europe.[5] In commenting on the conclusion of the Egyptian campaign a writer says: "There returned from the Orient a young hero, . . . who, everywhere conqueror of nature and men, wise, moderate, religious, seemed born to enchant the world. . . . Nevertheless, after some years, this wise man, now changed to a fool . . . immolated a million men, . . . drew Europe upon France, which he left vanquished, drowned in her own blood, . . . desolated. Who could have foreseen that the wise man of 1800 would be the madman of 1813? Yes, one could have foreseen it by remembering that absolute power

[1] Ibid., p. 24; Lavisse: Livret d'Histoire de France, Opuscule du Maître, p. 32; Lebaigue: Le Livre de l'École. Cours supérieur, p. 248.

[2] Bernard et Thomas: Résumé, p. 166.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Aulard et Debidour: Notions d'Histoire, p. 279.

[5] Lefrançais: Lectures Patriotiques, p. 247.

carries in itself an incurable madness."[1]

The historian Lavisse, after commending him for the institutions that he established, concludes, "But in founding equality he forgot liberty. He desired to rule France, as he did his soldiers, without contradiction. He treated as public enemies all those who attempted to resist him, and who claimed, even timidly, the liberties which the Constituent Assembly had given to the people. His own will he recognized as the sole law. His pride finally destroyed him; he was the artisan of his own ruin, and after so many victories and conquests, he left France smaller than he had found her, thus demonstrating that a nation commits an irreparable mistake in abandoning itself to one man, even when that man has received the gift of genius."[2] Thus for his pride, for his egotism, for his despotism, the Corsican who gave his name to an era has been held up to the youth of France as a warning. "Let us admire his military genius," says the author of a historical text, "but let us not desire to find again a

[1] Lebaigue: Le Livre de l'École. Cours Supérieur, p. 248, quoting Thiers.

[2] Lavisse: La Nouvelle Deuxième Année d'Histoire de France, p. 336.

new Bonaparte. He has done too much evil to France."[1]

Louis Napoleon shares the opprobrium which attaches to his uncle's name. "Inconceivable irony of revolutions!" exclaim the authors of a school history. "He [Napoleon III] was promised the presidency of the Second Republic because he was the nephew of him who destroyed the first."[2] His coup d'état of December 2, 1851, by means of which he paved the way for the establishment of the Empire, is said to have been a wicked violation of his oath, a crime against the state.[3] School children have not been allowed to forget the martyrdom of the deputy Baudry, who was killed while protesting against the coup d'état, at the very moment when he was adjuring the soldiers to refuse to violate the law.[4] "Better to be killed in doing one's duty," says Paul Bert, "than to

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[1] Normand: Biographies et Scènes Historiques, p. 208.

[2] Bernard et Thomas: Résumé Chronologique de l'Histoire des Français, p. 189.

[3] Aulard et Debidour: Notions d'Histoire, pp. 336-337; Lefrançais: Lectures Patriotiques, pp. 247-248; Villain, Comtois et Loiret, op. cit., p. 135; Lavisse: La Nouvelle Deuxième Année d'Histoire de France, p. 270.

[4] Burle: L'Histoire Nationale Racontée aux Enfants, p. 56; Bert: L'Instruction Civique, p. 78.

live in wealth and power after having violated the law and proved false to one's oaths like Louis Bonaparte."[1]

So, too, his foreign policy has received severe condemnation. Especially is he held responsible for causing the Franco-German War,[2] for Sedan,[3] and for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine.[4] "Napoleon III declared war without rhyme or reason, on the Russians, the Austrians, the Mexicans, the Prussians," says one writer, "and finally he brought about the loss of Alsace and Lorraine, to say nothing of the billions of indemnity that had to be paid."[5] "The imperial government," says another, "had ill prepared France for a war which its policy had rendered inevitable."[6]

This severity of criticism has, indeed, been tempered by a more tolerant attitude in some of the more recent textbooks, which tend to

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[1] Bert: L'Instruction Civique, p. 78.

[2] Ibid.; Blanchet et Pinard: Cours Complet, p. 594; Burle: L'Histoire Nationale Racontée aux Enfants, p. 65; Augé et Petit: Histoire de France. Cours Moyen, p. 179.

[3] Bernard et Thomas, op. cit., p. 189; Villain, Comtois et Loiret: La Lecture du Jour, p. 135.

[4] Bert: L'Instruction Civique, p. 25.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Blanchet et Pinard: Cours Complet, p. 594.

stress his weakness rather than his wickedness. "The emperor was good, with a goodness which amounted to feebleness,"[1] according to one of these texts, but he "sacrificed to his dynastic and personal interests the sacred interest of his country."[2] Thus has education dissipated something of the glamour that has hung so long over this dynasty of adventurers. The public school has distinctly impeded the progress of the Bonapartist propaganda in France.

Attacks on the two Napoleons, however, do not constitute the sole evidence of the determination of textbook writers to exorcise from the hearts of future citizens possible desires for monarchical rule. It is noteworthy that a long list of the great men of France given in a certain school manual does not include a single ruler, not even Charlemagne or St. Louis.[3] Gérard condemns monarchical government as the form farthest removed from the ideal.[4] Compayré says that a king or emperor is al-

[1] Jallifier et Vast: Cours Complet d'Histoire. Cours de Troisième. Histoire Contemporaine, p. 404.

[2] Ibid., p. 415.

[3] Hanriot: Vive la France, pp. 218-250.

[4] Gérard: Morale, p. 196.

ways more disposed to give heed to his own wants, or to show complacency toward courtiers, than to consult the public interests.[1] The possibility of a monarchical revolution is thus brought home to the youth of France by the authors of a school reader:

"Ah, well! you will say, we can be tranquil now. The Republic is firmly established; no one wishes to attempt to overthrow it. History replies to you: 'Have you forgotten the coup d'état of the 18th brumaire, 1799, and of the second of December, 1851, and the Napoleonic despotisms . . . ? Have you forgotten the Boulangist movement which—in spite of the awakening of Sedan—came near submerging all the country, and crushing it anew under a soldier's boot? Who assures you that we shall not see again, grouped around a 'liberator,' a pretender, those people who are at all periods accomplices of movements of violence?

"This peril, always to be feared, is for us to avoid."[2]

For reasons of this sort, the two historians, Aulard and Lavisse, diametrically opposed as are their views in many respects, unite in urg-

[1] Éléments d'Instruction Morale et Civique, p. 169.

[2] Villain, Comtois et Loiret: La Lecture du Jour, p. 204.

ing the future citizens of France not to vote for deputies who would seek to subject the country to the rule of one man.[1]

Possibly there has been little real danger of a coup d'état in twentieth-century France; but if there has been any, the war has inevitably increased it. It is reported that the royalist finds himself in greater favor than formerly. The successful general, too, receives the plaudits of all France, and moves in an atmosphere of hero-worship. Indeed it is said to recommend Joffre in the eyes of his civil superiors that he is not too spectacular, not inclined, apparently, to take advantage of the luster which attaches to his name. Yet there are those who fear even Joffre's power. Whatever danger, however, there may be of a new "Man on Horseback," that danger has been much diminished by the teachings of the school. Children have been taught to look with horror on the man who would use France to further his own ambitions.

[1] Lavisse: La Nouvelle Deuxième Année d'Histoire de France, p. 404; Nationalism is unmercifully condemned in Aulard et Debidour: Notions d'Histoire, p. 382, "Le nationalisme n'est autre chose que le Boulangisme reconstitué (sans Boulanger), par les césariens, les royalistes, les cléricaux, c'est à dire les ennemis toujours acharnés—mais toujours impuissants—de nos libres institutions."

"Clericalism—That is the enemy." It was Gambetta who thus pointed his accusing finger at that power which he believed was subtly striving to undermine the growing strength of the Republic. And indeed the ancient friendship between throne and altar had not ceased with the downfall of Napoleon III. Not without justification is the contention that in those years of doubt before the Republic had fully come to its own, zealous servants of the Church were influencing the children to a belief in monarchy. The bloody days of June in 1848, the Commune of 1871, argues a Catholic textbook of this period, have led many virtuous people to an aversion for Republican rule.[1] Monarchy is essential to peace and the establishment of the European equilibrium.[2] The school must be freed from the influence of the Church—so

[1] Colart: Histoire de France, p. 206.

[2] Ibid., Introduction, p. 9; Colart attacks Gambetta directly. "A cause de ses attachés au parti radical, il ne peut empêcher l'envahissement des différentes administrations par les déclassés de la faction. De là tant de scandales; dilapidations par certains fournisseurs, généraux improvisés, violences contre les hommes d'ordre, municipalités ignorantes et audacieuses, excès sanglants à Lyon, à Marseille, à Perpignan," p. 26. *See also* Bert, P.: L'Instruction Religieuse dans l'École, p. 57; Zévort: Troisième République, pp. 35, 97.

thought Republicans—before the government would cease to be endangered by clericalism.

Public education was captured from the Church in the early eighties, as has already been pointed out; and the Republic was free to use the school to carry out its own aims. Nevertheless there were those who were not satisfied, who still felt the Church to be a menace to the state. They wanted the government to cease paying salaries to the clergy; they desired the extinction of private religious schools. Indeed, in the excitement that followed the Dreyfus case, opposition to the Church became almost a mania. The extreme anti-clerical found it difficult to forgive his Maker for pretending to exist, while the hope of immortality was construed into an insult to the Third Republic.

It is not necessary to discuss here the details of the complex final struggle between Church and State. The separation was ordered by the laws of 1905; and another act provided that by 1914 all teaching by religious orders should cease. In the conflict the public school was theoretically neutral. The primary school teacher was definitely instructed through the official programs to avoid anything in language or attitude that might wound the re-

ligious beliefs of the children confided to his care, or that might trouble their hearts![1] Tolerance was one of the great ideals transmitted to the Third Republic by the Revolution. To that ideal, Republicans maintained they would be true.

Practically, however, there can be no doubt that the lay school was used actively to safeguard the state against the real or supposed peril of clericalism. Neutrality was violated. An alarmed pedantry insisted on striking from a popular Latin grammar the expression "*Deus est Sanctus*,"[2] and in a school edition of La Fontaine's Fables, the latter part of the sentence "*Petit poisson deviendra grand, si Dieu lui prête vie*" was changed to "*Si l'on lui prête vie.*"[3] But such changes, foolish though they might be, the children themselves would pass over unnoticed—unless indeed they were precociously inclined to text criticism. Uncon-

[1] *Plan d'Études des Écoles Primaires Élémentaires* (1887-1909), p. 42: ibid., pp. 41, 45; ibid., 1882, p. 35: *Plan d'Études . . . des Écoles Primaires Normales,* 1905, p. 6: *Plan d'Études . . . des Écoles Primaires Supérieures,* 1909, p. 47.

[2] Chatterton-Hill: Decline of the French Republic, Nineteenth Century, Vol. 72, pp. 273 ff.

[3] Ibid.

scious of the expurgation of the Deity, their religious beliefs would remain as before. But what of the little lady trained to a trustful faith in the Catholic Church as the sole road to salvation, who reads in a book of moral instruction the following passage:

"No one belief in regard to God, the origin of the world and the destiny of Man is accepted by all thinking beings: on these questions we can but make suppositions.

"Three great religions are shared by the majority of men: Buddhism, Christianity, Mohammedanism. These three religions are not in accord on any dogma. Christians themselves are divided into Protestants, Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics, etc. These are not in accord in belief.

"This proves that no one knows the whole truth, so it is foolish and criminal to wish to persecute someone who does not share our beliefs. Let everyone believe according to his feelings. Let everyone be free to believe or not to believe."[1]

A mature mind might not be disturbed by such teachings, but they are well adapted to plant in the heart of a child the germs of doubt

[1] Payot: La Morale à l'École, p. 231.

and distrust. Furthermore, certain textbooks suggest opposition to Catholicism more directly by pointing to the shortcomings of the Church in the past. Compayré is particularly skillful at this sort of insinuation, clothing it in a thin disguise of impartiality. Paul Bert, too, tells how the Catholics persecuted Nonconformists, showing a woodcut to illustrate the dragonnades in the Cevennes, Protestants hanging by the neck, while a sleek priest stands comfortably by.[1] It is not hard to understand why, when the manuals of Compayré and Bert first appeared, about 1882, the voices of Catholics were raised in furious protest.[2] A more recent text of moral and civic instruction by Professor Aulard and a colleague shows an even stronger anti-Catholic bias. "The morality taught in this manual," admit the authors, "is laïcal and positive, that is to say, independent of any religious confession and of any metaphysical system regarding the unknowable."[3] They teach specifically that it cannot be proved

[1] Bert: L'Instruction Civique, p. 136.

[2] Buisson: La Lutte Scolaire (chapter by Dessaye), pp. 268 ff.

[3] Aulard et Bayet: Morale et Instruction Civique, Avertissement.

scientifically that God exists.[1] They call attention to the persecutions and intolerance of the Church in the past,[2] while by means of a "Dialogue between a Jesuit Father and a Virtuous Man" they score the Jesuit order for its "doctrine of equivocation."[3] The popularity

[1] Part I, p. 150.

[2] Ibid., pp. 156, 157, 161, 164.

[3] Ibid., pp. 111-112.

"Dialogue between a Jesuit Father and a Virtuous Man."

"I wish now to speak to you," said the Jesuit, "of the easy means which we have used to avoid sins in conversation. One of the most embarrassing things is to avoid lying, especially when one is anxious to have something false believed. In such case our doctrine of equivocation serves admirably, which permits the use of ambiguous terms, causing them to be understood differently from what one understands them oneself. But are you clear as to what must be done when one finds no equivocal words?"

"No, Father."

"So I thought," he said; "that is not very well known. It is the doctrine of mental reservations: One can swear that one has not done a thing, even if one has really done it, with a mental reservation that one has not done it on a certain day, or that one has not done it before being born."

"Why, Father, is not that a lie and even perjury?"

"No," said the Father, "and there is another even more certain means of avoiding falsehood. And that is, after having said aloud 'I swear I have not done that,' to add under one's breath 'today'. You can easily see that that is telling the truth."

"I confess it is," said I, "but perhaps we would find that

of this book is indicated by its wide sale.[1]

Thus have the over-zealous writers of texts [2] attempted to safeguard the government against a foe once powerful, but a foe whose sharpest fangs had been drawn some years before Pope Leo, of blessed memory, commanded the faithful of France to accept the Republic.[3] Yet there is little probability that the psychology of patriotism and loyalty, described in the present work, would ever have developed had the school remained under the control of Mother Church.

If the devotee of Republican government

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telling the truth under one's breath means telling a lie out loud!" (Adapted from Pascal.)

[1] In 1902 the sale had reached 63,000 copies.

[2] *See further* Aulard et Debidour: Notions d'Histoire Générale et d'Histoire de France, pp. 135, 137-140, 155, 187; Villain, Comtois et Loiret: op. cit., p. 195; Belot: La République Française, p. 47; ibid., La Vie Civique, pp. 52, 53, 200; Despois et Labérennes: Lectures Morales, pp. 341-347. Belot: La Vie Civique, pp. 201-203, comments freely on the law of 1905. The schoolmaster in a dialogue says: "The separation of Church and State is a liberal measure, destined to complete the work of secularization which the Republic had undertaken and to assure the definite triumph of liberty of conscience." To which the pupil replies: "I do not see why there are people hostile to a law as generous and as liberal as that of the 9th of December, 1905."

[3] This was in 1893.

fears the influence of monarchist and cleric, he is not disposed to dismiss lightly the restless discontent of the workingman. To the good bourgeois of France, revolutionary socialism must appear, not as a distant cloud on the horizon, disquieting but little a people basking in the sunshine of prosperity, but as a smoldering volcano, which, in time of national excitement, may burst into eruption. For France has had two fearful lessons—the awful days of June in 1848 and the terrible Commune of 1871. Each of these revolts was signalized by fratricidal fierceness, bloody street fighting, incendiary fires and dreadful suffering. Each left a legacy of hatred between bourgeoisie and proletariat. But the Commune was the harder to forgive; for it came on the heels of a great national disaster; it was another sword, thrust deep into the wounded, weeping body politic. Europe looked on amazed; and angry France crushed the outbreak with a rigor heightened by hot resentment.

For some time after the Commune the forces of discontent remained quiescent. Then came a new development of socialism, out of which grew syndicalism. Syndicalism, dissatisfied with the older traditions of socialism, is "bent

on conferring upon trade unions, grouped more or less closely in a General Confederation of Labor, the powers which now belong to the Republican and middle-class state."[1] The syndicalist leaders have lost confidence in the ballot; they have used the strike effectively to attain immediate results from employers, while they have preached preparation for open war, at some later day, against the capitalistic classes of society. They have taught anti-militarism, even anti-patriotism, and have fraternized with the workingmen of other countries. Today these men are fighting their German "brothers" in the trenches—the *Marseillaise* has had its victory over the *Internationale.* But not long before the great war broke out it was feared that syndicalism might bring a dissolution of the union, the *mariage de raison,* between the laboring class and the republic.[2]

In many a textbook writer the Third Republic has found a doughty champion to defend her against the danger of the social revolution. Compayré, for example, in the manual of moral and civic instruction to which reference has

[1] Bourgeois, in Cambridge Modern History, Vol. XII, p. 128.

[2] Ibid.

been made, thus attempts to prick the bubble of the laborer's discontent. *Georges,* the youthful hero of the book, writes to his former instructor his impressions of a workingmen's congress which he has been attending at Marseilles. "I shall not conceal from you that I am moved by the liveliness of their complaints. . . . They trace the most desolate pictures of the situation of the laborer." To his fears the master replies, "How . . . could one hear without protest this new appeal to the Revolution? How tolerate this sophism . . . that there can be no social progress without violent revolution? Do you not understand, Georges, that it can no longer be a question of revolution, since the citizens enjoy the rights of suffrage?"[1] Certain authors teach that the June Days and the Commune were mistaken attempts to overthrow the existing order, even that they were terrible crimes.[2] Other writers,

[1] Éléments, etc., pp. 181-183.

[2] Duruy, V.: Petite Histoire Générale, pp. 247-248; Blanchet et Pinard: Cours Complet, p. 579; Blanchet: Histoire de France, p. 246; "Of all insurrections of which history has preserved the memory," says Lavisse, "the wickedest surely was that of March, 1871, which took place under the very eyes of a conquering enemy." La Nouvelle Deuxième Année d'Histoire de France, p. 390.

while acknowledging the right of laborers to strike, nevertheless caution against the abuse of that right, "for, my children, if strikes are sometimes useful, often also they have been disastrous and have degenerated into violence." [1] In order to increase the loyalty of the working classes to the Republic, attention is also called to the benefits which it has conferred on them. "It is not astonishing that workingmen should be attached to the Republic; it is the Republic which has emancipated them, which has proclaimed them grown-up, that is to say, free from all tutelage, free to form associations, free to defend their interests as all previous governments had held them in defiance." [2] "Do not blush to be a workman," says Laloi, "but do not despise on the other hand, those who do not work with their hands, nor think of them as parasites." [3]

Sometimes syndicalism and certain doctrines

[1] Fouillée: Francinet, p. 332; Laloi: La Première Année d'Instruction Morale et Civique, p. 64; Belot: La Vie Civique, p. 234; Gérard: Morale, p. 218.

[2] Petit et Lamy: Jean Lavenir, p. 284; Aulard et Debidour: Notions d'Histoire Générale et d'Histoire de France, p. 405.

[3] La Première Année d'Instruction Morale et Civique, p. 64.

of socialism are rather severely criticized. True, there is a disposition on the part of a number of writers to regard coöperative societies with favor and to impress children with the advantage of these for the working classes.[1] "Coöperation," says Belot, "is born of sympathy, of sociability, as much as of self-interest; it can contribute powerfully to the strengthening and fostering of morality." [2] On the other hand, the same man says of the syndicates that "they ought not to inject themselves into political or religious struggles, nor should they transform themselves into instruments of despotism or tyranny. . . . Syndicalism creates no monopoly. Nevertheless there exists a doctrine which would extend the *decisions of syndicates* to all the workmen of the same industry." [3] The old idea of the equal distribution of goods is refuted by the ancient argument that such distribution could not be lasting because of the inequalities of human character.[4] "Property

[1] Compayré: Éléments, p. 186; Fouillée: Francinet, pp. 327-332; Petit et Lamy: Jean Lavenir, pp. 286, 353-357; Belot: La Vie Civique, pp. 219-279; Ganneron: Tu Seras Citoyen, pp. 193-194.

[2] La Vie Civique, p. 279.

[3] Le Peuple, p. 39.

[4] Gérard: Morale, p. 122; Compayré: Éléments, p. 185.

should be inviolable and sacred like the work of which it is the product."[1] Pontsevrez opposes the communism of Plato. "This total sacrifice of the individual to the ideal state is contrary to nature." He holds that Saint-Simonism is also a step backward because it suppresses individual liberty, and reasons that to do away with the right of inheritance would be to destroy an important incentive to work. "It would be an injustice to those who by their work have acquired property and by their wisdom have economized for the sake of their children. Society would not be the gainer; for not being sure of handing down his goods, the individual would work less, would produce less."[2] Compayré sums up the arguments against socialism to his own satisfaction and presumably to that of his juvenile public by stating that "those who protest against capital have only one purpose—to acquire capital themselves."[3] The essence of Pontsevrez's view is that "of

Compayré adds that such distribution "étant la violation du droit de ceux qui possèdent déjà elle est la négation de toute justice." Rather a naïve argument for a disciple of the Revolution of 1789!

[1] Gérard: Morale, p. 122.

[2] Cours de Morale Pratique, pp. 97-99.

[3] Éléments, p. 185.

the ideas of the philosopher the crowd has retained only that which flatters its passions."[1]

Thus it is clear that socialism has been combated in the schools of France, though it has not been shown that such teaching is uniform and systematic. The effect of all these comments on the problem of capital and labor has been, however, to warn a large proportion of the rising generations of France against the use of violence as a means for reforming the existing order. These teachings, then, have made for the stability of the Third Republic.

Not only by pedagogic warnings against the perils lurking in the shadows of the national life, however, but also by a more direct inculcation of loyalty to the Revolution and the Republic has the present form of government been strengthened. From one point of view the Third Republic is simply the logical sequence of the French Revolution, the effective instrument for putting into practice the principles of 1789. Hence opposition to the Revolution implies opposition to the Republic; acceptance of it implies allegiance to the régime now in force. "The Revolution has put an end to all the iniquities of which I have given you a sum-

[1] Op. cit., p. 98.

mary view," says Boniface, "since the Republic has completed the work of the Revolution, by replacing the royal authority with the sovereignty of the people." [1]

What the Revolution has accomplished for France the same author thus recites:

"The year 1789 appears to you very far off, my children. It is a memorable date which you ought to have always before your eyes and at the bottom of your hearts, to glorify it, and to honor the memory of those to whom we owe the Revolution.

"It is the Revolution which has suppressed the unjust privileges reserved to the nobility and to the clergy; which has abolished the royal omnipotence, established Justice and Liberty for all, equality among all Frenchmen, who, from being subjects, submissive to the royal authority, were made citizens, members of a free State.

"It is the Revolution which has given birth to the great idea of *La Patrie.*

"To the deputies of the States-General who made the Revolution of 1789 is due our gratitude." [2]

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[1] Pour le Commencement de la Classe, p. 39.

[2] Ibid., p. 38.

So other writers tell of the benefits wrought by the Revolution, taking particular pains to explain the meaning of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity."[1] The "Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," that essence of the spirit of the Revolution, that program of nineteenth-century political reform, is frequently quoted in full in the textbooks, to show the deep and true significance of the movement of 1789.[2] "The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen," says Belot, "is only patriotism in maxims, and the principles of 1789 have fortified patriotism."[3] In 1901 the Chamber of Deputies passed a law by five hundred and forty-one votes to one that the Declaration should be posted in all the schools of

[1] Gérard: Morale, pp. 303-308; Mabilleau: Cours d'Instruction Civique, pp. 25-32; Villain, Comtois et Loiret: La Lecture, p. 375; Bert: L'Instruction Civique, pp. 111-132; Lemoine et Loiret, op. cit., p. 27; Compayré: Éléments, passim; Aulard et Debidour: Notions d'Histoire Générale et d'Histoire de France, passim; etc.

[2] Pavette: La Vie Civique, pp. 7-10; Belot: La Vie Civique, pp. 5-77; Despois et Labérennes: op. cit., pp. 396-398; Mabilleau, Levasseur et Delacourtie: Cours d'Instruction Civique, pp. 16-24; Manuel: Livre Nouveau, pp. 47-50; Aulard et Debidour: Notions d'Histoire Générale, etc., front and rear covers. Jost et Braeunig: Lectures Pratiques, pp. 253-254; etc.

[3] La Vie Civique, p. 74.

France.[1] Sometimes writers depict vividly the miseries of the Ancient Régime, contrasting these with the political happiness which France has enjoyed through the Revolution.[2] Indeed, Paul Bert goes so far as to say, "All that I have taught you up to this point, all that I have led you to love, to admire, 'tis the Revolution that has wrought it."[3]

Though almost inseparably interwoven with attachment to the Revolution, love for the Third Republic itself is even more fundamentally essential. Such love is not necessarily the same, however, as devotion to *La Patrie.* Even a royalist might be a good patriot, ready to die in his country's cause, though unalterably opposed to the present form of government. Hence the precept, "*Aimez la France,*" must be supplanted by the injunction, "Love the republican institutions which France has given herself."[4] As the benefits wrought for the peo-

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[1] Rouvier: L'Enseignement Public en France au Début du XX^{e} Siècle, p. 34.

[2] Fouillée: Francinet, pp. 221-223; Bert: L'Instruction Civique, pp. 131-165. Historians tend to stress this contrast.

[3] L'Instruction Civique, p. 135.

[4] Laloi: La Première Année d'Instruction Morale et Civique (43d edition, 1900), p. 161.

ple by the Revolution are recited, so also are those which are due to the Republic.[1] Thus Belot says:

"The Republic, government of the people, by the people, is a superior form of social organization. Much more than monarchy, the Republic assures liberty and equality, it guarantees men more justice and permits them more fraternity; it opens the way more surely to all beneficent reforms and to all progress. . . .

"The Third Republic must be the final French Republic. All citizens worthy the name must repel all thought of accepting anew a king, an emperor or a dictator. . . .

"The Republic has repaired the disasters of war; it has rebuilt the army and navy; it has restored the national credit; it has placed our frontiers in a state of defense; it has created and progressively fostered an immense colonial domain; it has arranged for the country powerful alliances and solid friendships, and has increased her prestige; it has attempted to

[1] Augé et Petit: Histoire de France, de Louis XI à nos Jours. Cours Moyen, pp. 190-191; Belot: La République Française, p. 3; Boniface: Pour le Commencement de la Classe, p. 39.

lessen the sufferings of the peasant, to labor for industrial and commercial development; it has enlivened and extended considerably the work of education; it has given an impulse hitherto unknown to the labors of foresightedness and of fraternity."[1]

Compayré represents his hero, *Georges,* as going from a rural district to Paris, where the citizens inquire what the feeling in his part of the country is toward the Republic:

"Do your compatriots begin to understand the benefits of the Republic? Do they know that it is the best form of government? That imperial and royal monarchies have finished their terms of existence in France?"

Georges soothes their fears by guaranteeing that his fellow-inhabitants are growing more and more devoted to the Republic.[2]

Thus through suggestion or direct precept pupils have been led to see the reasonableness of the régime under which they live and have been taught attachment to it. The supreme duty of such devotion is expressed by one writer in the words of Montesquieu:

[1] La Vie Civique, pp. 78-79.

[2] Éléments, p. 169.

"Virtue in a Republic is a very simple thing; it is love of the Republic." [1]

The official programs give to the teaching of loyalty to the Revolution and the Republic a more systematic and more general character than it would otherwise have. It is provided, for example, that in the first year of the elementary primary schools, civic instruction shall consist of "very simple explanations, in connection with reading, of words calculated to awaken an idea of nationality, such as: citizen, soldier, army, fatherland, commune, canton, department, nation, law, justice, public force, etc." [2] In the third year are to be taken up, among other things, "The national sovereignty; explanation of the republican device: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity." [3] According to the study plans of the higher primary schools for 1909 and of the primary normal schools for 1910, the teaching of morality is to include: "The republican form of government; its principle and

[1] "La vertu, dans une république, est une chose très simple; c'est l'amour de la république; c'est un sentiment et non une suite de connaissances." Despois et Labérennes, pp. 376-377.

[2] *Organisation Pédagogique . . . des Écoles Primaires Élémentaires,* 1887-1909, p. 24.

[3] Ibid., p. 47.

its superiority. Issued by our consent and modified by our will, there can be nothing arbitrary about it."[1] Thus through these and other official orders[2] the state has endeavored to train the youth of France to look upon the Republic as the natural and best form of government.

From the textbooks examined, then, it appears that the public school, captured from the Church after many a bitter battle, has lent itself to the protection of the order existent in France since 1870. Through the influence of the printed page, not without its power over older minds, but authoritatively effective with the ignorant and immature, the children of France have learned the danger of intrusting the political fortunes of the country to a Caesar, whether he claims the throne by divine right and the sanction of history or tempts by illusory promises

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[1] *Plan d'Études . . . des Écoles Primaires Supérieures de Garçons,* 1909, p. 48; *Plan d'Études . . . des Écoles Primaires Normales,* 1910, p. 6.

[2] *See* passim in the foregoing programs; *also Plan d'Études et Programmes d'Enseignement des Écoles Normales Primaires,* 1889, p. 8; *Plan d'Études . . . de l'Enseignement Secondaire Spécial dans les Lycées et Collèges, Préscrit par Arrêté du 10 août,* 1886; *Plan d'Études . . . de l'Enseignement Secondaire de Garçons,* 1902, passim.

and hopes of national glory. Theoretically taught to be tolerant toward all forms of religion, these same children have, not infrequently, been influenced against Catholicism, whose power has constituted, in the eyes of many fearful Republicans, a danger to the state and to the institutions for which the state has stood since 1870. Sometimes, too, they have been warned against thoughts of social revolution, even against certain socialistic doctrines. They have been led, also, to look upon the Revolution of 1789 as a liberation of the French people from the shackles of feudalism and monarchy. They have been told that the Third Republic is continuing the glorious work of that Revolution, and has already wrought many benefits for those living under its enlightened rule. Little wonder that a critic of the existing régime has said that the Republic should place over the doors of every lay school the motto, "*Super hanc petram ædificabo meam ecclesiam*" (Upon this rock I will build my Church), Matthew 16, 18.

In times of peace and comfort it may seem as if the state needed no such psychological defenses as those I have described. It may seem as if the opposition of the disaffected were but

the froth and foam on the surface of the deep, untroubled waters of contentment. But in the day of crisis the case is different. The history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has shown that in time of national stress and strain, and especially in time of war, the machinations of malcontents may shake the government of the modern state to its very foundations. In such periods the country has need of all the loyalty, all the patriotism of her citizens. Well for her, indeed, if she has patiently built up this loyalty and patriotism in her years of tranquil prosperity!

CHAPTER V

CONTENDING FORCES IN FRENCH EDUCATION

I. PATRIOTIC VERSUS SCIENTIFIC HISTORY

"The true school of patriotism," says Compayré, "is history, national history."[1] The tendency of the historian is to reflect the spirit of his age, and it is the spirit of the nineteenth century that Compayré thus voices. In the Middle Ages the task of the chronicler was to glorify the work of God, as exemplified in the Roman Catholic Church. His successor of Reformation and post-Reformation times used history to buttress the particular sect or creed to which he happened to have given his allegiance. Still later party politics dominated a goodly proportion of historical writing. In the nineteenth century, however, the primary political principle has been that of nationality.

[1] Éléments d'Instruction Morale et Civique, p. 60. *See also* Pécaut: L'Éducation Publique et la Vie Nationale, p. 128; Lavisse: *L'Histoire à l'École,* Revue Pédagogique, Vol. 45, pp. 211 ff.

Therefore many nineteenth-century historians have been intensely patriotic. But devotion to scientific scholarship has also been a prominent characteristic of modern civilization. So through the conflict between these two ideas there has come about a struggle in the French schools between scientific and "patriotic" history.

The modern belief in the principle of nationality originated in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic era. In the dark days of 1793, when France felt herself forced "to establish the despotism of liberty in order to crush the despotism of kings," a fervor of patriotism swept over the country, and the disciples of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" went forth to conquest. Militant missionaries, they aimed to spread by force of arms the new gospel of the Revolution. Then later, when these hosts had become the pliant instrument of Napoleonic ambition, when desire for glory had supplanted the early enthusiasm for liberty, the national feeling awoke in other countries, in reaction against the threatened despotism of the conqueror. From that time the spirit of intense patriotism, born in the pangs of national crisis, became a fundamental article of Europe's po-

litical faith. To this faith many historians of every civilized country have subscribed, fostering and developing it through their art, so peculiarly adaptable to this task.

After the Franco-German War the study of history naturally became a most effective instrument of the educational renaissance. For some twenty years after the defeat of France history in the schools ministered faithfully and continuously to patriotism.[1] Not that the authors of textbooks forgot entirely the spirit of impartiality. A number of them apparently made little attempt to point a patriotic moral. They allowed the narrative, for the most part, to speak for itself. Nevertheless they aroused a fighting devotion to the Fatherland through their emphasis on military events.

This spirit of impartiality is well illustrated in a popular historical text of MM. Blanchet and Pinard (edition of 1888).[2] There is but a small amount of polemics or apologetics in this book. Take, for example, their attitude toward the monarchical principle, which, as citizens of

[1] Duruy: École et Patrie, p. 15.

[2] Cours Complet d'Histoire de France, à l'Usage des Écoles Primaires Supérieures. (Adopted for the schools of Paris.)

a republic, they might well have been expected to condemn unreservedly. They do, indeed, severely criticize Napoleon I, though acknowledging his great military qualities. On the other hand they praise Louis Philippe and have scarcely an unfavorable word for Napoleon III. Furthermore there is in the book no hint of *revanche*. A similar impartiality characterizes the texts of Victor Duruy,[1] Brouard,[2] Ducoudray,[3] and other authors. In such schoolbooks history is not wholly subordinated to nationalism or the desire to safeguard the state. But they may be classed as patriotic histories since they stimulate courage and devotion through their emphasis on battles and campaigns.

In the works of certain other writers of historical texts, however, the patriotic purpose is clearly revealed. Thus M. Burle, the author of a popular little historical text, takes occasion to glorify the Revolution,[4] to suggest *revanche*,[5]

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[1] Duruy, V.: Petite Histoire de France.

[2] Brouard: Leçons d'Histoire de France et d'Histoire Générale, à l'Usage des Écoles Primaires. Cours supérieur. Livre du Maître.

[3] Ducoudray: Récits et Biographies d'Histoire de France. Cours préparatoire.

[4] L'Histoire Nationale, Racontée aux Enfants, etc., p. 48.

[5] Ibid., p. 59.

to condemn the empire of Napoleon III,[1] and to praise the Third Republic.[2] He even goes so far as to maintain that the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, Italy) was directed against France,[3] while the Entente Cordiale between England and France he holds to be the most serious guaranty of the maintenance of peace in the world.[4] "Love the Fatherland, and labor for it," is the moral that he draws from the narrative of his country's past.[5]

In similar fashion lessons of patriotism have been taught in other school histories such as those of Augé and Petit,[6] Zévort,[7] and Foncin.[8] Two textbook writers, however, stand out above their fellow-craftsmen as exponents of the pragmatic conception of history. Divergent as are their points of view in many respects, the celebrated scholars Lavisse and Aulard are at one in believing that the study of

[1] Ibid., p. 65.
[2] Ibid., p. 65.
[3] Ibid., p. 65.
[4] Ibid., p. 68.
[5] Ibid., p. 71.
[6] Augé et Petit: Histoire de France, Cours élémentaire; ibid., Cours moyen.
[7] Zévort: L'Histoire Nationale Racontée aux Adolescents.
[8] Foncin: Textes et Réeits d'Histoire de France (Première année).

history should foster loyalty and patriotism. They do not, however, emphasize the same lessons. Lavisse is concerned primarily with the military defense and the military prestige of France. From the defeats of 1870 he draws the conclusion that Frenchmen must render strong their country,[1] that all economy in regard to the army costs dear.[2] He does not hesitate to assert that the first duty of France is not to forget Alsace and Lorraine, who do not forget her.[3] He further maintains—as has already been pointed out in another connection—that the Germans hate France, that they are ceaselessly manufacturing guns and cannon, that they have long been preparing for war against their neighbor.[4] Thus his widely used historical texts have warned of the coming war, have shown the necessity of preparedness.

Aulard, on the other hand, sounds a different note. It may seem strange to class this much-criticized scholar among the essentially patriotic historians. In 1903 he was denounced by a

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[1] Livret d'Histoire de France. Opuscule du Maître, p. 42.

[2] La Nouvelle Deuxième Année d'Histoire de France, p. 404.

[3] Ibid., p. 406.

[4] Ibid., pp. 404-405.

member of the Chamber of Deputies for having written an anti-patriotic manual of moral and civic instruction, the deputy reproaching him—according to Aulard's own account—with having discredited the military service by saying that it was "an obligation very heavy and very painful."[1] But he is devotedly loyal to the Third Republic and uses history to strengthen allegiance to its institutions and its principles. In a little historical text, written with the aid of a colleague,[2] he puts before his youthful public the benefits of that Revolution to whose study he has devoted so many years and of which he is so ardent a disciple. Nationalism, too, he attacks as a reincarnation of Boulangism.[3] Furthermore, his interpretation of history appears to enable him to bring many an indictment against the Catholic Church,[4] whose services to society seem to him by no means to offset her intolerance toward her enemies. In his criticism of the Church he even goes so far as to say that the Pope's protest against the visit of the President of France at the Court

[1] Aulard: Polémique et Histoire, p. 14.

[2] Aulard et Debidour: Notions d'Histoire Générale et d'Histoire de France.

[3] Ibid., p. 382.

[4] Ibid., pp. 135, 138, 139-140, 155.

of Victor Emmanuel in 1904 has rendered popular among the French people the idea of a separation of Church and State.[1] In general, while Lavisse points his prophetic finger toward a foreign foe, Aulard attempts to guard against influences which he believes to be dangerous to the internal welfare of the state. They are in agreement, however, in warning the children of France against the danger of intrusting the destinies of the nation to a dictator.[2] Furthermore, though Aulard is pacific in tone, he believes, with Lavisse, in a defensive patriotism, ready to resist to the death any attempted invasion of the Fatherland.[3]

For some twenty years after the disasters of 1870, as has been pointed out, patriotic history held the field without dangerous rivalry.[4] Nor did its influence cease at the end of that period; the lessons of devotion to the Fatherland continued all along to be taught through many of the historical texts used in the schools. But toward the end of the nineteenth century the

[1] Ibid., p. 135.

[2] Ibid., pp. 279, 281, 336-337, 382 et passim; Lavisse: Livret d'Histoire, pp. 38-39; Ibid., La Nouvelle Deuxième Année d'Histoire de France, pp. 370, 404; etc.

[3] Aulard: Polémique et Histoire, p. 136.

[4] Duruy: École et Patrie, p. 15.

cold breath of scientific scholarship began to chill the warm glow of patriotic history. A new school of writers, who knew not Sedan, raised the demand that history should serve truth, and truth alone, and that the development of civilization should be emphasized at the expense of "l'histoire-bataille." But while this theory of the subject was discussed by educators from about 1890 on, it was not until 1902 that it seriously affected the official study-plans of the schools.[1] The program for secondary instruction appearing in the latter year greatly restricted the attention to be given to battles and wars.[2] The amount of diplomatic history was also to be reduced, while that of customs, ideas, social usages and political institutions was to be increased. A preponderant position, also, was given to modern times and to the study of contemporary society.[3] A similar

[1] Johnson: Teaching of History, p. 126.

[2] *Plan d'Études et Programmes d'Enseignement dans les Lycées et Collèges de Garçons,* 1902, p. 81. "On n'insistera pas sur le récit des luttes de la Révolution et de l'Empire. Dans les guerres principales le professeur choisira un ou deux exemples de batailles." *See also* pp. 42, 66, 106, 107, etc.

[3] Seignobos, Langlois, etc.: L'Enseignement de l'Histoire, p. 60; Smith, H. F.: History in the French Lycée, p. 17.

spirit animated the programs of the higher primary and the primary normal schools, published a few years later.[1] According to the latter the purpose of the study of history is "to awaken the scientific spirit."[2] In general the programs marked a victory of the scientific, evolutionary conception of history over the military, patriotic conception.

Probably the best series of texts written to conform with the new study-plan was that of Seignobos.[3] Customs and characteristics he has stressed, but has given comparatively little attention to battles and wars. Thus in one of his books he has devoted twenty pages to early life and society in Rome, while allowing but five for the Peloponnesian war.[4] So, too, MM. Jallifier et Vast, authors of another set of historical textbooks, state that they have sought "to fix the attention of pupils on customs and in-

[1] *Plan d'Études . . . des Écoles Supérieures de Garçons,* 1909, p. 15; *Plan d'Études . . . des Écoles Normales Primaires,* p. 68.

[2] Ibid., "Éveiller l'esprit scientifique, qui consiste, dans l'étude de l'histoire, à observer et à rapprocher des faits, à se défier des impressions personnelles comme des déductions logiques, à éviter l'esprit de système et les hypothèses hasardeuses."

[3] *See* Smith, H. F.: History in the French Lycée, p. 28.

[4] Ibid., p. 30.

stitutions, to substitute the history of civilization for history exclusively political.[1] Such treatment of the life of the past is altogether too cold for the volatile Abbé Dimnet, who holds that historical writers of this type were "so Germanized in their thoughts and teaching that it was difficult for their hearers to get at what might be left of sentiment under their scientific principles."[2] That this method of teaching history might become a national menace is the view of Professor Duruy, who disgustedly exclaims, "It is not by celebrating the benefits of the introduction of the potato or the invention of the weaving loom—pacificist themes of the first water—it is not by proclaiming Parmentier and Jacquard national heroes and benefactors of their country, more real than Louis XIV and Napoleon, that one imparts to souls the 'spirit' which helps in the fulfillment of certain difficult duties, like that of which, not without some profit for France, the fellow-soldiers of Villars acquitted themselves at Denain, those of Dumouriez at Valmy."[3]

[1] Jallifier et Vast: Histoire des Temps Modernes et Contemporains. Cours de première. Quatrième édition, Paris, 1908. Préface, p. 6.

[2] France Herself Again, p. 135.

[3] Duruy, G.: École et Patrie, p. 17.

In the light of present events, however, it is not uninteresting to note that shortly before the great war a history which bowed the knee in all sincerity to scientific scholarship, which emphasized the general development of civilization, rather than battles and campaigns alone, was taught in the schools of France. It has been said that the nationalist historian of the nineteenth century must bear a share of the blame for the catastrophe of today. "Woe unto us! professional historians, professional historical students, professional teachers of history," says the recent president of the American Historical Association, "if we cannot see, written in blood, in the dying civilization of Europe, the dreadful result of exaggerated nationalism as set forth in the patriotic histories of some of the most eloquent historians of the nineteenth century."[1] Something of this responsibility, however, must be lifted from the shoulders of those devotees of scientific scholarship who would have their historical writings serve truth rather than nationalism. Cold and unsentimental their work may have been, but not chauvinistic.

[1] Stephens, H. M.: Nationality and History, *American Historical Review,* January, 1916, p. 236.

Significant as the twentieth-century movement for the teaching of scientific history in France has been, however, its importance must not be exaggerated. The study of patriotic history in the schools did not cease with the issuance of the programs of 1902; and the years immediately preceding the present war saw a reaction toward this kind of instruction. Furthermore, it must be remembered that French history does not lend itself to the teaching of militant patriotism so easily as does that of Great Britain, that of Germany, or that of the United States; for the France of today has, in a measure, repudiated the France of yesteryears. If Jeanne d'Arc is glorified, anti-clericalism is offended. If the military exploits of Louis XIV are extolled, the monarchical principle is thereby exalted. If the schoolmen point with pride to Napoleon's achievements, hero-worship and Caesarism are suggested. On the other hand, love of country and the military spirit can be, and have been, inculcated by other means, notably through moral and civic instruction. "I will not say," proclaims the scientific Seignobos, "why I seek in the teaching of history neither lessons of morality, nor a school of patriotism, nor a collection of worthy examples

. . . I do not say that these things cannot serve a purpose in education; but . . . they can be taught more effectively by other means than by history." [1] The use of these other means in the schools of France has lessened the necessity of making the study of history wholly subservient to patriotic ends; and the possible danger to the national defense, of treating the subject from the scientific, evolutionary point of view, has been thereby diminished.

II. PACIFICISM VERSUS NATIONALISM

It has been shown in the preceding chapter that back of the movement to introduce a new kind of history into the schools lay the ideal of scientific truth and the theory of human evolution. Closely associated with these and affecting, in some degree, not merely the teaching of history but the spirit of the school as a whole, was another principle—that of pacificism. Now in France ideals and theories are more than mere formulae; there seems to be an insatiable desire on the part of their disciples to see them realized in practice. Therefore the nervous na-

[1] Seignobos, Langlois, etc.: L'Enseignement d'Histoire, pp. 2-3.

tionalist viewed with alarm the growth of the cosmopolitan, pacificist spirit in France in the early years of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the pacificist ideal had behind it, or more or less closely associated with it, certain political influences, such as anti-militarism, anti-clericalism and, above all, international socialism. Out of this mixture of idealism and politics arose what is known as the crisis of patriotism in the schools.

Modern pacificism, according to a recent writer, had its genesis in Revolutionary times. "It originated in the extreme left wing of the French Revolution. Its first representatives are found among the men of terror and blood who made themselves known and abhorred throughout the world as 'Jacobins.'"[1] In June, 1791, the Jacobins addressed a proclamation to the inhabitants of near-by countries: "Brothers and Friends—To you we announce peace, confidence, union, fraternity. Englishmen, Belgians, Germans, Piedmontese, Spaniards, soldiers of every people, the French and you constitute but a single people, a single family whose disunion is no longer pos-

[1] Kuhlmann: Pacificism as an Offspring of the French Revolution, *Mid-West Quarterly*, July, 1915, p. 397.

sible."[1] During the whole of the Revolutionary period, even when humanitarianism seemed to be almost smothered beneath the greed and glory of Napoleonic conquest, the fighting French proclaimed their message of death to rulers, but peace and brotherhood to peoples. Thus paradoxically the very movement from which sprang nineteenth-century nationalism gave birth to modern cosmopolitanism and pacificism.

The humanitarianism of the Revolution, persisting during the nineteenth century, showed itself in the sympathy of Frenchmen for oppressed nationalities in their struggle for independence and unification—for the Greeks, for the Poles, for the Italians, even for the Germans. Shocked and disillusionized by the War of 1870, it remained in abeyance till about twenty years after Sedan, when it began to crystallize into a propaganda which struck at the very heart of the national ambitions and even of the national defense. The murmurings of anti-militarism and anti-patriotism took bold form, attracting the disturbed attention of those who loved the Fatherland. In 1891 the author of an article appearing in the *Mercure de France* wrote, "Personally . . . I would not

[1] Ibid., p. 401.

give in exchange for these forgotten lands [he spoke of Alsace and Lorraine] either the little finger of my right hand, for it serves as a rest for my hand when I write, nor the little finger of my left hand, for it serves to flick the ash from my cigarette."[1] Then, too, a prominent professor conducted an investigation at the École Normale Supérieure as to whether patriotism were a rational feeling and whether it would bear the test of psychological analysis.[2] According to the Abbé Dimnet, "the cynical expression of disdain for the attachment to one's country . . . became a sort of elegance" during the last decade of the nineteenth century.[3] "If it is necessary to speak frankly," says the writer whose indifference to the lost provinces has been quoted, "in a word, we are not patriots."[4]

More significant than the sporadic utterances of "intellectuals," however, was the spread of anti-militaristic, anti-patriotic doctrines among the workingmen. During the last years of the

[1] Quoted in Agathon: Les Jeunes Gens d'Aujourd'hui, p. 23.

[2] Dimnet: France Herself Again, pp. 134-135; Agathon: Les Jeunes Gens d'Aujourd'hui, p. 23.

[3] France Herself Again, pp. 133-134.

[4] Agathon, op. cit., p. 24.

nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth the propaganda of the social revolution found increasing favor among the syndicalists. This was largely due to the influence of anarchists, always anti-patriots of the first water, who began to associate themselves with the workingmen's movement about 1895, and some of whom later became members of the governing committee of the General Confederation of Labor. Wearing the "false beards" of syndicalists, the anarchists penetrated into the councils of international socialism, from which they had previously been excluded. Here they were again able to make their dangerous teachings felt. The pacificist theories of the intellectuals, the anti-governmental propaganda of the anarchistic syndicalists, the vague feeling of the laboring proletariat that the struggle of the future ought to be with employers and rulers rather than with the workingmen of other lands—all these elements were brought to a focus by the Dreyfus case. Here was an innocent man, degraded and held prisoner on a lonely isle, that the so-called honor of the army might seem to bear no stain. Military influence sought to protect the real culprits, men of high military rank, at whose ex-

pense, however, Dreyfus was later rehabilitated. Even before his innocence had been completely established a storm of indignation broke out against the army, much of it passing easily from opposition to the army into opposition to the state.

Hence at the beginning of the twentieth centurythe old ideas of cosmopolitanism and pacificism seem to have united with newer political and social influences to endanger the security of the country. "I seek to comprehend the mental state of the anti-militarist," says Professor George Duruy. "This man is ordinarily a republican and a democrat, a socialist almost always. He professes to love ideas of which these two words, republic and democracy, serve as the insignia: fraternity, justice, equality, liberty, freedom of conscience, etc."[1] Journals and societies directly or indirectly connected with syndicalism bore home to the workingmen their real or fancied grievances against the army and the state. Mobilization for war was to be the signal for the revolt of the proletariat. "Instead of taking up arms," so ran a proclamation of the International Anti-Militarist Association in 1908, "you will use your cartridges

[1] École et Patrie, p. 51.

against the assassins who govern you and you will shoot them down without pity."[1] Thus paradoxically a militant pacificism came to menace the Fatherland.

True to its tendency to reflect, sooner or later, those forces which go to the making of the national *Geist,* the French school has admitted the influence of nineteenth- and twentieth-century humanitarianism, cosmopolitanism and even pacificism. Certain textbooks, even though not of pacificist character, nevertheless voice protests against the spirit of aggression and of hatred. Thus M. Hanriot, who certainly does not forget the lost provinces,[2] says, "We are not of the land of hatred. France does not know how to detest anyone; it would be repugnant to her spirit to set up in her system of education hatred of the foreigner, and it is not we who will ever carry out against any people the 'Delenda Carthago' of the implacable Romans."[3] So, too, the patriotic historian Lavisse points out that to love one's country

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[1] Quoted in Tardieu: La Campagne Contre la Patrie. *Revue des Deux Mondes,* July, 1913.

[2] Hanriot: Vive la France! p. 124.

[3] Ibid., p. 8; similarly, Despois et Labérennes, op. cit., p. 356.

is not to desire to destroy neighboring countries or to rejoice in their misfortunes. "This national egoism is called chauvinism; it has caused Frenchmen to commit terrible mistakes."[1] Patriotism—according to another writer—in order to be a real virtue must be regulated by the sentiment of humanity,[2] a view not very different from that of certain of the official programs, which require to be taught "the love of humanity and its reconciliation with duties toward the Fatherland."[3] Pacificism is not counseled in passages such as these, but there is an assumption that the ideals of patriotism and of the brotherhood of man ought to go hand in hand.

In some textbooks, however, cosmopolitan and pacificist beliefs exhibit themselves more clearly. M. Desmaisons teaches frankly that above national brotherhood is human brother-

[1] Lavisse: Livret d'Histoire de France, Opuscule du Maître, p. 45.

[2] Petit et Lamy: Jean Lavenir, p. 249. "True Republicans," maintain the authors, "desire peace with all men of good will. During the Revolution they sang:

'To the world will Frenchmen give
Peace and Liberty.'"

[3] Martin et Lemoine: Lectures Choisies, p. 213.

hood, more noble than the other.[1] One author even stands sponsor for the sentiment of Montesquieu: "If I knew anything useful to my country, yet prejudicial to Europe, I would regard it as a crime."[2] In other cases an outcry is raised against war and its attendant horrors. "War is a frightful calamity. It has its origin in the instincts of barbarism," exclaim the authors of a school reader.[3] "If you see two dogs who are barking and biting and tearing at each other," thus MM. Aulard and Bayet quote from La Bruyère, "you say, 'See those senseless animals!' and you take a stick to separate them.

"If anyone told you that all the cats of a great country were assembled by the thousand in a plain and after mewing and caterwauling they dashed at one another with fury, and that after the mêlée there remained nine or ten thousand cats dead on the field of battle, would you not say: 'This is the most frightful thing I ever heard of.'

"And if the dogs and cats said that they were

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[1] Desmaisons: Pour le Commencement de la Classe, pp. 147-148.

[2] Boitel: Trois Années, pp. 188-189.

[3] Martin et Lemoine: Lectures Choisies, p. 213.

fighting for glory would you not laugh heartily at the madness of these poor beasts?

"Nevertheless the sole difference between the beasts and you is that they use only their teeth and their claws, while you have convenient instruments, with which you can make great wounds, from which the blood can pour even to the very last drop." [1]

Since war is so terrible it is the duty of France to preach horror of it and to render it impossible in the future by fostering the fraternity of peoples, by diffusing peacefully the principles of 1789.[2] So significant did Professor George Duruy consider this sort of teaching that he asserted about 1907 that at that time the general tendency of the authors of primary school texts was to expurgate from their works anything of which pacificism might disapprove.[3]

If cosmopolitanism affected somewhat the textbooks, however, its influence on a certain proportion of the teaching force of France was

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[1] Aulard et Bayet: Morale, etc., Part I, pp. 95, 96. The same selection is to be found in Despois et Labérennes: Lectures Morales, p. 335.

[2] Aulard et Bayet, op. cit., Part II, p. 12.

[3] École et Patrie, p. 19.

deeper and more striking. It was the fond theory of Jules Ferry in his dream of a lay school as the cornerstone of the Third Republic, that the instructor of youth, passionately devoted to the state, would avoid the quagmires of party politics. But his hopes were only partially realized.[1] If the earlier teachers had something of the fanaticism of a lay priesthood,[2] forgetful of self in their zeal for France, a discontent gradually seeped in among certain of the younger men. Their meager salaries compelled them all too frequently to lead lives of penury.[3] Their spirits rebelled and they lent a willing ear to the tempting teachings of international revolutionary socialism.[4] "Experience proves," says a writer in the *Revue de l'Enseignement Primaire,* "that the teaching body has nothing to gain by coquetting with the bourgeois parties; it is its duty and its interest to turn to its natural ally: the laboring proletariat."[5] M. Gustave Hervé, a professor at the Lycée of Sens, wrote articles insulting the

[1] Goyau: Le Péril Primaire, *Revue des Deux Mondes,* Jan., 1906, p. 189.

[2] Ibid., p. 198.

[3] Ibid., p. 194.

[4] Ibid., p. 196.

[5] Ibid., p. 197.

French flag,[1] and was the principal signatory of a manifesto calling on the soldiers of France to revolt in case war were declared.[2]

Hervé was punished for his presumption,[3] but his bold utterances met with sympathy among certain of his fellow-craftsmen. A congress of elementary schoolmasters meeting at Lille in 1905 professed adherence to his doctrines, and at the same time passed anti-military resolutions.[4] Another such congress, a few years later, voted that the teachers' syndicates should subscribe to the *Sou du Soldat,* a fund of which one object was to encourage the desertion of soldiers. So strong was the feeling in the early years of the twentieth century that an educational journal actually demanded "that they banish from the school the religion of '*La Patrie.*'" Little wonder that there seemed to be a crisis of patriotism in education!

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[1] Bodley: Article on France in Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition.

[2] *Journal des Débats,* March 7, 1908.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Bodley: Encyc. Brit., France; M. Chabot, in an article in the *Revue Pédagogique,* Vol. 46, p. 511, says, "Un grand nombre d'instituteurs approuvent les articles où M. Hervé insulte le drapeau et prêche la désertion ou la guerre civile."

Nevertheless the reader should not take too seriously this pacificist movement which created such excitement in France among many of those who dearly loved their country. In the first place, if cosmopolitanism has been taught in the schools, it has also been combated there. Lavisse points out that the national disasters ought to teach Frenchmen to love France first, humanity afterward.[1] To be convinced of the falsity of the thesis of cosmopolitanism, argues another writer, one has only to compare what he receives every day from his country with what he receives from humanity.[2] Gérard maintains that cosmopolitanism "consists less in love of other men than in forgetfulness of duties toward the Fatherland. It flatters itself that it loves everybody, in order to have the right to love nobody."[3] Finally, Compayré sums up the matter in his blunt way by stating that citizens of the world are egotists and idlers.[4]

Furthermore, even the authors of the pro-

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[1] Lavisse: La Nouvelle Deuxième Année d'Histoire de France, p. 405.

[2] Pontsevrez: Cours de Morale Pratique, p. 125.

[3] Morale, p. 226.

[4] Éléments, p. 61.

tests against war which have been quoted have not taught a spineless doctrine of non-resistance to aggression. War for national defense, for justice, for liberty, they hold to be necessary and right.[1] Their expressions of pacificism seem to be intended as a sort of psychological leash calculated to hold in check those hot-headed spirits who would fain plunge the country into unnecessary strife. There is apparently little idea of deifying humanitarianism at the expense of *La Patrie.* Then, too, it must be remembered that at the very time at which Professor Duruy was writing of the menace of pacificism in the school, new editions of older books, books like Foncin's geographies, were being issued, in which the military spirit and *revanche* were clearly inculcated. A large proportion of such manuals had a wide sale. In general, however, it may be said that just before and just after the opening of the twentieth century, there was a tendency on the part of the writers of new schoolbooks to soften militant teachings by more pacific doctrines.

Had this tendency grown, had the propa-

[1] Martin et Lemoine: Lectures Choisies, p. 213; Aulard et Bayet, op. cit., p. 971; Villain, Comtois et Loiret, op. cit., p. 214.

ganda of the social revolution continued to spread through the discontented ranks of ill-paid teachers, there is no telling what might have resulted to the psychology of loyalty and patriotism. While politicians were bickering over the questions of militarism, clericalism and international socialism, however, and teachers were exercising, with louder voice than usual, their well-known avocation of complaining about their salaries, the nation began to awake to the reappearance of an ancient peril. On March 31, 1905, William of Germany steamed into the harbor of Tangier on his yacht, the *Hohenzollern.* The emissary of the Sultan of Morocco he saluted as the representative of an independent sovereign, and turning to the group of German residents gathered at the pier in expectation of his arrival, he said, "I am happy to greet in you the devoted pioneers of German industry and commerce, who are aiding in the task of keeping always in a high position, in a *free land,* the interests of the mother country."[1] It was a warning to France that the mailed fist of Germany would not permit unquestioned the extension of French influence in Morocco.

[1] Quoted in Gibbons: New Map of Europe, p. 72.

In the next few years followed the Algeçiras Conference, the Agadir incident, the French acquisition of a protectorate over Morocco, German anger thereat, and the increase of armaments in both countries. Contemporaneously with these developments came a rejuvenation of French patriotism,[1] while the tide of pacificism gradually ebbed. The year 1908, according to a writer in the *Revue Pédagogique,* saw anti-patriotism among the teachers yield its tone of arrogance,[2] while the author of a book appearing in 1913 could say "one no longer finds . . . in the Faculties, in the great schools, pupils who profess anti-patriotism. . . . The words Alsace and Lorraine call forth long ovations and each professor speaks of German methods only with prudence, for fear of murmurs or hisses."[3] In fine, according to the same author, the fundamental sentiment of youthful consciences had come to be faith in the Fatherland.[4] The cloud which had overhung

[1] "Une aube, une grandissante aurore se leva sur l'obscurissement de cet automne 1905, où notre jeunesse comprit que la menace allemande était présent." Agathon: Les Jeunes Gens d'Aujourd'hui, p. 30.

[2] Gérard-Varet: *Revue Pédagogique,* Vol. 54, p. 525.

[3] Agathon, op. cit., p. 29.

[4] Ibid., p. 22.

that psychology of patriotism which the state had fostered so carefully dissolved into mist when the country seemed to be threatened.

What, then, was the net result of the humanitarian, anti-militaristic movement in education? To measure its influence with accuracy is of course impossible. Certain it is, however, that it did not penetrate the heart of France so deeply as excited patriots once feared it might. On the other hand it must have modified chauvinism; it must have weakened the doctrine of *revanche*. Fundamentally, it seems to me, there has been a conflict between highly developed nationalism, on the one hand, and the principle of fraternity on the other—that principle of the French Revolution which has been interpreted to mean cosmopolitan brotherhood. Since the Third Republic professes reason as its guide, since it acknowledges devotion to liberty of thought, it has not entirely subordinated education to a narrow nationalism but has allowed humanitarian doctrines, which many believed to be dangerous to the state, to appear in the schools. Patriotic instruction in France has not been blindly enslaved by chauvinism.

It is doubtful, however, whether the pacificist movement in education seriously weak-

ened the psychology of the national defense. Love of country, belief in the obligatory military service, the government has all along expected the teachers to inculcate, and has insisted on such instruction by means of the official programs and by a highly centralized system of school inspection. "We do not know," wrote M. Bouglé several years ago, "whether there ever existed a pacificist, even a fanatic, who preached seriously to his country the doctrine of nonresistance to evil, and in consequence the necessary preliminary disarmament. It is more than clear, at any rate, that such teachings could not possibly find a place in a national system of education."[1] Some measure of the excitement in regard to anti-patriotism in the schools must, then, be attributed to the exaggerations of alarmists. There was probably comparatively little serious thought of leaving the country defenseless against aggression.

The great war has revealed how insecure the imposing structure of internationalism really was. The German "brothers" are held responsible for the failure of the French workingmen to unite against the forces of militarism.

[1] Bouglé: Solidarisme et Libéralisme, p. 216.

Hervé is writing patriotic songs; his young followers of other days are fighting loyally in the trenches. Infinitely pathetic in its resignation to a deferment of the dawn of better things is the "War Song of the French Workmen," which appeared in that once stout champion of staunch internationalism, the *Bataille Syndicaliste:*

> The day that Germany opened up the abyss,
> One and only one word, peaceful, sublime,
> Was spoken by the one-minded people:
> "It must be."
>
> Dear workmen, put off your hope
> To do away with hunger and suffering:
> It must be.[1]

Thus pacificism has been engulfed in the maelstrom of soldiers' blood.

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[1] Stoddard Dewey, in the *Nation,* January 13, 1916.

CHAPTER VI

PATRIOTISM IN GERMAN EDUCATION

The great war has brought Germany before the judgment seat of humanity. The world insists on knowing what manner of people this is whose enemies accuse her of the worst barbarities, whose friends laud her benevolence to the skies. The seeker for truth stands bewildered before these conflicting opinions. It is as unfair, however, to judge Germany by the excesses of some of her soldiers, or even by the seeming ruthlessness of her treatment of Belgium, as it is to draw a verdict from the propaganda of praise. Nor is the spirit of the works of Chamberlain, Bernhardi or Treitschke necessarily typical of the whole people. The German school, on the other hand, affords the fairest field in which to discover the ideals of the empire of the Hohenzollern; for Germany, beyond all other modern states, has embodied national aspirations in its educational system, which, though not wholly free from the

influences of tradition, custom and conservatism, recognizes in a degree elsewhere unparalleled the value of education as a political instrument and a factor in national evolution. Here it is that one finds the soul of Germany.

Only extended investigation can reveal how fully her educational system exemplifies the spirit of Germany. The present study does not profess to be exhaustive. It has made no attempt, for example, to show how industrial and technical instruction has been developed to realize the ideal of national efficiency. A careful study of official plans of instruction and of many textbooks widely used in recent years in German schools, however, warrants the following conclusions:

1. Patriotism, while not designated in the school curricula as a separate subject, has been systematically taught in connection with various studies, throughout all grades of instruction, from the lowest common schools to the university. The military spirit dominates this sort of teaching.

2. The school has fostered belief in the monarchical principle and a devoted loyalty to the Hohenzollern dynasty. Doctrines deemed dan-

gerous to the present form of government have been combated.

3. Education has tended to develop national egoism through a glorification of German civilization and German achievements, and a failure to make due allowance for shortcomings.

4. The school has toyed with the vision of a greater national destiny, suggesting the hope of increased power on land and sea.

5. This apotheosis of Teutonism which has characterized German education has naturally been accompanied by a disposition to ignore or disparage other nations.

These various features of German education suggest certain comparisons with the teaching of patriotism in France, while they furnish, at the same time, a partial explanation of the German's point of view in the present war, and of the process by which this viewpoint has been evolved.

In imbuing the youth of Germany with patriotism in the various forms of its expression, an important part has been played by that powerful psychological stimulant, suggestion. Its subtle influence permeates many a textbook from cover to cover, conveying, now an impression of the essential faultlessness of the Father-

land, or again hinting at a national future more splendid, greater and more powerful than the Empire has yet known. Such suggestion is no doubt frequently unconscious on the part of the author, a natural development of his own hopes for his country, or of his pride in her achievements; probably he would resent any intimation that he was, for example, advocating conquest, much as an American teacher would resent the imputation that she had been fostering hostility toward Great Britain, perhaps at the very moment when her pupils were attempting to enact on the playground some stirring scene from our own Revolution. Yet the psychological influence of such suggestion must at times have been more far-reaching and more fraught with dangerous possibilities than that of didactic precept.

The use of the school as a training field of German patriots dates from the time of Prussia's regeneration. As has been previously stated, it was the spirit of this period of her rival's history which France has striven to emulate since 1870. In the hour when Napoleon dragged in the mud the pride and glory of the state which had "gone to sleep on the laurels of Frederick the Great," the philosopher,

Fichte, to whose inspiration his country owes so much, "set all his hopes for Germany on a new national system of education."[1] Those years of preparation, which culminated in the Battle of the Nations and in Waterloo, were a period also of mighty effort to base the power of the state on the intelligent loyalty of the individual citizen and soldier. Hence Prussian statesmen turned to that most picturesque of oddities, that most successful of failures, the one conspicuous schoolmaster in Europe who had been able to secure the love and loyalty of his pupils—Pestalozzi. The king, Stein, Fichte, Humboldt, and many other noble spirits organized the movement to make of the school a great factor in the development of the nation. In all grades of instruction began the tendency to emphasize everything German.

Thus initiated and in a measure fostered under later Prussian rulers, patriotic instruction has been cherished with special care since the formation of the Empire. In this zealous policy the influence of the present Kaiser has been especially active and fruitful. On May Day, 1889, within a year after his accession to the throne, the Emperor sounded the keynote

[1] Paulsen: German Education Past and Present, p. 240.

for school instruction thus: "For a long time my attention has been engaged by the thought of making the school in its various grades, useful in combating the spread of socialistic and communistic ideas. Upon the school, first of all, will fall the duty, by cherishing reverence for God and love of the Fatherland, of laying the foundation for a sound conception of political and social relations."[1] The following year, at a great conference of educators, the young ruler expressed his dissatisfaction with the instruction then in vogue in the *Gymnasien*. It was not national enough to suit him, nor sufficiently adapted to the needs of modern times.[2] In general he perceived some of the possibilities of education as a political instrument, and was intent on their realization.

With the attitude of the Kaiser in these matters the various Plans of Instruction, for common schools—*Volksschulen* and *Mittelschulen*—and higher and normal schools, have ever since been in sympathy, though not always in complete harmony. In deference to his wishes the

[1] Schöppa: Die Bestimmungen . . . Betreffend die Volks- und Mittelschule, die Lehrerbildung und die Prüfung der Lehrer, etc. Edition for teachers, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 36 ff.

[2] Paulsen: German Education Past and Present, p. 207.

number of hours devoted to Latin in the *Gymnasien* was decreased,[1] while greater emphasis was laid on German.[2] The total hours given to Latin each week (for all classes) was reduced in 1892 from seventy-seven to sixty-two. It was raised in the *Lehrplan* of 1902 to sixty-eight, but German and history retained the number fixed in 1892, respectively twenty-six and seventeen.[3]

The significance of these changes as an adjustment to the demands of nationalism lies in the fact that the *Lehrpläne* have required the teaching of patriotism in connection with the study of German language and literature and of history. "Instruction in German," accord-

[1] The following table shows the hours devoted to Latin each week in each of the nine classes in the German *Gymnasien* for the years 1882, 1892, 1902:

	VI	V	IV	UIII	OIII	UII	OII	UI	OI	Total
1882	9	9	9	9	9	8	8	8	8	77
1892	8	8	7	7	7	7	6	6	6	62
1902	8	8	8	8	8	7	7	7	7	68

Kratz Lehrplan, p. 25.

[2] Paulsen: op. cit., p. 209. The author of a recent article on "Pan-Germanic Education" says, "The present Emperor did his utmost by the rescript of 1892 to impose the teaching of German, history, geography and saga." Randall, *Contemporary Review*, November, 1915, p. 593.

[3] Kratz, op. cit., pp. 17, 25, 55.

ing to the 1902 *Lehrplan* for the higher schools of Prussia, "is, along with instruction in religion and in history, of the greatest educational importance. The task assigned to it is difficult and can be fulfilled only by teachers, who, relying upon thorough understanding of our language and its history, transported by enthusiasm for the treasures of our literature and by patriotism (*von vaterländischem Sinne*), know how to excite in the hearts of our youth ardor for German language, German nationality (*deutsches Volkstum*) and German greatness of spirit (*deutsche Geistesgrösse*)."[1] Furthermore "the special task assigned to instruction in German of fostering patriotism (*die Pflege vaterländischen Sinnes*) connotes for it a close connection with history."[2] One of the chief purposes of the study of this subject in the normal schools, according to the official requirements for these institutions, is to "aid the students in gaining the ability to impart such instruction in history as will promote patriotism in their young pupils. . . . The prospective teachers and instructors are to learn to under-

[1] Official Lehrpläne und Lehraufgaben für die höheren Schulen in Preussen, 1902, p. 20.

[2] Ibid, p. 21.

stand and love the Fatherland, its ordered life and institutions, that they may become qualified to arouse and to nourish in their pupils love for the Fatherland and for the ruling dynasty."[1] And of instruction in geography —"As in history the highest object is the knowledge of the Fatherland and the comprehension of its organisms, so, too, in geography the greatest stress is to be laid on the knowledge of the Fatherland, its character, its political divisions, its civilization on the material side (*materielle Kultur*) and its commercial relations with foreign lands."[2] Thus in Prussia as in France the teaching of patriotism has been officially enjoined. It is noticeable, however, that at the very time that Prussia was especially emphasizing the nationalistic purpose of the study of history in the schools, the French programs of 1902 were laying stress on a history scientific rather than purely patriotic, evolutionary rather than purely military.[3]

As is to be expected, the spirit of militant

[1] Schöppa: Die Bestimmungen, Edition for teachers, 1904, pp. 98, 99. Cf. p. 140 for examination requirements for teachers of history.

[2] Ibid., p. 103. Cf. p. 140 for examination requirements.

[3] The Prussian Lehrplan of 1912 shows no essential changes in these matters from that of 1902.

patriotism permeates the textbooks dealing with the foregoing subjects. Much of the teaching is retrospective, a celebration of past victories from which may be inferred a glorious future. In a school reader, for example, a tale is told of one of Frederick the Great's officers who with six men put to flight fifteen Austrian hussars.[1] A burning tribute is paid in a historical text to the martial ardor and spirit of sacrifice that characterized the period of Prussia's regeneration.[2] So, too, stirring accounts

[1] Bellermann Deutsches Lesebuch, Erster Teil, pp. 241, 242 et passim, for other stories of Prussian courage.

[2] Andrä: Erzählungen aus der deutschen Geschichte. "Fired with enthusiasm, the people rose, 'with God for King and Fatherland.' Among the Prussians there was only one voice, one feeling, one anger and one love, to save the Fatherland and to free Germany. The Prussians wanted war; danger and death they wanted; peace they feared because they could hope for no honorable peace from Napoleon. War, War! sounded the cry from the Carpathians to the Baltic, from the Niemen to the Elbe. War! cried the nobleman and landed proprietor who had become impoverished. War! the peasant who was driving his last horse to death . . . War! the citizen who was growing exhausted from quartering soldiers and paying taxes. War! the widow who was sending her only son to the front. War! the young girl who, with tears of pride and pain, was dismissing her betrothed. Youths who were hardly able to bear arms, men with gray hair, officers who, on account of wounds and mutilations, had long ago been honorably dis-

are given in poetry and prose of the triumphs of the Franco-German War,[1] "the beginning of the greatest and most splendid period that Germany has known in the course of her history."[2] The strength of the sentiment for the Fatherland is illustrated in the poem, "Hans Euler," quoted in Scheel's "Lesebuch." Hans, whom a stranger is about to kill for the slaying of his

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charged, rich landed proprietors and officials, fathers of large families and managers of extensive businesses were unwilling to remain behind. Even young women under all sorts of disguises rushed to arms; all wanted to drill, arm themselves and fight and die for the Fatherland . . . The most beautiful thing about all this holy zeal and happy confusion was that all differences of position, class and age were forgotten, . . . that the one great feeling for the Fatherland, its freedom and honor swallowed up all other feelings, caused all other considerations and relationships to be forgotten. . . . So much did the sacred duty and common striving stir all hearts that nothing low or base desecrated the splendid enthusiasm of those unforgettable days. It was as if the most insignificant felt that he must be a mirror of morality, modesty and right, if he would conquer the arrogance which he had so despised in the enemy." (Translated by Margaret S. Scott.)

[1] Bellermann, etc.: Deutsches Lesebuch, pp. 32, 34, 35, 57, etc.; Scheel: Lesebuch, pp. 190, 360, 457, etc.

[2] Lange: Leitfaden zur Allgemeinen Geschichte, Vol. I, p. 67, "So begann der Krieg und mit ihm die grösste und glänzendste Zeit welche Deutschland in seiner Geschichte erlebt hat."

brother, says that he put him to death for threatening the Fatherland: "You slew him then in a just cause," says the stranger. "I crave your pardon."[1] In the same book approximately one-third of the space devoted to the *Sexta* class concerns itself directly or indirectly with the teaching of patriotism. Thus the youth of Germany, like the youth of France, have been psychologically equipped for the titanic struggle of today. They have learned the supreme duty of sacrificing the individual to the state in time of national peril.[2] The teaching of patriotism in Germany is less formal, less didactic than in France, and so perhaps even more inspiring for the hour of victory. It has, however, certain weaknesses which will be pointed out later.

Patriotism as inculcated in Germany is not only national; it is personal. Loyalty to the House of Hohenzollern and adherence to the monarchical principle are carefully taught

[1] Pp. 162, 163.

[2] Treue Liebe, bis zum Grabe
Schwör' ich dir, mit Herz und Hand
Was ich bin und was ich habe
Dank ich dir, mein Vaterland."

—From Hoffman von Fallersleben, quoted in Bellermann, op. cit., p. 32.

along with, and as a part of, devotion to the Fatherland. As has been previously shown, the students in the normal schools of Prussia are to qualify themselves "to arouse and to nourish in their pupils love for the Fatherland and for the ruling dynasty."[1] For the higher schools of Prussia we find prescribed in the Plans of Instruction: "Where the history of the recent centuries offers opportunity to present the social-political measures of the European civilized nations [*Kulturstaaten*], the transition is natural to a presentation of the services of our ruling house in promoting the welfare of the people down to today."[2] The textbooks carry out these instructions with characteristic fervor and enthusiasm. Little tots, just being taught to read, learn of the delightful paternal attitude of the Kaiser toward his people: "The Kaiser has many soldiers. He loves us all. We love him, too."[3]

[1] Schöppa: Die Bestimmungen. Edition for teachers, 1904, p. 99.

[2] Official Lehrpläne für Höhere Anstalten Preussens, p. 48; Kratz, pp. 59, 60.

[3] Henck und Traudt: Fröhliches Lernen, p. 61. The desire to inculcate a very personal loyalty to the Kaiser is illustrated in the following pretty little poem ("Erika," p. 63) quoted on the next page:

His great ancestors are lauded to the skies. A poet represents the inhabitants of South Germany as saluting the Emperor Frederick, "Hohenzollern, Son, Sufferer, Hero, Sage! They feel for him, they glory in him—now their Kaiser."[1] A tribute to the Emperor William I reads, "But whatever the night-covered wings of the future may bring, can they ever bring forgetfulness and the end of our fidelity? The rustling wind in echo whispers 'Here and beyond, we were, we remain thine, Lord and Emperor."[2] Frederick the Great is represented

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Der Kaiser ist ein lieber Mann
Und wohnet in Berlin;
Und wär' es nicht so weit von hier,
So ging ich heut' noch hin;

Und was ich bei dem Kaiser wollt'?
Ich gäb' ihm meine Hand
Und brächt' die schönsten Blümchen ihm,
Die ich im Garten fand.

Und sagte dann, "Aus treuer Lieb'
Bring ich die Blümchen Dir;"
Und dann lief ich geschwinde fort,
Und wäre wieder hier.

[1] Scheel: Lesebuch, p. 186.

[2] Ibid., p. 362. *See also* Lange: Leitfaden, Vol. I, p. 68; Andrä: Erzählungen.

as "the most powerful example of unqualified and complete devotion to the State."[1] The author of a historical textbook says that the only fault attributable to that monarch of blameless life (who robbed Maria Theresa of Silesia, intrigued successfully to secure a share of unhappy Poland, and treated his own wife with cold neglect) was that he preferred French to German culture.[2] In general the Hohenzollerns are a race of heroes;[3] their house is one of the two firm foundations of the German Empire, the other being a well-trained army.[4] It seems as if, in times of danger, Divine Providence had always sent a Hohenzollern to rescue Germany from trouble and distress.[5] Only grateful devotion to Prince and Fatherland can maintain the State upon the heights she has attained.[6]

[1] Neubauer: V Teil, p. 63, Frederick stood "on a solitary height above his people, the war-lord and statesman, the philosopher and historian, the most powerful example of unqualified and complete devotion to the state."

[2] Lauer: Weltgeschichte, pp. 173-4.

[3] Lange, p. 68.

[4] Lauer, p. 242.

[5] Andrä, p. 157.

[6] Fischer-Seistbeck: Erdkunde, III Teil, p. 92; see especially the Ministerial regulations on this subject in Schöppa: Bestimmungen, pp. 40, 42.

Loyalty to the imperial dynasty has been further upheld by praise of the monarchical principle, in the official directions to the Prussian schools[1] and accordingly in the textbooks. Certain regulations for the lower schools of Prussia, for example, require the use of such a textbook as will show "how the monarchical form of the state is best adapted to protect the family, freedom, justice and the welfare of the individual."[2] The author of a historical reader says that the nineteenth-century movement toward individual freedom has been offset by the necessity of a strong state's power, and especially by the right of monarchy.[3] The Emperor William I's manner of ruling, and his genuinely royal character, according to another writer, "strengthened the feeling for monarchy, in which lies security for the well-being of our nation."[4]

Furthermore, since the grim shape of Socialism ever casts a shadow athwart the throne of the modern monarch, its doctrines have been

[1] Schöppa: op. cit., pp. 37-38.

[2] Ibid., p. 37.

[3] Neubauer: Lehrbuch, V Teil, p. 122.

[4] Schenk-Koch: Geschichte, VI. Teil, Unter Secunda, 3d Edition, 1909, p. 124. *See also* Lauer: Weltgeschichte, p. 176.

combated through criticism,[1] prompted by official mandate. "The instruction in economic and social questions, in their relation to the present time"—according to the Prussian program of 1902 for higher schools, "demands peculiarly reliable tact and great circumspection in the choice and treatment of matter to be dealt with. The instruction, given in an ethical and historical spirit, must discuss on the one hand the justness of many of the social demands of the present day, and on the other hand expose the ruinous character of all violent attempts to alter social conditions. The more objectively the historical development of the mutual relations of the different classes of society, and in particular the position of the working classes, is treated, and the continual progress toward a better state of things is shown, without any display of prejudice, the sooner will it be possible, seeing the healthful common sense of our younger generation, to enable them to form a clear and calm judgment of the dangers attending the unjustifiable social ambitions of the present day.

". . . Wherever the history of the last centuries offers an opportunity of reviewing the so-

[1] For example Neubauer: op. cit., V Teil, p. 123.

cial reforms effected by the civilized states of Europe, the transition to a representation of the services of our ruling House in furthering the national well-being down to the most recent times is a natural one."[1] A French scholar, writing several years before the outbreak of the present war, does not appear to exceed the limits of truth when he says that the professor of history in the *Gymnasium* is the qualified representative of the official struggle against the social democracy.[2]

In Germany, then, education has been used to fortify monarchical rule, whereas in France it has served to weaken the desire for one-man power. The German school has placed the Kaiser on a pedestal; it has crowned his brow with the laurel wreath of loyalty and love. The two countries are at one, however, in having strengthened the stability of their respective forms of government by means of the school system. On the other hand, a comparison of programs and textbooks shows that the schools of the Empire have paid less deference to the

[1] Quoted in Great Britain, *Special Reports on Educational Subjects,* Vol. IX, p. 200; also Kratz, p. 59.

[2] Tourneur, in Seignobos, Langlois, etc.: L'Enseignement de l'Histoire, p. 88.

ideal of individual liberty than have those of the Republic. Furthermore, the German preachments against socialistic and communistic ideas bear more of an official stamp than do those of France. As far as education is a factor in national life, therefore, Germany has probably secured greater docility in her people, though not necessarily greater loyalty, than has France.

"Perhaps the most prominent feature in the psychology of the German nation," says a recent English writer, "is its exaggerated race-consciousness."[1] A study of German textbooks does much to sustain this accusation; for the teaching of patriotism melts almost imperceptibly into the inculcation of national self-glorification and national egoism. Thus Lauer, in his "Weltgeschichte," says that Germans have never been defeated except when fighting against other Germans.[2] Sometimes textbook writers transmit to the youth of the Empire a rather excessive pride in German culture and German civilization.[3] For example, an English

[1] Randall: Pan-Germanic Education, *Contemporary Review*, November, 1915, p. 589.

[2] P. 264.

[3] Brust und Verdrow: Geographie, Teil I, p. 36; Fischer-Seistbeck: Erdkunde, III Teil, p. 88; Daniel: Lehrbuch der Geographie, pp. 262, 355; etc.

student of education asserts that a very popular German school geography "contains the statement that the Germans are *the* civilized people of Europe and that all real civilization elsewhere . . . is due to German blood."[1] Even though the word "German" as here used may mean "Teutonic," the statement is complacent enough.

But I find it even more significant that in such school histories as I have examined I have never met with a real criticism of Germany's past conduct. Poland, for example, was responsible for her own destruction by reason of her internal weakness; Prussia shared in her partition to prevent all the spoil from falling into the hands of Russia, to bolt the door of Prussia against the Russian giant, and to convert territory, formerly German, but doomed by the Poles to well-nigh certain depopulation and destruction, into a land blossoming with German civilization.[2] The war between Austria and Prussia, whose advent was, in the view of the foreign looker-on, promoted by the latter, is attributed by one writer to the desire of Aus-

[1] Brereton: Who Is Responsible? p. 63.

[2] Neubauer: Lehrbuch, V Teil, pp. 63, 64; Schenk-Koch, VI Teil, p. 19.

tria to recover Silesia,[1] by another to her unwillingness to endure any augmentation of Prussia's territory on the North Sea.[2]

The Franco-German struggle is said to have come, not, in part at least, from Prussia's purpose to unify and dominate Germany, but wholly from Louis Napoleon's envy, his Machiavellian plans which had long been maturing.[3]

For the student of the psychology of Germany the significant fact is, not that her children are taught that other nations have to bear their burden of guilt and responsibility for her wars, but that no part of it is attributed to the Fatherland; its shield is spotless. To those who have come under the influence of such teaching the inference is natural that all wars in which Germany has become embroiled, whatever be the events leading to them, have been, on the part of that country, wars of defense;

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[1] Lange: Leitfaden, Vol. I, p. 65.

[2] Lauer: Weltgeschichte, p. 221.

[3] Daniel: Lehrbuch, p. 356; Lauer, p. 229; Andrä: Erzählungen, p. 170 ff.; Schenk-Koch, VI Teil, p. 108: "und am 18 Januar, 1871, fand im Spiegelsaale zu Versailles die öffentliche Verkundigung des Deutschen Kaiserreichs statt noch mitten in *dem* Kriege, den der Erbfeind gerade zu dem Zwecke entfacht hatte um die *Einigung Deutschlands* zu verhindern."

the Fatherland has never instigated war in the past; it cannot now or ever! The present conflict *must* be a conspiracy against the beloved Fatherland! There is something naïve about this exaggerated race-consciousness, something dangerous, too, as well to Germany as to other states, as the obsession of a religious zealot is dangerous to himself and those about him. It leads to suspicion of other countries, to an unwillingness and even an inability to recognize their rights and their legitimate ambitions.

It is natural that in a country whose recent history has been as brilliant as has that of Germany, whose wealth and population have been increasing so rapidly, whose territory has been so restricted, that there should have developed a certain demand for expansion. Such a demand in any country, however, does not necessarily represent the attitude of the nation as a whole. So Germans have pointed out that the books of Bernhardi have met with but little sympathy in the Empire, that they have been taken far more seriously abroad than at home.

It would indeed be unfair to maintain that Bernhardi represents the attitude of all his fellow-countrymen. But that the idea of a *Weltpolitik* was not confined to a small coterie

of chauvinists in Germany, is shown by the fact that its influence penetrated the school. The pedagogical significance of suggestion in the teaching of patriotism is perhaps nowhere greater than in the inculcation of Pan-Germanism. The Pan-German vision looks forward to the acquisition by Germany of the major portion, if not of the whole, of the territory once comprised in the Holy Roman Empire. So far as I have found, the German textbook writer is by no means inclined to accept Voltaire's dictum that this flimsy political structure was neither holy nor Roman nor an empire. To him it is the ancestor of the Hohenzollern Empire of today; he usually refers to it as *Das deutsche Reich*,[1] and takes it very seriously. "Politically," says the author of a school geography, "the Empire furnishes since the Treaty of Verdun (843), for more than a thousand years, therefore, a unity, even if at times only loosely held together by the German Kaiser-idea."[2] It is also pointed out by an-

[1] Andrä: Erzählungen, passim; Neubauer: Lehrbuch, V Teil; Fischer-Seistbeck: Erdkunde, V Teil; Daniel: Lehrbuch; etc.

[2] Fischer-Seistbeck, p. 91 ff.; Schenk-Koch, V. In tables of dates to be learned: "962-1806, Das Heilige römische Reich der deutscher Nation," the next entry in the same col-

other geographer that Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg are either wholly or in great part inhabited by Germans, though now detached almost entirely from the old German Empire to which they once belonged.[1] The same author also says that the German land embraces in a geographical and ethnographical sense a territory of 850,000 square kilometers. "Its chief constituent part is the German Empire."[2] The Pan-German theory furnishes of course an additional justification for the sequestration of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871.[3] Certain Germans will see in it, also, a justification for the "reconquest" of Belgium. Possibly they would reason that the great crime was not that the im-

umn, "Deutsche Geschichte," being: "Burgund kommt zum Deutschen Reiche," p. 115. The corresponding entry in the same author's Teil VI, p. 130, is: "Burgund fällt an Deutschland."

[1] Daniel: Lehrbuch, pp. 424, 425.

[2] Daniel, op. cit., p. 315. *See also* pp. 356, 424-425, 428. In Fischer-Seistbeck: Erdkunde, V Teil, p. 76, occurs the following statement: "In the sectarian turmoils of the 16th century and in the war-currents of the 17th and 18th centuries, Germany completely lost her sea power; the heaviest loss, however, is coupled with the separation of Holland from the Empire in 1648."

[3] Daniel, op. cit., p. 271; Lange: Leitfaden, Vol. I, p. 68.

perial forces marched across German (i. e., Belgian ancient imperial) soil, but that Germans (i. e., Belgians) rose to attack their brothers. Certainly the textbooks to which reference has just been made have tended to implant in youthful minds the idea that territory once German should again be German. "We have waged no wars of conquest," wrote a German girl to an American friend in September, 1915. "If we had done so, Holstein, Alsace-Lorraine, Belgium, the Russian provinces on the Baltic would not have been torn from the Empire." The Pan-German suggestion is *Germania irredenta.*[1]

The value and need of the founding and maintenance of German colonies are frequently emphasized in the schools, and with their corollary, German power upon the seas, are made an object of inspiration to the young. Daniel's geography in its hundreds of thousands of copies, after sketching the history of colonization, continues: "All this proves what immeasurable worth colonies had and still have for every land. Universal history shows that the prosperity,

[1] I have heard it stated—by a German—that many Germans today consider the retention of Belgium justified by the principle of nationality.

yea even the existence of so many states is dependent only on colonization; the Greeks in antiquity and the English in modern times are the best examples of this.

"If now the question is asked what peoples have contributed most to the colonization of the globe, the answer is, in antiquity the Greeks, in medieval and modern times transitionally the Romanic, but mainly the Germanic peoples."[1] This final statement, that Germans are the historic colonizers, the Fischer-Seistbeck geography for higher schools expands into an impassioned argument, which with others, economic and geographical, would justify Germany's claim to a larger place in the dominion of the seas.[2] "In the great discoveries at the opening of the modern epoch," to quote but a small part of what the authors have to say, "the Welfs of Augsburg took a notable part; in three expeditions they conquered Venezuela, which properly should be called Welfland, but lacking support from the Empire they were unable to preserve the colony. The scholar of Metz, Waldseemüller, designed the first maps of America and gave the land its name; and

[1] Daniel: Leitfaden, 264th Edition, p. 52.

[2] Fischer-Seistbeck: Erdkunde, pp. 74-76.

Mercator's system of projections became the model for the construction of sea-charts." In none of the books that I have examined have I found military or naval conquest directly advocated, but there is certainly the tendency to suggest the right of Germany to an increase of territory and power in Europe and elsewhere, in a word to a "place in the sun." And how is this "place in the sun" to be obtained unless by war on land and sea? Such is the natural inference to be drawn from the textbook teachings in regard to German expansion.

Nevertheless the use of education to strengthen the idea of national expansion has not been confined to Germany. For *revanche* has been taught in France; her schools cannot be wholly freed from the accusation of having inculcated chauvinism. On the other hand, German patriotic instruction has not been modified to the same extent as that of France by the influence of cosmopolitanism. I have found nothing approaching pacificism in the German textbooks. Indeed, teachings of this sort are hardly compatible with that tendency to foster a militant and exaggerated race-consciousness which has been shown to be characteristic of the German system of education. France, on the other

hand, has, through the school, distinctly combated the development of national egoism, believing it to be dangerous to the welfare of the state.

It is of the essence of a highly developed nationalism that it should tend to ignore or to disparage foreign peoples. It is hardly surprising, therefore, to learn from the Prussian program of 1902 for higher schools that the "history of nations outside of Germany is to be considered only as it is of importance for German history."[1] But the inaccuracy which sometimes accompanies the interpretation of this rule is a bit startling to those Americans who have been accustomed to think of Germany as the Holy Land of scientific scholarship. A textbook prepared for the *unter-secunda* classes begins the story of our Civil War thus: "The North American Civil War. Between the North and the South of the Union the sharpest contrasts had always existed; in the former, a population preponderatingly Germanic and Protestant; in the latter, Romanic and Catholic."[2] In connecting the history of the United States with the history of Germany—in accord-

[1] Official Lehrpläne, etc., p. 215 and passim.

[2] Schenk-Koch: Lehrbuch der Geschichte, VI Teil, p. 94.

ance with the official regulations of 1902—the same writer says, "The relation of the Union to Germany has increased in warmth since the twelve millions of Germans, citizens of the United States, have become more deeply conscious of their Germanism (*Deutschtum*) and of their connection in spirit with the United Fatherland (*Deutsch-Amerikanischer National Bund*)."[1] It is but natural that Germany should give less attention to the history of our country than we to hers. But it is strange that a state which has organized and developed at great expense a secret service system for gathering information in regard to foreign countries should allow errors so obvious to penetrate the minds of her future citizens. Such teachings do not make it easier for Germans to understand the temper of the American people in times of strained relations.

Among the many accusations lodged at Germany's door since the opening of the great war, one is that hatred of Great Britain has been inculcated in the schools of the Empire.[2] "This

[1] Schenk-Koch: Lehrbuch der Geschichte, VI Teil, p. 94.

[2] *London Times,* Weekly Edition, July 23, 1915. As far as that goes I have understood from a reliable (and "proally") source that in at least one military school in England the boys were taught to hate Germany.

process has been going on," says Dr. Thomas F. A. Smith, "in lectures, reading-books, charts on the wall and all the other apparatus of school life."[1] Dr. Smith's contention, however, is weakened by his failure to support it with adequate evidence, as well as by his clear and very violent prejudice against the *Vaterland*. My investigations do not warrant drawing so severe an indictment. Official Plans of Instruction and textbooks have furnished the material for my study; and it would require an acquaintance more extensive than I possess with the work, method and personality of the teacher in the German schoolroom to determine the extent to which hostility to England has been encouraged there. Possibly the schoolmaster has been more inimical than the textbook. It is safe to say that the sentiment of the textbook inculcating love on the one hand and hostility on the other loses nothing of force under the direction of the enthusiasm enjoined by the "Lehrplan."

I do find in the textbooks, as occasion offers, however, disparagement of Great Britain. Her policy in the nineteenth century has been shrewd but inconsiderate (*rücksichtslos*), ac-

[1] The Soul of Germany, p. 31.

cording to one;[1] according to another, she has been forced, during the same period, with natural repugnance to admit to rivalry in world commerce, first France, then the United States and finally "us Germans, long so lightly esteemed."[2] The same author holds that the pride of the Briton in his "old England" is pardonable so long as this national feeling does not degenerate into presumption and immoderate bearing (*unmassliches Wesen*) toward foreigners.[3] As a consequence of the Franco-German and Russo-Turkish wars in the last third of the nineteenth century, "England derived again, as she has for two centuries, great advantages from the wars of the continental powers."[4] After specifying these advantages the author proceeds: "In view of the commanding position of England as a world-power, and of our unimportant colonial possessions, the lamentable relation which has arisen between England and Germany is almost incomprehensible."[5] "The increase of the German navy,"

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[1] Neubauer: Lehrbuch der Geschichte, V Teil, p. 138.
[2] Daniel: Lehrbuch der Geographie, p. 428.
[3] Ibid., p. 275.
[4] Schenk-Koch: Lehrbuch, VI Teil, p. 119.
[5] Ibid.

says the same author, "constant and with complete self-consciousness of its purpose, is followed by the English with unfriendly eyes, and there are, despite all mutual efforts for a better understanding, very influential circles in England which hold that an enfeeblement of Germany (*eine Schwächung Deutschlands*) is necessary to secure Great Britain's position as a world-power."[1] Of England's conquests in India this is said: "The English domain of influence (*Einflussgebiet*) was uninterruptedly extended in further India, for the most part attended by the exercise of extreme craftiness and cruelty."[2] Such occasional criticisms by schoolbook writers would naturally prompt in the pupils memorizing them distrust and dislike of England, but they do not make certain a widespread and systematic purpose to inspire "hatred of England."[3] Possibly, then,

[1] Schenk-Koch: Lehrbuch, VI Teil, p. 120.

[2] Ibid., p. 92.

[3] It cannot too often be insisted that Treitschke is not necessarily typical of the German attitude toward England. After all, he taught in a university where instruction is more highly individual than in a school. On the other hand, since the natural tendency of education is to yield but slowly to new social forces, antagonism toward England, a comparatively recent sentiment, in its more virulent

animosity toward Great Britain, which undoubtedly existed in Germany before the war, had not thoroughly permeated the schools. The question is one that deserves more thorough study than it has yet received.

The ancient enmity between Germany and France, on the other hand, stands out more sharply in the textbooks. In the school readers many a poem in praise of Germany's past triumphs preserves the vindictive memory of the age-long hostility between the two countries. In the soul-trying times of 1813 Arndt roused the heart and purpose of Germany thus: "We'll redden the iron with blood, with hangman's blood, with Frenchman's blood; Oh, sweet day of revenge! That sounds good to all Germans; that is the great cause!" Repeatedly reprinted,[1] these words have been frequently recited by the children and the children's children of the patriots of Arndt's day. The French are called voracious ravens;[2] in the War of 1870 they were full of envy and trick-

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form, may very well have affected a large proportion of the population of Germany without great contemporaneous effect on the schools.

[1] Scheel, p. 367.

[2] Ibid., p. 368.

ery;[1] they had stolen Alsace and Metz and Lorraine from Germany by sneaking cunning.[2] A true German may not endure any Frenchman, though he is glad to drink his wines.[3] A historian rejoices in the defeat in the Seven Years' War of the "hated French" (*verhassten Franzosen*).[4] In general, France is the hereditary foe (*Erbfeind*);[5] and Mr. Randall even goes so far as to assert—with some exaggeration—that "enmity against France might almost be said to form a subject of school curricula."[6]

Thus Germany, like France, has equipped her people with a psychology of preparedness. Like France, she has held before her sons the ideal of military courage and has taught them to be ready to die like heroes for the Fatherland. She has inculcated this spirit of patriotism largely through the study of history, of geography and of the German language and literature; while France, though not neglecting entirely the patriotic possibilities of these sub-

[1] Scheel: Lesebuch, p. 191.

[2] Ibid., p. 193.

[3] Quoted in Daniel: Geographie, p. 261.

[4] Andrä: Erzählungen, p. 111.

[5] Scheel, p. 369, et passim.

[6] Pan-Germanic Education, *Contemporary Review*, Nov. 1915, p. 595.

jects, has placed more reliance on books of moral and civic instruction. Like France, Germany has brought her school system to the support of the existing government, but in so doing she has fostered a devoted loyalty to monarchy, a form of control to which French education has been unalterably opposed. The development of this sentiment of devotion to the ruling house is one of the most conspicuous factors in the patriotic instruction of young Germans.

The two countries are alike also in having planted in the minds of their future citizens thoughts of the recovery of ancestral territories. French textbook writers have taught definitely that the state ought not resign itself permanently to the losses of the Franco-German War, though this doctrine was preached more fervently in the first half of the Third Republic's history than in the second. German writers have suggested conquest by reminding their youthful public of the outlying lands which, according to their interpretation of historic and national claims, should form part of the Empire. In both countries, too, textbook writers have been allowed by their governments to sow the seeds of national antagonisms and national suspicions.

There are, however, two respects in which the patriotic education of the French has been of a character less dangerous to world-peace than that of Germany. In the first place, the official programs and consequently the textbook writers of France have laid emphasis on the defensive aim of the country's military preparations. The supreme necessity of repelling invasion has been constantly reiterated, while there has been a disposition to decry chauvinism. In Germany, on the other hand, there seems to have been a tendency to glorify the military spirit for its own sake. This would naturally lead to chauvinism. If this tendency in education has been curbed by contrary influences they have not come within my ken.

Secondly, as has been indicated, a greater degree of national egoism is to be found in the textbooks of the Empire than in those of the Republic. In France such national egoism as existed in the days of fat prosperity that preceded the Franco-German War was given such a shock by the disasters of the tragic year that it could not possibly recover in forty or fifty years. Furthermore the devotion of the French to such principles as those of liberty, equality and fraternity would, in any case, prevent her

from being completely dominated by a narrow nationalism.

The patriotic training of early years, then, helps to explain that curious war psychology of the Germans which foreigners find so hard to understand and which hinders the Germans themselves from comprehending the viewpoint of their foes. Of the extent to which his attitude has been determined by instruction the individual German is naturally unconscious. Many a man, in every civilized country, believes certain views absorbed in the impressionable years of boyhood to be the ripe and reasoned conclusions of maturity. The German, therefore, often bases his arguments in regard to the war on premises taught him in school, premises unconsciously assumed to be axiomatic but which his opponents will not admit. Thus he assumes that the interests of the Fatherland are paramount, that they should precede every other consideration. Who or what, therefore, will gainsay his right to promote them? If devotion to the state and to its ruler impels him to acts of the highest heroism, it justifies also, in his mind, a policy of rigorous severity toward those who would injure his country's cause. That the Fatherland can do no wrong,

that it has a civilizing mission toward the rest of Europe, are natural deductions from the precepts of the textbooks. If the European may bear the torch of civilization by brute force into benighted Africa, why should not the light of *Kultur* accompany the armies of victorious Germany? Furthermore, wherever there is a hint of Pan-Germanism, it leads to the natural inference that the Fatherland has been ill-treated in the past, that it has been deprived of portions of an inheritance which may rightfully be regained by conquest. Whatever may be the feeling of foreigners with regard to the justice of his cause, it would indeed be difficult for the German of today, reared in this atmosphere of patriotism and loyalty, to escape a sincere conviction that he is fighting for the right. From infancy he has been dominated by a narrow nationalism.

CHAPTER VII

THE LESSON FOR AMERICA

In the early years of the present century the temper of the United States was becoming unwontedly introspective. Secure in the comfortable assurance that our relations with foreign countries were on the whole most amicable, and confident that the government was handling with requisite skill such difficulties as arose, we began to concentrate on the solution of internal problems and to engage vigorously in a moral housecleaning. Then came the great war; and we turned from our study of corrupt politics, malefactors of great wealth and the sorrows of white slavery, to a dazed contemplation of European battlefields and the wreckage of Belgium. After the first pharisaical wave of thankfulness that the United States was not as other nations had passed, came the question whether after all our own country might not some day be involved in a conflict with the highly trained and scientifically armed troops

of a foreign power, and whether, in such case, the simple expedient of locking arms and rudely pushing them into the sea would prove completely effective. Hence the demand for preparedness.

In opposition to this demand for increased armament arose the cry "Preparedness means war." The fear developed that a militaristic, swashbuckling spirit would fasten itself upon the United States, that the country would become overbearing and ambitious for conquest. Thus preparedness, it was argued, would arouse the hostility of other nations and would, in the end, bring on the very conflict against which it had originally sought to guard.

In spite of such fears the sentiment for preparedness has grown steadily. The European conflict has clearly revealed the fact that the desire to avoid war is not of itself an adequate guaranty of the impossibility of war. Society has not yet reached that stage of altruism which permits the lion and the lamb to lie down together or which secures the safety of that nation which denudes itself of armament. Furthermore, the United States has recently emerged from that condition of happy isolation which was in times past perhaps her greatest

safeguard. Our country has acquired new possessions which it is at present in honor bound to protect, even though it may look forward to conferring upon them ultimately the rights of self-government. The Monroe Doctrine places upon us vast responsibilities for the protection and welfare of the western hemisphere; involved in its defense are innumerable possibilities of conflict. Furthermore, Mexico is a constant menace in spite of the peaceful policy of our President. Nor can we be absolutely sure of the continued friendship of all the great powers. The rest of the world can no longer reckon without the United States; the United States cannot reckon without the rest of the world.[1]

For any such war as that which now overwhelms Europe our country is of course entirely unready. It is not even prepared for a conflict of much smaller proportions. Not only is our army small, but we lack that trained reserve which is proving so effective in Europe. "At the beginning of every single one of our wars," says Huidekoper, "the want of trained reserves has caused the quality and efficiency

[1] See Bacon: National Defense (Handbook), for these and other arguments.

of our regular Army to be adulterated by increasing its number of raw recruits."[1] "Our history is replete with the achievements of the volunteer soldier after he has received the training necessary for war, but it contains no instance when raw levies have been successfully employed in general military operations."[2] The untrained patriot, hastily transferred from civilian clothes to uniform, makes but a sad showing when face to face with the experienced soldier of a hostile nation. The reservist, on the other hand, is apt to prove a good fighter.

Considerations such as these have resulted in vigorous efforts to arouse the country to a realization of the need for more adequate national defense. A host of books and articles have appeared on the subject, some of them worthless or mediocre, others more worthy of thoughtful consideration. Professor R. M. Johnston has taken a broad, philosophical view of the question of armaments in his "Arms and the Race." Theodore Roosevelt has voiced his convictions in his two books, "America and the World War" and "Fear God and Take Your Own Part." The actual

[1] Military Policy of the United States, p. 535.

[2] Ibid., p. 531.

status of our defenses is discussed in Francis V. Greene's "Present Military Situation in the United States" and Carter's "American Army." The weaknesses of our past military policy have been pointed out in General Leonard Wood's little work, entitled "Our Military History; Its Facts and Fallacies." But perhaps the most significant of all books dealing with the subject of preparedness is Frederic L. Huidekoper's "Military Unpreparedness of the United States," which, though "put together in an incredibly short time—is comprehensive and well-organized, and carries its message with extraordinary force."[1] From books such as these the American public has been learning something of the reasons underlying the demand for preparedness.

Through organizations and demonstrations the sentiment has been further crystallized and strengthened. The program of the National

[1] *American Political Science Review,* Vol. IX, p. 778, November, 1915. For further references see Bacon, C.: Selected Articles on National Defense. (Debaters' Handbook Series), Vols. I and II. The H. W. Wilson Co., 1915-1916. A new book likely to prove valuable, to which I have not had access, is being published by Putnam; it is by Lucien Howe, M.D., and is entitled "Universal Military Education."

Security League, for example, calls for less wastefulness in the matter of military expenses, a stronger and more effective army and navy, organization of the National Guard under the War Department, and "the creation of an organized reserve for each branch of our military service."[1] A number of other societies, with somewhat similar aims, have devoted their influence to the movement.[2] The demand for adequate national defense has been more dramatically voiced, however, in the great parades of citizens in New York and other great cities of the country. In New York more than 140,000 persons marched for long hours in token of their sympathy for preparedness.[3] Boston's parade brought out some 40,000 marchers,[4] while Chicago, the chief city of the supposedly lukewarm Middle West, marshaled a host of more than 130,000.[5] By means such as these the demand for preparedness has fastened it-

[1] Bacon: National Defense, p. 15.

[2] Among these are the American Defense League, the American Defense Society, the American Legion, and the Navy League of the United States.

[3] The figures given in a report of Grand Marshal Charles H. Sherrill are 140,139.

[4] *The Outlook,* June 7, 1916, p. 292.

[5] *Chicago Herald,* June 4, 1916.

self more and more securely upon the thought of the nation.[1]

Finally the two great political parties have declared themselves squarely in favor of a stronger national defense. The Republican platform asserts that "We must have a sufficient and effective regular army and a provision for ample reserves, already drilled and disciplined, who can be called at once to the colors when the hour of danger comes.

"We must have a navy so strong and so well proportioned and equipped, so thoroughly ready and prepared, that no enemy can gain command of the sea and effect a landing in force on either our Western or our Eastern coast. To secure these results we must have a coherent and continuous policy of national defense, which even in these perilous days the Democratic party has utterly failed to develop, but which we promise to give to the country."

The Democratic party, for its part, states: "We . . . favor the maintenance of an army

[1] At the San Francisco preparedness parade occurred a disastrous outrage. A bomb, placed in a suitcase and set off by a time fuse, exploded, killing a number of persons and injuring many more. It was impossible to trace the author of the deed.

fully adequate to the requirements of order, of safety, and of the protection of the nation's rights, the fullest development of modern methods of seacoast defense and the maintenance of an adequate reserve of citizens trained to arms and prepared to safeguard the people and territory of the United States against any danger of hostile action which may unexpectedly arise; of a navy worthy to support the great naval traditions of the United States, and fully equal to the international tasks which the United States hopes and expects to take part in performing. The plans and enactments of the present Congress afford substantial proof of our purpose in this exigent matter."

It hardly seems to be a question, then, as to whether or not our national defenses shall be increased, but rather as to how far preparedness is to go and what form it is to take.

There are, however, two dangers of an opposite character which may develop from the present situation. The first is that the preparedness movement, at present sustained by events in Europe and Mexico, may later evaporate in inconsequential hysteria. The second is that,

in spite of the protestations of its advocates, it may foster militarism.

For the avoidance of these two possibilities a rational, patriotic education is needed. Such instruction the French have made the psychological basis for the national defense. Such instruction they have used, though not with complete uniformity, to oppose chauvinism. So in our own country the right sort of education ought to furnish the most effective means for reconciling adequate preparedness with those pacific ideals which we have always professed. In the development of such instruction America can learn much from the merits and defects of the patriotic teachings of France and Germany.

The apathy and ignorance of many Americans in the presence of contemporary crisis furnish one of the clearest indications of the inadequacy of the patriotic instruction now given in our schools. It is significant that a leading educator has recently written that "for a generation past the teaching of civics aimed at little more than the acquisition of knowledge about government. It was assumed that the school's function did not extend beyond an intellectual treatment of social and political welfare. The subject matter was formal and nec-

essarily barren, remote from ordinary human interests, and more remote still from any concerns of children.'' [1] It is even more significant that the index of the 1915 volume of the ''Addresses and Proceedings of the National Education Association,'' which contains some eighteen references to vocational education, contains none to patriotism.[2] Nor is this heading to be found in the index of any of the preceding vol-

[1] Suzzallo, H., in Hill, M.: The Teaching of Civics, Editor's Introduction, p. v.

[2] The tone of certain resolutions adopted at the 1915 meeting of the National Education Association was decidedly pacificist. This year (1916), after some debate, a resolution, mild enough, yet very different from those of last year, was adopted. The Association "affirms its belief that the instruction in the school should tend to furnish the mind with the knowledge of the arts and sciences on which the prosperity of the nations rests and to incline the will of men and nations toward acts of peace; it declares its devotion to America and American ideals and recognizes the claims of our beloved country on our property, our minds, our hearts, and our lives. It records its conviction that the true policy to be followed both by the school and by the nation which it serves is to keep the American public school free from sectarian interference, partisan politics and disputed public policies, that it may remain unimpaired in its power to serve the whole people. While it recognizes that the community, or the state, may introduce such elements of military training into the schools as may seem wise and prudent, yet it believes that such training should

umes for at least eight years. This is the more noticeable as the work of this association furnishes probably the clearest indication of the general trend of contemporary educational thought in the United States. It is said that in the mountain regions of some of the Southern States there are many children who have never even seen an American flag.[1] Conditions are better, indeed, than they were ten years ago. Something has been done to improve our deplorably insufficient instruction in patriotism. But the problem is not to be solved simply by the passage of laws requiring schools to display in a conspicuous place the American flag, or requiring the children to salute it, or setting apart a day in its honor. It is not to be solved simply by expecting pupils to learn the national airs, or to study civics and American history after the old-fashioned manner. What is needed is a great national awakening.

The most obvious form of educational preparedness is that of military drill in the public

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be strictly educational in its aim and organization, and that military ends should not be permitted to pervert the educational purposes and practices of the school."

[1] This is vouched for by a prominent member of the Society of the Daughters of the American Revolution.

schools. Prompted by the present excitement, the legislatures of several states have turned their attention to this matter, and New York has actually passed a law requiring, among other things, that schoolboys between sixteen and nineteen years of age shall drill regularly. The experience of France, however, warns against the over-confident enthusiasm which sees in the khaki-clad high school lad a tower of strength in time of trouble. Long before the present war had revealed how wide was the gap between the parade ground and the battle-field, patriotic Frenchmen were inclined to look with disfavor [1] on those *bataillons scolaires* in which they had taken such pride in the earlier days of the Republic.[2] The American scholar, Farrington, writing of the French primary schools in the early twentieth century, reports, "The only military drill that I ever found was confined to simple marches and squad evolutions entirely without arms. Even this is found but rarely." [3] "Do you prepare men!" General Chanzy once said, addressing a gathering of

[1] De Coubertin: "Bataillons Scolaires ou Cowboys," in *Le Foyer,* Jan. 1, 1913.

[2] Hanriot: Vive la France! p. 8.

[3] The Public Primary School System of France, p. 114.

teachers. "Leave to us the task of making soldiers." [1]

The skepticism of the French in regard to the efficacy of military drill in the schools is paralleled by the findings of the legislative commission appointed to consider the question in Massachusetts. Having shared in the investigation conducted by this body, Commissioner Snedden reports that such military drill as is taught in schools can have little functional significance in war as it is now waged. For example, orders on the battlefield "are given by whistles and signals, just as you see in the case of a foreman of a great building; and there are orders that are whispered along from man to man. But that beautiful way of shouting out orders is a thing of the past." [2] Rifle practice, however, Dr. Snedden considers valuable. "I do not see why we should not train boys of twelve years with the rifle. Boys of twelve are plastic." [3] Furthermore, he advocates the development of a program of physical training for high school boys.[4] All these things show that

[1] Quoted by De Coubertin, in *Le Foyer,* Jan. 1, 1913.

[2] Snedden: Military Training in the High School in *Education,* May, 1916, p. 613.

[3] Ibid., p. 614.

[4] Ibid., p. 615.

little reliance can be placed in war time on the results of the old-fashioned military drill. Something may be done perhaps to prepare the schoolboy for the actual tasks of the soldier. It is noticeable that the Boy Scout movement met with some sympathy in France in the years immediately preceding the world-conflict. Its activities, like those suggested by Commissioner Snedden, bear a real relation to warfare. But in making ready for the day of national danger, the chief concern of the French school has been with the mind and heart of the boy rather than with his body. Likewise for the defense of America, the development of a vigorous psychology of patriotism and loyalty is more necessary than the formal drilling of high school cadets.

High ideals and definite knowledge should constitute the basis of this psychology. Recent educational experimentation tends to confirm the ancient belief that right habits are best formed where right ideals have been patiently inculcated. There is today too much sentimentality in the teaching of patriotism in America, too little true sentiment. Love of country is taught, but the duty of self-sacrifice for the sake of the Fatherland is not brought home to the

American boy with sufficient emphasis. In France and Germany, on the other hand, the minds and hearts of school-children are impregnated, from their earliest days, with a stern sense of responsibility toward the nation in peace and in war. French boys learn something of the grim realities of war; but they learn, too, that they must be prepared to face these realities if their country demands it. So in the United States the old individualistic ideal in education, redolent of the pioneer spirit, must yield to the ideal of national responsibility. The American must be trained, from childhood, as the Frenchman has been, to make whatever sacrifice an endangered Fatherland may demand.

Nor is a general willingness to defend one's country in time of war the sole demand which national military efficiency makes upon the psychology of the schoolboy. Courage and coolness must, as far as possible, become second nature with him. We admire the heroic deeds of the French or German soldier in today's conflict, but at the same time we are prone to assume that war changes a man's psychology over night, transforming a ribbon-counter clerk into a prodigy of valor. We forget that from childhood the ideal of courage has been fos-

tered in him. So must it be fostered in the American boy—far more than it is at present.

Idealism must be accompanied by intelligence. The defeat of France in the Franco-German War stands as a terrible warning against ignorant over-confidence. The intellectual efficiency of the Prussian soldier in the same struggle shows the value of discriminating knowledge. Much of this knowledge was inculcated, of course, during the years of compulsory military training; but its foundation was laid in the school.

In our own country it is necessary first of all that American history for schools should be written in a different way, and taught in a different way, from that in use at present. The trouble with the average historical text is not so much that specific facts are misrepresented as that the general perspective is wrong. The impression gained from a perusal of one of these works is that while our troops were defeated in individual battles, their record as a whole has been brilliantly successful. Even where defeated, they fought heroically, yielding only to overwhelming numbers or because of circumstances over which they had no control. The calm confidence of many American citizens

that embattled farmers can always be counted on to repel the invasions of a foreign foe is based largely on what they learned of American history in school. Of the origins of their point of view these worthy citizens are naturally unconscious, just as the Germans are unconscious of the origins of their present war psychology. Such instruction leads easily to the belief that an unprepared United States can "lick the world." Its influence cannot but be pernicious in the hour of danger.

Patriotism, as well as scholarship, demands that school children know not merely the truth, but the whole truth. The weakness and ineffectiveness of our military policy at various periods of our history should not be concealed from them. They should know, for example, of the disastrous battle of Bladensburg, which preceded the capture of the city of Washington in 1814. "On the 24th of August," says the candid Upton, "the army described by its commander as 'suddenly assembled without organization,' or discipline, or officers with the least knowledge of service, numbered 5,401, of whom 400 were regulars, 600 marines, and 20 sailors, the remainder being volunteers and militia.

"The same day the army thus hastily assembled was as hastily formed in order of battle at Bladensburg, where, in the presence of the President and the Cabinet, it was attacked and routed with the loss of but 8 killed and 11 wounded.

". . . The British force . . . numbered 3,500, of which only a part of the advance division of 1,500 were engaged."[1] Upton contrasts this battle with that of Lundy's Lane, a month earlier, where American regulars fought with the greatest courage and endurance. Of the War of 1812 in general, the same writer says, "The lessons of the war are so obvious that they need not be stated. Nearly all the blunders committed were repetitions in an aggravated form of the same blunders in the Revolution, and like them had their origin either in the mistakes or omissions of military legislation."[2] If these things be true, American children have a right to know them. There is plenty of heroism in our history; there is no need of trying to find it where it is not.[3] And

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[1] Military Policy of the United States, pp. 127-128.

[2] Ibid., p. 142.

[3] George Washington thus criticizes American military policy: "Had we formed a permanent army in the begin-

our national future will be much better promoted by a frank acknowledgment of past weaknesses than by bombastic national glorification. France has pointed the way.

Furthermore, our youth should know of the law of the continuity of history. They would then realize that the nations of the world are most unlikely to break suddenly with their past habits and that therefore any immediate realization of the ideal of universal peace is practically an impossibility. If there were no other arguments against pacificism this law alone ought to deal it a deathblow.

With greater impartiality in the study of history should go a fuller and more accurate

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ning, which by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we never should have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776, trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved; we should not have remained all the succeeding winter at their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sufficient body of men to mount the ordinary guards, liable at every moment to be dissipated, if they had only thought proper to march against us. . . . Had we kept a permanent army on foot the enemy could have had nothing to hope for, and would in all probability have listened to terms long since." Ibid., pp. 53-54, from Sparks' "Writings of Washington," Vol. 7, pp. 162, 164.

knowledge of present conditions. In connection with the study of geography, specific information should be given in regard of the strength and efficiency of our army and navy as compared with those of other great countries. The condition of our fortifications, the weaknesses of our frontier should be known. Furthermore, the expense involved in adequate preparedness should not be concealed; but the children, having been taught the necessity of such expense, should be led to a willingness to share later in the financial burdens involved. Finally there should be some study of the foreign problems which confront the government. In this connection regular instruction should be given in current history, than which there is probably no subject better calculated to create a permanent interest in the affairs of the nation.

By such means, perhaps, the present insidious apathy in regard to the vital concerns of our country can be partially removed. The rising generations will learn that they are living, not in a Utopia, but in a man-made world where it behooves every nation to be on its guard. If the feminine influence in American education is not too strong, a more virile patriotism can

be developed. There can be inculcated a stronger feeling of obligation, a sterner sense of duty toward the Fatherland.

Alarmists may protest that instruction of this character will lead to militarism. But there is no fundamental reason why it should do so. No doubt certain French writers of textbooks have striven to inculcate in the youth of France the desire for war with Germany. No doubt a narrowly nationalistic instruction in Germany has fostered the spirit of conquest. But against chauvinism it is always possible for education to guard; and the school can do much to promote international amity.

To attain these happy results the school should first of all emphasize the fact that the army and navy are for the defense of the nation, not to further national aggression. Everything that savors of the braggart spirit, that tends to hostility toward any other country, should be expunged from the teaching of the schools.

In this connection, again, the study of American history needs a thorough revision. For this subject has helped to perpetuate the effete idea that Great Britain is our hereditary enemy. That this has been done incidentally

to national glorification rather than of set purpose scarcely lessens its harmfulness. "The widespread spirit of hostility which, like a prairie fire, swept over the country after President Cleveland's Venezuelan message, and which utterly amazed England, was a startling revelation of latent belligerency due largely to a narrow and false teaching of history."[1] Fortunately, modern historical scholarship is turning to documents less biased than the time-honored *Annual Register,* on which so many histories of the American Revolution were so largely built. It is to be hoped that the spirit of this newer research will more and more thoroughly permeate the teaching of history in our schools.

Education can hasten in a more positive way, however, the era of good feeling among the nations. For example, more sympathetic attention can be given to the history and civilization of foreign countries. It is one of the weaknesses of the educational systems of France and Germany that each country inclines to give disproportionate attention to itself. In the primary schools of France, according to Farrington, "the work in geography and history is

[1] Mead: Patriotism and the New Internationalism, p. 15.

confined almost exclusively to France and her colonies, most of the other parts of the world receiving only hasty consideration."[1] Fortunately for the cause of international amity, however, Europe has long been the Mecca of American devotees of culture. The little schoolmistress, who has hoarded her slender savings for the long-anticipated Cook's tour, returns from her trip full of respect and admiration for the countries she has visited. Her sympathetic interpretation does much to inspire in her pupils like feelings for the peoples of these lands. But much more might be done through education to develop a friendly attitude toward other nations. The government might send American pupils as well as American teachers, in large numbers, to study abroad, receiving in return similar educational representatives from foreign parts. The textbooks of other countries, too, might be used in American schools, thus promoting at one and the same time the study of foreign languages and the sympathetic appreciation of foreign peoples. Especially ought friendship with the South American states to be strengthened in such ways as these.

[1] Farrington: Public Primary School System of France, p. 111.

Thus can be lessened the dangers of international misunderstandings and disputes.

It is possible, then, to make of education in America a great political instrument which shall lay a psychological foundation for a strong national defense and at the same time restrain chauvinism, and pave the way for a realization of the ideal of human brotherhood. On the one hand can be inculcated that self-sacrificing devotion to the Fatherland which inspires the schools of France and Germany. On the other hand can be developed that true friendship toward other countries which must inevitably precede the complete attainment of international amity. But it must be remembered that education is not itself a creative force; it simply intensifies ideals and purposes already dominant in the national life. If, however, well-considered public opinion really demands preparedness, education can strengthen and rationalize this sentiment. If the heart of the nation is at the same time bent on the avoidance of militarism, education can be used as a safeguard. Always it can be Reason's most effective weapon in her struggle against Ignorance and Passion.

CHAPTER VIII

MILITARY TRAINING IN EUROPE

A German who was once asked to address a group of American students in regard to his school experiences concluded with an account of his training in the army of the Fatherland. For the army, as he pointed out, is the apex of the German school system. Practically every male citizen is compelled by law to undergo some military instruction, and his character is decidedly affected thereby. Nor is Germany alone in accepting the principle of universal compulsory service. France, too, has long had her citizen army, as have all the chief powers of the world save England and the United States. Even Switzerland and Australia have become "nations in arms"; and it has been suggested that the military systems of these two lands have features well worthy of imitation in our own country. It is claimed that they offer the advantages of adequate defense with-

out impairing the liberties of the individual, or leading to militarism. Since belief in these ideas seems to be growing, it is quite possible that before long the obligation to undergo a limited amount of military service even in time of peace, will be regarded in the United States as a normal corollary of citizenship.

Modern conscription, contrary to a widely accepted popular belief, is of French rather than of German origin. In the early years of the Revolutionary period, when France was in imminent danger from hosts of foreign soldiers who threatened to overrun the land, suppress the new social forces which had taken control of the country, and reëstablish the Ancient Régime in all its former pomp and power, the liability of all able-bodied citizens to serve in the army was decreed. While the means of enforcement were at first inadequate, nevertheless large forces of men were raised in this manner. Numbers and enthusiasm for the Revolution atoned in part for lack of training, and military success testified to the efficacy of conscription. It was not until 1789, however, that the compulsory principle was firmly established. In that year General Jourdan introduced into the Council of Five Hundred a law

which "remained practically unaltered as the basis of the French military organization down to 1870. The law definitely laid down the liability of every able-bodied French citizen to serve from his twentieth to his twenty-fifth year, leaving it to circumstances to determine how many classes or what proportion of each should be called up for service. Finally after much discussion the right of exemption by payment of a substitute was conceded, and therein lay the germ of the disaster of 1870."[1] It was this law which made possible Napoleon's boast to Metternich, "I can afford to expend thirty thousand men a month."[2] It was this law and the successes that attended its operation which in the end forced the other European states to pass similar measures, and substituted the armed nation for the professional army.[3]

If, however, modern conscription is of French origin, the principle of the trained reserve force is attributable to Prussian influence. The awakening of the soul of Prussia, which fol-

[1] Article on Conscription, in the eleventh edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica (Vol. VI, p. 973), by Col. Maude, the English military critic.

[2] Ibid., p. 972.

[3] Ibid.; Johnston: Arms and the Race, p. 49.

lowed the battle of Jena and initiated that great movement for patriotic education which has been previously described, found its most immediately effective expression in a military reformation of tremendous significance. A military commission was appointed with Scharnhorst at the head. Him Henderson describes as "unmilitary, almost slovenly in appearance, with no objection to munching his evening meal in the streets or parks of Hanover, yet by virtue of necessity an ideal conspirator, with as many folds in his conscience, Treitschke has said, as wrinkles on his simple face."[1] With Scharnhorst were associated men like Clausewitz, Gneisenau and Boyen, whose names will live long in the military history of Germany. Under the influence of this commission incompetent army officers were punished, the luxuries of officers in the field were curtailed, and opportunity for promotion was opened to those not of noble birth. The treatment of the common soldier was vastly improved, and instead of being subjected to inhuman and degrading punishment for minor offenses, the iron discipline of earlier times was relaxed, and he was treated as a self-respecting human being.

[1] Short History of Germany, Vol. II, p. 278.

Finally the famous *Krümpersystem* was introduced.

The aim of this system was to expand the army by means of reserves. By a secret article of the Franco-Prussian Convention of September 8, 1808, Napoleon, in the insolence of a power which seemed to find especial delight in the humiliation of Prussia, had demanded that that state "should limit her army to 42,000 men for at least ten years, and should not form a militia or a national guard."[1] To this demand Prussia perforce agreed, but met the situation by training troops as thoroughly as possible and passing them into the reserves, filling their places at regular intervals with raw recruits who in turn went through the same process. Thus while the standing army never at any one time exceeded the stipulated number of 42,000, as many as 150,000 men were available by 1812 for effective use whenever the call to arms might come.[2] How well these reservists could fight, Napoleon learned to his sorrow in October, 1813, at the fateful Battle of the Nations.

The Prussian system of military training

[1] Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IX, p. 333.

[2] Ibid.

was made permanent by Boyen's law, proclaimed on September 3, 1814. "Boyen's law opens," says Professor Ford,[1] "with the words of Frederick William I, 'Every citizen is bound to defend his Fatherland.' The obligation rested upon all after the twentieth year. Five years were to be passed in the standing army—three of these in active service and two as reservists on leave. Then came seven years in the first call of the *Landwehr,* with the obligation to serve abroad as well as at home, to participate in occasional reviews and drills on set days, and once annually to participate with the regular army in larger maneuvers. The second summons of the *Landwehr* filled out seven years more with occasional drills, the obligation to do garrison duty in war, and the possibility of service abroad in need. After these nineteen years they were to hold themselves ready for service in the *Landsturm,* which included all those between the ages of seventeen and fifty who were in any way able to bear arms. Its uses were purely defensive. The citizens who could show a certain degree of education and could furnish their own arms and uniforms

[1] Boyen's Military Law, in *American Historical Review,* Vol. XX, pp. 536-537 (April, 1915).

served only one year with the colors and then generally in special troops (*Jäger* and *Schützen*), followed by two years as reservists, and had a prior right to officers' places in the *Landwehr*. The standing army was to form the core of this army, thus preserving in the new national army the best proved product of the old régime." This law the same writer believes to be the most important statute of the nineteenth century.[1] It has served as a model for the military systems of all the leading European powers save England alone.

It is remarkable how closely the general tenor of the laws governing compulsory military training in Germany at the present time resembles that of the Prussian act of 1814, although of course certain lesser differences are to be noted. The term of service in the standing army (in time of peace) is now seven years instead of five, but the actual training of infantry with the colors is two years instead of three. Thus the period for reserve service in the standing army has been increased from two years to five.[2] During these five years the re-

[1] Ibid.

[2] For cavalry and horse artillery the terms are three years in the ranks, four in the reserve.

servist is expected to join his corps for actual training twice, for periods of not over eight weeks each.

Terms in the *Landwehr* and *Landsturm* are somewhat shorter today than under Boyen's law, so that liability to military service ends at forty-five instead of fifty years of age. The chief duty of the *Landwehr* in time of war is supposed to be that of garrisoning the home fortresses and manning the coast defenses. "They also furnish the armies to occupy conquered territory, to guard prisoners, and to assume every duty that will prevent the diversion of troops from the battle lines at the front."[1] The *Landsturm* is supposed to be used purely for home defense. Extraordinary conditions may of course force a modification of these regulations.

The system of one-year volunteers, decreed by Boyen's law, is also retained at the present time. Young men who have passed certain examinations are allowed to complete their service in the ranks in one year. They are expected, however, to pay their own expenses during this period, which "are reckoned at from four hun-

[1] O'Ryan and Anderson: The Modern Army in Action, p. 53.

dred to five hundred and fifty dollars.'' [1] From these men most of the reserve officers are chosen.

A certain proportion of the able-bodied men of Germany have been able, in time of peace, to escape the military training just outlined. The population of the Empire has increased so rapidly since 1871 that more men have been available for service than the government felt that it needed, or could afford to train thoroughly. These men, escaping conscription by lot, or rejected by the military authorities because of minor physical disabilities, form what is known as the *Ersatzreserve.* Their ''special function is to supply men to replace war losses so as to maintain the companies in the field at full strength. For twelve years they are carried in this reserve and during this time they are called out for a total of three periods of training, lasting ten, six and four weeks respectively.'' [2] In the event of war their training is completed as rapidly as possible.

The fighting strength of Germany at the opening of the present war consisted, then, (1)

[1] Fullerton, G. S.: Germany of Today, p. 91.

[2] O'Ryan and Anderson: The Modern Army in Action, p. 51.

of a standing army composed of three classes of men: first, those who were serving a two years' term in the ranks and were continually in training; second, those who were serving a five-year period in the reserve in readiness for action, but accountable for only two comparatively brief periods of training in time of peace; and third, the one-year volunteers; (2) of a *Landwehr,* ready for garrison and other duties in the event of war; (3) of a *Landsturm* for home defense; and (4) of an *Ersatzreserve* to supply vacancies created in the active army by the casualties of war.

It is not necessary to discuss the French system in detail. After her crushing defeat in 1870, France determined to reorganize her army according to the Prussian model. Hence the military law of July 27, 1872, rendering every Frenchman liable to service between the ages of twenty and forty. Substitution was abolished, though certain classes were allowed partial or complete exemption. The period with the colors was fixed at five years. Germany gasped with astonishment, tried to bully France, and then to isolate her, but to no avail. Not till 1889, when passions waned and calmer thoughts prevailed, did France reduce the term

of active service to three years. In 1905, after the Dreyfus case and its attendant circumstances had aroused a large part of the people to feverish opposition to the army, service with the colors was reduced to two years, but at the same time exemptions, save those for physical disability, were abolished. The year before the outbreak of the present war, however, France, alarmed at measures taken by Germany to increase the standing army and to lay up new stores of ammunition, raised the term of service to three years again, and prepared for the inevitable. Discussing in July, 1913, this army bill of France, a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* is reminded of a passage in the Chamber of Deputies in 1868 between Jules Favre and Maréchal Niel, apropos of a proposed increase in the army, "Would you, then, make of France a barracks?" exclaimed Favre; to which Niel replied, "Take care that you do not make of her a cemetery." This was but two years before the battle of Sedan.[1]

It need hardly be said that both France and Germany have taken military training with the utmost seriousness, and that the individual citizen is far from finding his years of service a

[1] *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1913, p. 235.

sinecure. In the German army the recruit is first taught to walk in military fashion, to stand straight, and to take part in squad evolutions. Then he learns the use of the rifle and is trained in close order drill. During the summer months he is taken out into the open, is hardened physically, and prepared for the August and September maneuvers. These maneuvers approach as nearly as possible actual war conditions.[1] The following extract from an account given some ten years ago by one who had undergone this training shows how its hardships and brutalities stand out in the soldier's mind:[2]

"If I live to be a hundred," says the writer, "I will never forget those few initial weeks. They were simply hell. The first two weeks I was taught how to walk. Here was I, fully grown man—at twenty a lad thinks he knows it all—being instructed in the art of walking properly. I felt like a child; it hurt my pride. For three hours every morning, and for two each afternoon, I had to walk back and forth, a regular moving clothes dummy. If this was the

[1] O'Ryan and Anderson: The Modern Army in Action, pp. 47-49.

[2] Schultz, E.: "A Soldier of the Kaiser," in the *Independent,* August 23, 1906, pp. 430 ff.

glorious life of a soldier, I already had my fill of it. At times I would rebel mentally, and, in consequence, my walk would become slouchy. I was quickly brought to my senses by the language hurled at me by the officers, which was coarsely forcible and far from complimentary to me. But it made me walk."

He then goes on to tell how poor the food was; how, after he had learned to walk, he was drilled in marching with other recruits, and then was taught to carry a rifle. The process of learning to wear a helmet he describes as almost unendurable. "The leather lining gripped my forehead, and the helmet itself pressed so heavily that at times I thought I should go stark, raving mad. But the watchful eye of the officer was continuously focused upon me, and I was more afraid of offending that vigilant taskmaster than of anything else.

". . . Of course, army regulations forbid an officer to abuse and strike a private, but they do it, nevertheless.

"One day I was almost prostrate with fatigue. In spite of all my efforts to the contrary, my chin would occasionally stick itself out in a most unsoldierly manner. An officer noticed it. Without a word of warning, he dealt me a ter-

rible blow on the offending jaw. I saw stars for a time, but I had to accept my punishment without a murmur. . . . They have a rule in the German army that if a private is abused or maltreated by an officer, he is not allowed to report the outrage until the next day. This gives the poor fellow a night's sleep to calm down and to weigh the matter carefully. He can then—if he be so disposed—take his grievance to a superior officer. Woe unto the complainant if he fail in proving his case absolutely! Even if he make it good, he is thenceforth a marked man. Instead of being occasionally the butt of one officer's anger, he now becomes a scapegoat to all his superiors. So it always happens that, after a night's thinking over the matter, the victim sees the folly of heaping troubles upon his own head and decides to keep his mouth shut."

After learning how to use the rifle effectively, the young soldier of the Kaiser was considered fit for field drill in the open country. "At six in the morning we breakfasted, and from that on, until four o'clock in the afternoon, we were either on the march or run. It was heart-breaking work, but a blessed and welcome relief from the drudgery and monotony of barracks

life. At the end of the first year we had our regimental drill, the maneuvers."

His second year was much like the first and he was elated when his term of service drew to a close. In spite of his sufferings, however, he concludes, "I am proud that I have served in the army of the Kaiser. While the training and ill-treatment nearly killed me, it made a man of me. The German army is all right. The abuses in it are what is wrong. Let us hope that time and our Emperor will rectify the evil, before it is too late."

If the reader is tempted to think this brutality characteristic only of the German army, let him turn to the pages of Décle's "Trooper 3809," or even to the milder impressions of Professor Guérard, as set forth some five years ago in an article in the *Popular Science Monthly*.[1] "I have roughed it a good deal since those days," says M. Décle, "but I have no hesitation in saying that the time of my active service with the colors was the bitterest experience I ever underwent."[2] He served in the '70's, however, since which time conditions

[1] "Impressions of Military Life in France," in *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 364-370.

[2] Décle: Trooper 3809, p. 8.

have improved. M. Guérard, pointing out certain dangers and abuses connected with military training, nevertheless says that it is, "on the whole, a very unpleasant experience for any person of fastidious tastes and habits; tolerable for healthy individuals of an adaptable type; satisfactory for the great majority."[1] Complaint in France and Germany seems to have been chiefly of the brutality of under-officers, and of the practical inability of the common soldier to secure justice against their tyranny.[2] As for the other hardships, real preparation for war cannot be child's play; a "natty" uniform, a little-used rifle, and "right forward, fours right" in the sunshine of feminine admiration will not equip a man for the death-duel.

There are, however, few Americans who

[1] Op. cit., p. 366.

[2] "The act of striking a superior," says Décle, "meaning any man superior in rank to oneself, from a Corporal upwards, is punished by Death, even in time of peace. Two instances occurred while I served. In the first instance a private had struck a Corporal who had bullied him in a most shameful way; in the second instance a Corporal had struck an officer who had called his mother by a vile name. Both men were found guilty and publicly shot in the presence of their regiment on special parade." Trooper 3809, p. 6.

would not recoil from the thought of saddling our country with such military burdens as France and Germany have carried for so many years. For us to undertake this load would be neither necessary nor right. On the other hand, as has been shown, there is a growing feeling that more should be done to improve our military organization. Our national position of aloofness from European affairs, of "friendship with all foreign nations, but entangling alliances with none," has perforce been changed to that of a member of the concert of powers interested in world affairs. But while our national position has changed, our national mechanism has not been altered to conform to new needs. We have no diplomatic force, because no diplomatic class is systematically trained in this country as it is abroad. And we have no army—no army, that is, capable of resisting effectively any large force of efficient troops which might succeed in getting a foothold within our national boundaries.

To remedy the defects of our military organization two systems have been most prominently considered, the Swiss and the Australian. These are to the military systems of the great continental powers of Europe as vaccination is

to the smallpox. Those who believe that the United States ought to be vaccinated against war cannot be indifferent to the workings of the citizen armies of Switzerland and Australia. They have striven to solve the problem of establishing an adequate national defense without developing those features of the conscriptive system which are essentially distasteful to the American mind.

"All Swiss must perform military service," says the law of 1907. Those who are disqualified for physical or other reasons from active participation must pay an exemption tax.[1] As in Germany, the military organization is composed of an active army (known in Switzerland as the *Élite* or *Auszug*), a *Landwehr,* and a *Landsturm.*

The foundations of military training are laid in the school. Education is compulsory between the ages of 7 and 15, and during this period the boys are required to undergo a stiff course in calisthenics and other physical exercises. Rivalry in the national sports is also encouraged

[1] Military Law of the Swiss Confederation. Translated by Second Lieutenant Alexander P. Cronkhite. United States Senate, 64th Congress, 1st Session. Document No. 360.

and carefully directed. At the same time the boys are, in some cantons, obliged to become members of cadet corps, in whose service they are taught map reading, marching and target shooting. After leaving school and before beginning the regular training required by the state, they may, if they wish, become members of Military Preparation Companies. All this preliminary work, in school and out, is of no mean importance. "The physical and military preparation of the Swiss youth," says Captain Faesch,[1] "is an essential part of the Swiss military system."

At twenty the young Swiss is given his arms and other equipment, which he is expected to keep always at home and in good condition.[2] He is now ready for active training, and begins work at a recruit school under the supervision of a permanent military instructor. The period of service in this school varies from sixty days in the sanitary, veterinary and transportation corps, to ninety days in the cavalry.[3] The training is intensive and therefore hard and

[1] The Swiss Army System, p. 9 (pamphlet published by Stechert).

[2] Ibid., p. 9.

[3] Military Law of the Swiss Confederation. Senate Doc. 360, 64th Cong., 1st Session.

effective.[1] "Each day at least eight hours' hard work is required, except on Sundays, and even then they are frequently sent out for night work in the evening. There is a great deal of night work, night firing, constructing trenches, etc., but it does not interfere with that required each day, for, although the recruits may be out until three o'clock in the morning, the work next day proceeds as usual."[2] If the work is strenuous, however, it is soon over. Sixty to ninety days seem but a small amount of time compared to the two years of service in Germany, or three in France.

The young militiaman is now a member of the *Élite* or active army. He is turned over to that branch of the army for which he has been fitted, and for several years thereafter is kept in fairly good trim for fighting by means of what are known as repetition courses. These occur at annual intervals and last for two weeks each. Conditions approach actual warfare as nearly as possible.

At thirty-three the citizen becomes a member of the *Landwehr*. Every four years he is called out to undergo a repetition course lasting

[1] *See* Appendix II.

[2] Senate Doc. No. 796, 63d Cong., 3d Session, p. 119.

eleven days.[1] The *Landwehr* furnishes troops for garrison duty,[2] and is charged in time of war with such operations as require endurance and tenacity of purpose rather than daring. In war time it may also be used to fill vacancies in the *Élite*.[3]

When he reaches the age of forty-one the soldier passes into the *Landsturm*, in which he remains until he is forty-eight. "These *Landsturm* sections," says Captain Faesch,[4] "are the very men wanted to protect the Swiss Railroad Stations, tunnels and bridges, the Alpine roads and great passes, baggage columns, electric central power stations and gunpowder factories. They form the Territorial Army, whereas the first and second classes form the Field Army.

"There is still another class, the non-armed *Landsturm*. This class comprises all those physically unfit as well as those volunteers who have not reached the necessary age or who are older than the law prescribes. According to their profession or abilities they have to help

[1] Military Law of the Swiss Confederation. Senate Doc. No. 360, 64th Cong., 1st Session.

[2] Senate Doc. No. 796, 63d Cong., 3d Session, p. 131.

[3] Senate Doc. No. 360, 64th Cong., 1st Session, p. 23.

[4] Swiss Army System, p. 12.

wherever they are needed (as bakers, butchers, typists in staff offices, in ammunition factories, etc.)." The *Landsturm* may also be called upon to fill vacancies in the *Landwehr* and the *Élite*.[1]

A most important part of the Swiss system is the rifle practice which every man receives. All over Switzerland exist societies of sharpshooters, semi-official in character. Every soldier carrying a gun is obliged by law to fire so many shots a year at a target. Unless he comes up to a certain standard, he is summoned, at his own expense, to a parade ground where he must take a special three days' course in rifle practice. Every important festival has its contest in marksmanship. Shooting at a mark is, indeed, as much a national sport in Switzerland as cricket is in England.

This intensive and practical training of the Swiss has been the chief influence in preventing their country from becoming a negligible factor in the military calculations of the European powers. Apart from geographical considerations the little republic could never have been overrun as was Belgium.

In Australia, as in Switzerland, it is the duty

[1] Mil. Law of Swiss, Senate Doc. 360, 64th Cong., 1st Session, p. 23.

of all male citizens, save for a small number of exempted persons, to share in the national defense. For this duty the youth is prepared by a carefully devised system of instruction consisting of three stages: (1) the junior cadets, from 12 to 14 years of age; (2) the senior cadets, from 14 to 18 years of age; and (3) the citizen forces, from 18 to 26 years of age. This system, though organized during the past decade, "is not new, but simply an extension of the old cadet and militia organization to include all those who are physically fit instead of limiting membership to 'volunteers.'"[1]

The first stage, that of the junior cadets, is essentially preparatory. Ninety hours a year must be devoted to such work as general physical training, marching drill and sometimes miniature rifle shooting, swimming, organized running exercises, and first aid to the injured. This training is in the hands of the schoolmasters.[2]

The second stage, beginning at the age of 14, lasts four years, and bears a closer relation to actual warfare than the first. The youth is ob-

[1] Senate Document No. 796, 63d Cong., 3d Session, p. 30.
[2] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

ligated, during this period, to four whole-day, twelve half-day, and twenty-four night drills (quarter-days), annually.[1] The training is rigorous in character, the aim being to develop as much soldierly ability as possible in the shortest space of time. It includes "drills in marching, discipline, the handling of arms, physical drill, guard duty and minor tactics. A cadet rifle and belt are added to his (the cadet's) 'junior' uniform and 10 per cent of the best shots are given target practice with the service rifle."[2]

At the age of 18 or shortly thereafter the lad passes into the militia or citizen army. Here he is required to render a total of 16 days in the military and 25 in the engineering branches of the service annually. The act of 1909 provides, however, "that, except in time of imminent danger or war, the last year of service in the citizen forces shall be limited to one registration or one muster parade."[3] In his twenty-seventh year he is dismissed from active serv-

[1] These last respectively not less than four hours, two hours, and one hour each. Senate Doc. No. 796, 63d Cong., 3d Session, p. 50; Wood, L.: Our Military History, p. 231.

[2] Wood, op. cit., p. 231.

[3] Sec. 125 of the Act of 1909, quoted in Wood, op. cit., p. 230.

ice. There is much rifle practice during and after the years of training. There are, indeed, practically no reserves save rifle clubs, a fact which called forth the criticism of General Sir Ian Hamilton shortly before the outbreak of the great conflict. The mere fact that all male citizens may be called to the colors up to the age of sixty, he does not consider of itself a sufficient guaranty of military efficiency.[1] In fact the system is too new to have been thoroughly tested, but defects can be remedied with time and experience.

From what has been said it is evident that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries society has given increasing recognition to the idea of the trained citizen army. Evolved from the distresses and dangers of France during the Revolution, the principle of conscription made possible Napoleon's vast expenditure of men, and thus contributed to his victories. Accepted by Prussia, and developed through her establishment of a system of trained reserves, it contributed in turn to Napoleon's downfall. In the Franco-German War it again demonstrated its terrible efficiency, and led France to build up a citizen army of her own on the Prussian

[1] Senate Doc. No. 796, 63d Cong., 3d Session, pp. 66-68.

model. In general the continent of Europe has believed it necessary to imitate the example of Prussia.

That the United States should impose upon herself such burdens as France and Germany have carried, no one but the most ardent militarist could suggest. On the other hand, both the Swiss and Australian systems deserve the careful consideration of Americans. In the first place they do not require that large sacrifice of the individual's time which the conscriptive systems of the great European powers necessitate. Certainly they demand no more of the individual's time than he ought gladly to give to his country. Secondly, such time as is required is used intensively; attention is concentrated on essentials like rifle shooting, instead of being dissipated on the tricks of the parade ground. Furthermore, in each case control of the system is centralized, as it should be in order to attain the greatest military efficiency. In general each of these systems is well suited to the needs of a democracy. The defensive purpose of the training is strongly emphasized. There is little danger of the development of a military caste or of an aggressive military spirit.

Mere imitation of the externals of the military systems of Switzerland or Australia, however, cannot solve the problem of preparedness for the United States. "The Swiss system works wonderfully," says Norman Hapgood, "not because of the system itself, but because of the spirit that the people put into the system. If the Swiss had no more sense of public duty, of what private sacrifice was reasonable in the individual, the system would not work at all.

"The Swiss lesson is not a lesson in technique. It is a lesson in citizenship. We cannot imitate the Swiss army unless we imitate the Swiss spirit. We cannot have the Swiss army, or anything remotely resembling it, until we have Swiss sense of citizenship, Swiss respect for law, Swiss integrity in politics; until, in short, we are an intense political democracy, at a constant white heat of civic feeling. That is what we need to learn from Switzerland." [1] In other words, adequate preparedness must rest on a psychology of patriotism. This psychology it is the duty of the school to develop.

[1] Hapgood, N.: Swiss Army Lesson, *Harper's Weekly*, July 17, 1915, p. 56.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

As the battle of Jena awoke the slumbering nationalism of Prussia, so Sedan aroused from the comfortable lethargy of the Second Empire the patriotism of France. Like Fichte before him, Gambetta set his hopes for the future of his country on the development of a truly national system of education. The task of France, however, was not entirely similar to that of Prussia. Prussia's object was, first of all, to escape from the domination of the military genius who had conquered, humiliated, and insulted her. Behind this immediate aim lay the dream of a patriotism not narrowly Prussian but broadly German, a patriotism which was to draw together the divided elements of a noble race, and to raise that race to new heights of greatness under the rule of the Hohenzollerns. In the accomplishment of this latter purpose the school played a part not sufficiently recognized by historians.

The work of French patriotism was, first, to develop an adequate national defense and rehabilitate national prestige. Secondly, it was to place on a firm foundation the insecure structure of the Republican form of government. The strength and glory associated with the ancient monarchy were to be revived by a democracy imbedded in the hearts of the people. The school was to sustain the state in its efforts to solve the problems which the Franco-German War had ushered in.

The educational renaissance of France may be divided into four periods. During the first of these—lasting for more than a decade from the founding of the Third Republic—Republicanism engaged with clericalism in a struggle to control the public school. However lofty the teachings of the Church—and what doctrines could be nobler than the fundamental tenets of Catholicism?—ardent republican patriots did not believe the clerical interpretation of them to be sufficiently adapted to the pressing needs of the time. The Church might indeed teach love of France, but logically this love must be subordinated to devotion to Catholic principles. Patriotism could at best be only the second of

virtues; republicans would place it first. Furthermore, the Church was implanting, in the hearts of the young, belief in monarchy, opposition to the Republic. It was largely because of its power over the rising generations that Gambetta and his followers determined to crush clericalism. They would substitute the religion of *La Patrie* for Christianity itself.

In the early eighties the *école laïque* was established; and the second period of the educational renaissance began. The religion of the Fatherland held the field without a rival. The education of patriotism and loyalty was placed on a sound basis by the government, by devoted textbook writers, by zealous teachers. Children were trained to the belief that love of country was the first of duties, and that the first element of that duty was to defend France from her enemies in time of war. Above all thought of self, the Fatherland must be enshrined in the hearts of her citizens. Hence her future defenders must learn courage, must be ready to endure the rigors of military training, must be prepared to make the pecuniary sacrifices which an adequate national defense would necessarily entail. They must not slumber in the false security of ignorance, but must be ever

watchful in the presence of ever-threatening perils.

Nor did the schoolbook writers of this period, or at any rate a goodly proportion of them, hesitate to point out where they conceived the chief source of danger to lie. In their view the foe of 1870 was watching and waiting, preparing to plunge its talons into the heart of France, to tear away flesh and vitals till the very lifeblood flowed out, leaving the country a dead carcass to be devoured by the imperial eagle. These writers taught, too, that Germany had already taken her pound of flesh in the form of Alsace-Lorraine, leaving in the breast of France a gaping wound. That wound must be healed. The younger generations must regain what the men of 1870 had, with all their courage, been unable to hold.

At the same time the school was used to intrench the Republican form of government. Instead of learning to look forward to the reestablishment of monarchy as had the children of the seventies, the pupils of the *école laïque* were taught to shun the very thought of a royalist restoration, of imperialism, of dictatorship. Nor was the Church treated with that complete justice which the ideal of toleration demanded

and which the government proclaimed would be realized. The religious beliefs of many little hearts were wounded; many were turned against the Church of their forefathers. In partial excuse it may be said that in the angry tempests of the time strict neutrality in matters of religion was practically impossible to many temperaments, however honestly they might strive for its attainment. On the other hand, French youth were taught to distrust the extreme opposite of clericalism; they were warned to avoid the pitfalls of revolutionary socialism. To the principles of the Revolution of 1789, however, they were instructed to give their heartfelt allegiance, for these principles, they were told, constituted the foundations of French liberty. The Third Republic was continuing and developing these principles, as well as restoring the prestige of France and conferring new blessings on those living under her enlightened rule. In fine, to this Republic its future citizens must be prepared to render "the last full measure of devotion"; this was the law and the prophets of the religion of *La Patrie.*

From the time of its establishment the lay school has continuously inculcated patriotism and loyalty. Toward the close of the nineteenth

century, however, began a period of reaction against the intense nationalism of earlier years. Disciples of various intellectual, political and social creeds clamored for recognition in the school, and attempted to undermine certain tenets of the religion of *La Patrie*. Thus a group of scientific historians demanded that unswerving devotion to truth alone should characterize the writing and teaching of their subject. They insisted also that the attention given to military campaigns and exploits should be diminished, while the history of civilization should be brought to the foreground. Their efforts were crystallized in the programs of 1902; the glow of patriotic history seemed to pale before the cold, white light of science and the doctrine of evolution.

Furthermore, humanitarian ideals knocked for admission at the door of the *école laïque*. These ideals ranged in scope from a mild opposition to chauvinism, to a belligerent pacificism and a disheveled anarchy. Supporting them were the more or less ill-balanced theories of certain intellectuals, the clamors of syndicalism, and the pecuniary discontent of a teaching proletariat. In the textbooks the doctrines of these people appeared chiefly in protests against

war and international hatreds, in assertions of the brotherhood of man. Among certain teachers they sometimes took the form of acceptance of the tenets of international, revolutionary socialism, expressing themselves, perhaps, in insults to the French flag. Nationalists spoke of the crisis of patriotism in the schools.

But the movement lacked depth. It probably weakened but little the carefully fostered psychology of national defense, though it must have curbed chauvinism and modified the teaching of *revanche*. Furthermore, its influence was brief. While the wild cries of anti-patriotism were resounding through the air, alarming those who held their country's good dearer than aught else, suddenly the German menace loomed darkly along the horizon of peace and prosperity. As the cloud grew blacker and blacker, the frightful onlookers ceased their petty squabbles and prepared to face unitedly the coming storm. Thus the years immediately preceding the present war constituted the fourth and last period of the educational revival. Not that revolutionary socialism died a sudden death; men sang the "Internationale" on the very eve of the great conflict. But the crisis was passed. New school manuals appeared, intensely pa-

triotic in character. The *jeunesse intellectuelle* showed new vigor, was more athletic, and above all responded more fervently than ever to the loudly voiced appeal for devotion to the Fatherland. France was herself again.

The greatest immediate result of the education of patriotism and loyalty has been to lay a psychological foundation for a determined resistance to attack. In this respect the patriotism taught in the French schools is perhaps superior to that taught in Germany, since it is more discerning, more critical of national errors. In France are inculcated the misfortunes as well as the triumphs of the Fatherland; in Germany it is chiefly the triumphs. In so far, then, as education is a determining factor, the morale of the French soldier should be better in defeat than that of the German. If the tide should turn against the Hohenzollern Empire it will not be well for her sons to have imbibed a fanatical belief in her invincibility.

To the United States, too, her sister republic's careful development of the psychology of national defense should carry a lesson. It is unsafe to assume that there is a devoted patriotism at the bottom of every American heart; it is unsafe to assume that if such patriotism

exists it can meet adequately the crises of modern warfare. It is a crying shame, too, that our schools, colleges and universities leave in the hearts of youth so little desire to study our national problems, even to acquaint themselves with the major events of current history. It was self-confident ignorance that led France to Sedan. Must we, too, have a great disaster before the national consciousness is aroused? I am not of those who believe that any one country is planning our destruction. But if from the kaleidoscope of events war should evolve, we must be ready to meet it. If eternal vigilance is the price of liberty in a democracy, then none too soon can we begin to give our future citizens some adequate idea of the problems which face us as a world power; none too soon can we begin to foster that spirit of courageous devotion to the Fatherland which is serving France so well in her hour of trial.

On the other hand that tendency to the intensification of nationality, which has been the fundamental characteristic of the history of the nineteenth century, should be shunned as the great political disease of modern civilization. While science and art, the steamship, the railroad and the telegraph have been drawing the

civilized countries of the world closer and closer together in their outward manifestations, the development of the principle of nationality has drawn them farther and farther apart in spirit. In earlier days Christianity strove to unite in one brotherhood the undeveloped states of western Europe. To the theories of one universal Church and one universal Empire the medieval world subscribed. These visions have passed. Today each great nation tends to find in itself alone those qualities that are wholly admirable. Each tends to disparage the achievements of others, is unwilling, even unable, to grasp their points of view. Each deifies its own individuality. Thus have been engendered race-egoisms, misunderstandings, suspicions and hatred. Open conflict was the inevitable product.

In this intensification of the national spirit education has played a part of tremendous importance. It has catered to pride of race, it has fostered racial antagonisms. If France has taught *revanche,* Germany has suggested conquest of the lands once belonging to the Holy Roman Empire. In the schoolrooms of each country has the idea of the hereditary enmity between the two found welcome. Each has neglected the geography and history of other coun-

tries to emphasize its own, and in Germany history has served as the humble minister of national self-glorification. In the schools of Italy irredentism has been taught. Nor is the United States exempt from the charge of having fostered antagonism through education. "Americans," says Professor Morse Stephens, "are taught from childhood to hate Britishers by the study of American history, and not only the descendants of the men who made the Revolution, but every newly arrived immigrant child imbibes hatred of the Great Britain of today from the patriotic ceremonies of the public school." [1] A strong statement, perhaps, but one which the memories of some of us tend to confirm.

Two facts make clear the potency of the school as an instrument for the intensification of nationality. In the first place education has become practically universal in western Europe and the United States. Only a small proportion of the inhabitants of a country can, then, escape its influence. Furthermore this influence is exerted in the most impressionable years of life. "The 'strength of early association,'" says William James, "is a fact so uni-

[1] Nationality and History, *American Historical Review*, Jan., 1916, p. 236.

versally recognized that the expression of it has become proverbial; and this precisely accords with the psychological principle that during the period of growth and development the formative activity of the brain will be most available to directing influences."[1] Furthermore, "in most of us, by the age of thirty, the character has set like plaster, and will never soften again."[2] Such is the modern psychological justification of the old saying that "as the twig is bent, the tree is inclined." Individuals, indeed, will react against their early training, but of the masses of a nation it can be pretty safely asserted that what they have been taught in childhood will form the basis of their point of view in manhood.

To those who believe that the catastrophe of today is the result of a Machiavellian plot between the Kaiser and the Father of Lies, or to those who consider it the product of British greed and hypocrisy, the spirit of education in the various countries will seem to have no connection with the present war. To those who look beneath the diplomatic documents and other surface manifestations, however, for their

[1] Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 112.
[2] Ibid., p. 121.

final explanation of the conflict, the intensification of nationality through the school must appear deeply significant. The noxious weeds of racial egotism and racial antagonism grow easily and rankly in a soil thus fertilized. Little wonder that the warring nations of today fail to understand one another, that each believes in the essential righteousness of its own cause, in the essential perfidy of its enemies. A blatant chauvinism need not have permeated the school in order to attain these results. It is sufficient to have exalted unduly the national idea, to have interpreted other countries from an unsympathetic point of view. It may be that nationalistic education is the chief underlying cause of the war. But even if the school is not fundamentally responsible for today's struggle, at least it has fostered conditions out of which, in the present stage of human evolution, war must sometime have inevitably developed.

Nevertheless it may well be that for these very conditions the school itself can become the most effective remedy.

The bright vision of universal peace is today dimmed by the smoke and dust of the battlefield. International socialism has postponed indefinitely its dream of abolishing warfare

through a unification of the proletariat. Disarmament appears impossible to many of its quondam advocates because of the distrust of the countries for one another. The fate of Persia, the encroachments on China, the violation of Belgian neutrality, all stand as warnings against defenselessness. The ultimate barbarity of human nature has revealed itself in all sorts of brutalities. The pacificist, indeed, continues to build his house of hope on the shifting sands of fancy, instead of on the solid rock of human experience. But the rest of the world stands disillusioned.

Nevertheless, in the inevitable reaction that must follow the definite ending of the war, the demand for a realization of the ideals of universal peace and the brotherhood of man will surely rise again. Toward such realization the school can do much; for there are possibilities inherent in education, for hastening the course of human evolution, of which society in general has not yet dreamed. Through the school the nations can be sympathetically interpreted to one another. Dreams like that of Cecil Rhodes can be realized on a larger scale by extensive exchange of teachers and of students. These teachers and students can carry with them the

message of their own countries, and, returning home, leaven their fellow-citizens with the civilization of the lands in which they have sojourned. Furthermore, the rising generations can be familiarized with the ideal of arbitration, can be taught the virtue of national self-restraint, can be led to respect the Hague Tribunal, and to look to it for the solution of questions which in our era lead to war. They can be brought to see why an international league to enforce peace is desirable for the security of the world. Patriotism can be taught at the same time, for patriotism and cosmopolitanism are by no means irreconcilable. Through such humanitarian teachings the great states of the world can be led to understand one another, can be made to forget racial antagonisms and distrusts, and can learn to give true allegiance to the dictum of Goethe, "Above the nations is humanity." As the school of yesterday and today has fertilized the soil from which have sprung national suspicions and hatreds, so may the school of tomorrow usher in the era of the brotherhood of man, of universal peace!

APPENDIX I

THE MILITARY VALUE OF A PSYCHOLOGY OF PATRIOTISM

From R. M. Johnston, "Arms and the Race," pp. 77-79

It was quite evident to honest German investigators that under modern conditions of intensified fire, shorter training, and looser tactics, their infantry tended to dissolve into a mob. And mobs inevitably are less inclined to face trouble than to escape it. Evidently the greatest efforts must be made to obtain infantry leading highly trained in maintaining cohesion, continuous advance, proper direction, and the best tactical shock. But with whatever pains this difficult standard might be pursued, there would still be the flinching of the individual soldier to overcome, an almost insuperable difficulty, as the experience of 1870 seemed to show. "The only things," wrote Hönig, "that can furnish a substitute for the lowered action of the leaders on the masses are a more developed sentiment . . . and the national principle of honor. . . . If a national injury to honor, or to territory, and so forth, were felt in equal degree by each individual, . . . causing him to require satisfaction

and to pledge from his innermost sentiments body and life for this, then Tactics would have an easy game to play. . . . Mahomet was the type of an army psychologist. . . . In war that which is highest must be sought in the soul . . . and the fighting method must correspond to it, must be national. . . . Nations which desire to gain something . . . will as a rule possess in their armies more operative imponderables (trans. freely: rooted prejudices) than others do . . . that merely desire to hold, that is to protect their property, their position among the nations.'' [1]

This idea, tha tthe nation must be fanaticized, for this is what it amounts to, was the cry of despair of the tactician at the ineffectiveness of modern infantry for getting a decision by shock. It was largely acted on in Germany during the period preceding the war of 1914, and reënforced the previous acceptance by the intellectuals of the Bismarckian doctrine of blood and iron. The nation was trained to think in artificial terms, all tending to fanaticize the rank and file and thereby to increase efficiency.

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[1] Hönig: Tactics of the Future, 4th Edition, Part II, Sections 1, 3 and 4.

APPENDIX II

A DAY'S WORK IN THE SWISS ARMY

From a Report on "The Swiss Military Organization," by Capt. T. B. Mott, Quoted in Senate Document No. 796, 63d Congress, 3d Session, pp. 138-139.

To show the way the Swiss map out a day's work, I will give a short account of 24 hours I spent with a class of recruits and a cadre school. The morning exercises went on as usual. At 2 p. m. the senior Cavalry instructor (commanding a brigade) assembled the 20 or 30 lieutenants who were present as assistants in a course for candidate corporals. The same was done for the infantry (a recruit course was on). The candidates made up the troopers of two squadrons, the young officers commanding. In the lecture room of the barracks the theme was given out and the assignments made, the brigadier explaining first in German and then in French what it was proposed to do, and gave his ideas. The officers took notes with maps in front of them. Two assistant instructors, captains, were present. They then mounted and took their squadrons some 6 miles out and posted them, covering a debarkation in rear and feeling for an enemy expected from the north. This constituted

the left of the line. The right was made up of the battalion of infantry recruits (they had been under instruction three weeks). The enemy was composed of four bicycle companies ordered from another garrison to move toward Berne.

About 6 p. m. I rode out with the brigade commander, who inspected the posts. I was greatly struck with his painstaking way of questioning, not only each chief of post but most of the privates. What will you do in such and such a case? Where is the next post? Who commands it? Where does this road lead to? Where is the captain to be found? Most of the replies were intelligent, and showed that during the afternoon the young officers had gone over the case with every man. Each soldier had a good map. We got supper at 9 o'clock and had a little sleep. At 2:30 a. m. we started out to make the rounds. In front of each post the sentries, well hidden, were on the alert, and upon being ordered to fire a shot the post came out at once. At daybreak the squadrons were united and then patrols sent on the various roads to look for the enemy, push him back, and see what was behind. By 7 o'clock the maneuver was over.

The young officers were then united and the chief instructor criticized, in a lucid and interesting talk, the little operation, the mistakes each man had made, what was done right, etc., etc. The cavalry then rode home and after lunch went to work as though they had spent the night in bed. The infantry (recruits) marched directly to the skirmish range and had skirmish firing till noon, then marched to bar-

racks 4 miles for a few hours' rest before resuming afternoon drills.

Now, these recruits had been out since 2 p. m. the day before, had supped on a cake of compressed soup and a piece of bread (I examined their rations); they were on outpost all night and had precious little sleep; by 4 a. m. they were out maneuvering after breakfast composed of a piece of bread and a glass of milk (we all had the same); the maneuver over at 8, they put in 4 hours' marching and target practice; then in the late afternoon more drills. This schedule is, I believe, typical. I am much on my guard against programs prepared for foreign inspection; but, after seeing a great deal of this Swiss training, I can only say it is the most intense, the most fiercely practical work I have ever seen. The instructors do not spare themselves and for them it is a continuous affair. One of the assistant instructors told me very seriously that except for a month's leave he could honestly say he had during the entire year just time enough each day to read the newspapers.

The officers only get hold of these men for 6 or 8 weeks at a stretch, but they work them unceasingly all of that time. There is so much to learn, there is so much that is new every day, and over new ground, that the interest really does not flag. There is plenty of mental and physical fatigue, but there is no ennui.

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